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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the responses adopted by rural households in Somaliland 
to changes in their resource endowments and market exchange during the 1988- 
1992 food crisis. It tests whether there is a predictable sequence of responses 
adopted by rural households when faced with food insecurity and famine 
conditions and examines the implications of this for famine early warning and 
famine response.
The research is based on fieldwork conducted in rural Somaliland in 1992. A 
sample of 100 households interviewed just before the outbreak of the war in 
1987 were re-sampled, allowing comparisons to be made before and after the 
crisis. These households experienced food insecurity and famine conditions 
caused by the 1988 war which displaced almost the entire population and 
disrupted markets, trade and food production.
The thesis reviews droughts and famines from the late 19th century to the 
present and investigates their causes and impacts on rural households. It also 
examines both the adaptive and coping strategies developed by the households 
in response to these crises. These strategies have largely been successful in 
mitigating the effects of droughts and famines and preventing widespread 
starvation in most food crises. It is argued that droughts and famines in post­
colonial periods were characterised by a lack of public intervention and a failure 
of policies which contributed to the long-term vulnerability of the households.
The hypothesis that there is a predictable pattern of responses adopted by rural 
households is rejected on the basis of empirical evidence presented in this thesis.
The implication of this is that monitoring response sequences cannot generally 
be used to provide indicators o f the level of stress faced by households in crisis 
situations as they can produce misleading information. It is argued that greater 
understanding of market conditions and household resource allocation is required 
if household responses are to be used for famine early warning and famine 
intervention.
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CHAPTER 1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction
Famine has become endemic in the Horn of Africa region which has suffered 
one of the most severe and sustained famines in modem times. For the last two 
decades, at least one major famine has hit the region every five years. Hundreds 
of thousands of people have been killed and millions displaced as a result of 
these famines. For instance, between 1983 to 1984 more than two million 
people are estimated to have been killed by famine in Ethiopia and Sudan. The 
latest famine in Somalia from 1991 to 1993 alone killed more than half a 
million people out of a population of only 7 million. Moreover, the recurrence 
of famines made hundreds of thousands of people more vulnerable and less 
able to survive future food crises and famines. Vulnerability has increased to 
such a level that moderate droughts which people used to cope with in the past 
are now causing widespread starvation and deaths.
\
Whilst droughts undoubtedly contribute to food insecurity and famine, conflict 
plays a major role in the persistence of famine in the region. The recurrence of 
famine and the continuing conflict in the region are causally linked. The root 
cause of food insecurity results from dismptions and destructions caused by 
conflicts. Conflict increases vulnerability to famine through the destruction and
1
\dislocation of markets and infrastructure; the displacement of populations; and 
disruption of coping strategies (Duffield: 1990). This is particularly so in 
Somalia and Somaliland where several years o f war have caused total 
destruction of infrastructure and resulted in substantial displacement o f the 
population.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Despite the recurrence of famine in the region, there is still a lack of 
understanding as to how rural households, which form the bulk of the 
population, respond to food insecurity and famines. A growing literature on 
household coping strategies in Africa has not helped either in understanding 
how rural households respond to food crisis and how they manage their 
resources in crisis situations. Many of the household response studies are based 
on simplistic generalizations and poorly conceptualized models.
When faced with declining entitlements to food, rural households plan 
strategically to mitigate the effects on their livelihoods. They do not await 
starvation passively, but they actively engage in a sequence of actions aimed 
at minimising the risks they face (Frankenberger 1990). They adopt a wide 
range of responses, involving re-arrangement of the mix of their resources, 
changes in their food consumption, liquidation of their assets and so on. What
2
type or sequence of responses are taken up depends on the households’ 
resource endowments, local market conditions and the exact sequence of events 
leading to famine conditions (Corbett 1988). These factors determine options 
open to each household and the viability o f each action.
Understanding household responses is important for three reasons. Firstly, it is 
argued that the information on household behavioral responses can be used in 
predicting famines. This means if household responses can be fully understood, 
they could form part of the famine early warning systems (EWS) set up 
throughout much of Africa since the 1973/74 droughts and famines in Sahel 
and Horn of Africa. The disappointing results o f EWS to provide accurate and 
timely information on impending food crises have led many to suggest the use 
of household responses as the basis for EWS.
Secondly, understanding household responses can help in providing relief and 
responding to crises. By knowing how households are reacting to the crisis and 
what actions they are taking, interventions could be made more relevant by 
supporting their coping mechanisms. Failure to understand what affected 
households are trying to do and why they are doing it has led to the failure of 
many relief programmes (Corbett 1988).
Thirdly, understanding household responses can also throw light on the issue
3
of why some households cope with famine, while others starve in a given 
situation. Again studying responses of different groups over time under 
different circumstances can give insight into this problem. A relevant example 
here is the recent famine in Somalia where some of the coping mechanisms of 
certain communities collapsed while others managed to survive. Thus, there is 
also the need to know why the coping mechanisms of certain groups collapse 
earlier than those of others. Much has been written on famines, but very little 
has been done by way of empirical research which addresses these issues.
Although most of the famines in Africa are now caused mainly by wars, the 
existing household response studies are mainly based on food shortages and 
famines that were caused primarily by other factors such as droughts. Although 
the ultimate effects of food shortages and famines, whether they are caused by 
wars or droughts, on rural households may be the same, the process and 
sequence of events which lead to the famines are different, causing the 
households to respond differently. One major difference between the two types 
o f famines is the time scale involved in the process o f famine. War famines, 
for instance, typically have a much shorter time scale than those caused by 
droughts. This essentially means households will have less time to respond to 
conditions that may be changing rapidly. In conflict situations entire markets 
may be destroyed overnight; household assets looted; and people forced to 
migrate from their farms and villages.
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The lack of understanding at the conceptual level o f the responses o f rural 
households is confounded by a lack of detailed empirical study. Despite the 
existence of a number of case studies on household coping strategies in famine 
conditions, reliable empirical evidence is not yet available. Reflecting this view, 
Corbett (1988: 1101) points out that:
it should be noted that detailed empirical evidence is much rarer. Where 
empirical evidence is available, there are often severe limitations on the 
sample size ... alternatively, data collection may not have started early 
enough to enable comparisons to be made between what households 
"normally" do and what they do during famine conditions.
Moreover, the existing case studies have tended to define general patterns o f 
household responses, rather than trying to understand factors underlying them.
These problems provide both the theoretical and empirical focus of this 
research. It is the first empirical research on household food insecurity 
problems in Somaliland where famine prevention ranks top on the country’s 
priorities. It is expected that the findings of this research will contribute 
towards better understanding of what households do when they are faced with 
declining access to food, why they do it and the implications for famine 
prevention.
5
Although the unit of analysis in this research is the rural household, inter­
household and intra-household issues which are important in understanding 
household responses are also considered.
1.3 Objectives
The main objective of the research is to study the responses of rural households 
during food insecurity and famine conditions. The questions that concern this 
thesis are: what determines the sequence of household responses? Is there a 
predictable pattern of responses followed by rural households when faced with 
declining entitlements to food? How do rural households manage their 
resources during crises? What are the implications for famine early warning 
system and famine relief?
Specific objectives of the research are:
a) To study the responses of rural households to changes in their 
entitlements.
b) To examine the determinants of the sequence of household 
responses.
6
c) To explore the implications for famine early warning and famine
relief.
1.4 Hypotheses
In order to answer the questions raised and to achieve the stated objectives, 
research propositions should be stated as clear hypotheses. The central 
hypotheses of this study are:
1. There is a predictable sequence of responses adopted by rural 
households faced with food insecurity and famine conditions.
2. A greater understanding of household resources and the effects of 
changes in market conditions on their allocation is necessary for 
interpreting households responses in famine early warning.
These hypotheses are tested empirically using survey data from rural 
Somaliland. The first hypothesis is postulated to test the proposition that there 
is a predictable pattern of household responses in food crises and famine 
situations. It has been argued that households faced with food crisis go through 
a predictable sequence of responses as stress increases. These range from 
reduction in consumption through to the liquidation o f assets. For a typical
7
household, these may include selling small stock, cows, oxen and possessions. 
Many factors such as market conditions, resource endowments, timing and 
severity o f the food crisis and options available to the households influence 
which responses are adopted and in what sequence. On a priori the proposition 
that there is a predictable sequence of responses adopted by rural households 
is maintained.
The second hypothesis is concerned with the importance of market conditions 
and household resource management during crisis. It is argued that 
understanding how rural households respond and why they respond in the way 
they do, requires greater understanding of the prevailing market conditions and 
the structure and management of household resources. In the literature on 
household responses, two criteria are claimed to determine the sequence of 
household responses. These are the "reversibility" o f the responses and the 
"commitment o f the domestic resources". This hypothesis rejects these criteria 
as insufficient in explaining household responses in times of crisis.
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on famines, famine early 
warning and household responses to food insecurity and famine conditions. It 
firstly reviews various theories o f famines, including Sen’s entitlement theory.
8
This is followed by a review of famine early warning systems. Finally, both the 
theoretical and empirical literature on household responses and coping strategies 
are reviewed, identifying problems at the conceptual level.
Chapter 3 sets out the research methodology used in the thesis. It explains both 
primary and secondary data collected during field work and methods used in 
data collection exercise. It describes sampling procedures, sample size, 
questionnaire design and the study area in detail. This is followed by a 
description of detailed interviews with key informants on past and present 
droughts and famines, and the gathering of price and market information. 
Sources and accuracy of the secondary data used are also explained. Moreover, 
the analytical procedures are discussed. This is carried out by reviewing 
alternative techniques used for modelling household responses. The relative 
merits o f using different models are also considered.
Description of past droughts and famines in Somaliland are presented in 
Chapter 4. Using information from various sources, including oral accounts, 
colonial publications, and unpublished material, droughts and famines in the 
last century are described. The chapter focuses on the causes and the impact of 
droughts and famines, explaining how rural households responded to these 
crises. Special emphasis is given to local people’s perspectives on these crises.
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Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the rural economy before and after the 
1988 war. Chapter 5 describes the farming systems and the structure of the 
rural economy before the outbreak of the war. It examines livestock and crop 
production systems, the effects of government pricing policy on farming and 
agricultural markets and the role of the cultivation of Qat in the rural economy. 
The impact of the government development programme on the agriculture in 
the area is also assessed. Chapter 6 looks at the effects of the war on the rural 
economy. It specifically looks at the impact of the war on markets, incomes and 
assets of rural households and the overall livelihoods of people in the area. It 
analyses the social and health crisis that resulted from the war.
Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis of the responses of rural households in 
Somaliland between 1988-92. In this analysis, the concept of the sequential 
uptake of responses advanced in the literature is rejected on the basis o f the 
empirical evidence presented. The determinants of household responses are 
analyzed using ranking and linear programming models.
In Chapter 8 the implications for famine early warning and famine relief are 
explored. The use of household responses in famine early warning is examined, 
considering both the limitations and the potential. The possibilities o f predicting 
household responses to changes in their entitlements are also examined. Using 
the linear programming model set up in Chapter 7, household responses under
10
different scenarios are projected. The main objective here is not just to identify 
the sequence of responses, but more importantly to ensure that the economic 
rationale of the responses are fully understood.
Conclusions and a summary of key findings are presented in Chapter 9. 
Implications for policy and future research are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the literature. The first section reviews 
theories o f famine and the debate surrounding Sen’s work on entitlement 
approaches to famine analysis. The following section reviews literature on 
famine early warning systems in Africa and the effectiveness of the systems in 
providing timely information on impending crises are reviewed. The final 
section reviews both theoretical and empirical literature on household responses 
and coping strategies, identifying the conceptual limitations of the model used 
to explain responses.
2.2 Theories of Famine
In recorded history, famines have periodically affected societies throughout the 
world. The earliest recorded famines hit ancient Egypt in the fourth millennium 
BC, whereas the most recent famines occurred in the Horn of Africa in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. However, despite its long history, famine still remains 
a misunderstood phenomenon (Ghose 1989).
There is an ongoing debate on the nature and causes of famine. Until recently
12
the standard explanation of famine had been in terms of "food availability 
decline" (FAD) which is based on the concept o f a declining aggregate food 
supply over time. The FAD approach has its origins in Malthus’s pessimism 
based on the expectation of falling food output per head. Malthus argued that 
agricultural production could only grow arithmetically, while the population 
could grow geometrically and thus human beings would eventually breed 
themselves into starvation (Malthus 1798, 1800). The current theories o f a 
"population bomb" as a cause of food crisis and growing environmental concern 
about the sustainability of natural resources have added impetus to Malthusian 
pessimism (Gershon 1990).
Although Malthus’s original hypotheses have been proven wrong by history, 
contemporary neo-Malthusians claim that the cause of famine can still be 
explained in terms of population growth and food shortage (Devereux 1993). 
Related to this issue is the concept of "carrying capacity" which suggests 
environmental deterioration and desertification as inevitable consequences.
The FAD approach to famine was first critically examined and then dismissed 
by Sen (1981) in his seminal work on famines. Sen argued that the FAD 
approach is not only an insufficient explanation but often just plain wrong. Sen 
analyzed four major famines in Bengal, Ethiopia, Sahel and Bangladesh and 
showed that only in Sahel had the aggregate food supply declined. In the other
13
1three cases there was an "entitlement failure" for certain sections of the 
population and there was no significant decline in aggregate food supply (ibid). 
Based on his analysis, Sen maintained that:
A food-centred view tells us rather little about starvation. It does not tell 
us how starvation can develop even without a decline in food 
availability. Nor does it tell us - even when starvation is accompanied 
by a fall in food supply — why some groups had to starve while others 
could feed themselves. The overall food picture is too remote an 
economic variable to tell us much about starvation.
Sen explained famines in terms of "entitlement failures" and argued that it is 
the failure of some sections of the population to command adequate food for 
survival that directly relates to their starvation rather than some aggregate 
statistics about food supply. He noted that, in an exchange economy, factors 
other than food supply are involved and that markets determine people’s ability 
to survive. The "entitlement failure" results from either a fall of a person’s 
endowment (assets) or from an unfavourable shift in his exchange entitlement 
(e.g. rise in food prices, fall in wages).
Sen identified four components of entitlements in private ownership market 
economies: trade based entitlement; production-based entitlement; own-labour 
entitlement; and inheritance and transfer entitlement. An individual’s 
entitlement collapses when endowments contract (i.e. crops fail, livestock die)
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or exchange entitlements shift unfavourably (terms of trade between livestock 
and food falls, food prices rise). The unit o f analysis in the entitlement 
approach is the occupation groups. "The logic o f the entitlement approach 
indicates that the analysis must inter alia concentrate on occupation groups" 
(Dreze and Sen 1989: 31).
The entitlement approach to famine has been extensively examined, criticized 
and extended in the literature. One such criticism has been that what the 
entitlement theory says is self-evident and well known. Mitra (1982) notes in 
his early review of Poverty and Famines that:
Our great-grandmothers, who ... were altogether innocent of the notion 
of ’non-negative orthant of n-dimensional real space’, knew about these 
common factors underlying famines. The poor have little assets or 
incomes; since the exchange value of these assets and incomes go down 
further in the years of famine, poor people starve and occasionally die. 
Amartya Sen, I am afraid, has not said anything beyond what our great­
grandmothers were already aware of; he has taken ten chapters, four 
appendices and more than 200 pages to say this.
In another review, Srinivasm (1983) also argued that: the "entitlement 
approach" is a fancy name for elementary ideas fairly well understood by 
economists. However, much of the criticism labelled against it has been 
concerned with defending the "FAD approach". The most forceful proponent
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o f this approach has been Bowbrick (1986, 1987), who argued in his paper, 
"How Professor Sen’s Theory Can Cause Famines" presented at the 1985 
Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, that Sen’s 
entitlement approach is more likely to cause famines than to cure them. The 
essence of Bowbrick’s argument is that aggregate food availability is central to 
understanding the causes of famines. He argued that Sen’s entitlement theory 
was based on unreliable and inaccurate statistics.
The limitation of the FAD approach to famine analysis is that it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for famines to occur. It is not sufficient because local 
food shortages can be redressed by purchasing or importing from surplus 
regions. FAD is not necessary because famines can occur without a fall in food 
availability. A further limitation of FAD is that it does not explain why certain 
groups suffer more than others in famines.
The most important feature of the entitlement theory, on the other hand, is that 
it shifts the focus from the conventional supply-side analysis to the access of 
food by individuals or groups within society (Devereux 1993). Moreover, it 
allows the analysis of famines that occur in "boom" or "slump" periods. Sen 
described the Great Famine in Bengal as a "boom famine" in which there was 
no food shortage but the exchange entitlement of agricultural labourers 
collapsed.
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While Sen’s analysis is very useful in explaining the causes o f entitlement 
failure it concentrates exclusively on production and exchange failures or the 
demand-side explanations and does not explain the role o f assets in famine 
vulnerability. Devereux (1988: 282) has argued that no single theory explains 
every aspect of all famines and, therefore "the "FAD v entitlement" debate is 
both sterile and redundant." In his view what is needed is an understanding of 
the role of both supply and demand factors as proximate causes and not an 
exclusive concentration on the demand-side explanations. Recognizing this 
limitation, Swift (1989) has extended the entitlement theory by analyzing the 
role of assets and claims on other households and government in determining 
household vulnerability to famine. He contends that households survive crisis 
by transforming assets directly into consumption or production inputs and their 
ability to survive collapses only when these assets and claims are exhausted. 
This is useful in explaining how vulnerability accumulates over time and why 
one year’s poor harvest does not necessarily lead to food crisis and famine. In 
this model, assets create a buffer against entitlement failure. Thus, household 
vulnerability is a function of both immediate entitlement failure and the extent 
to which existing buffers have been depleted (Maxwell and Frankenberger 
1992).
The entitlement theory has also been criticised for failing to recognize the role 
o f conflict in famine analysis, given the fact that most o f the current famines
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are caused by wars. Swift (1989: 10) argued that:
Sen’s work treats war and civil disturbance as external to the model. 
Yet clearly civil war and other major disturbances are crucial to 
understanding vulnerability and famine.
The issue of conflict is particularly important in understanding contemporary 
famines in Africa. Most of the major famines in Africa for the last two decades 
were caused either directly or indirectly by wars and civil disturbances.
Other criticisms have been levelled against the entitlement theory. For example, 
de Waal (1989) criticized it for failing to recognise the role o f disease in 
famine deaths. He argued that the entitlement approach considers famine 
mortality as resulting from starvation rather than excess deaths caused by poor 
sanitary conditions that exist in relief camps gathered by famine victims. Deaths 
during famine, he maintains, are therefore caused by outbreaks of disease and 
not by starvation. Stewart (1982) has also criticised Sen’s entitlement approach 
as being descriptive rather than prescriptive because famine may be caused by 
the non-arrival o f famine relief or what Devereux (1993b) called "relief 
entitlements failure".
Other writers have also argued that the entitlement approach fails to recognize
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the processes that lead to famine (Cutler 1985, Desai 1988, D’Souza 1988, 
Raikes 1988, Rangasami 1985, Walker 1989). Sen described famine as a 
"distinct phenomenon" and a particularly virulent form of starvation. This view 
o f famine has been particularly challenged by Rangasami (1985) who argues 
that starvation is a process that has clearly marked phases and the process is 
completed with the loss of all the victim’s assets. Our perceptions o f famine 
relate only to the terminal phase and not the entire process (ibid).
A definition o f famine which takes into account the processes that lead to its 
development has been proposed by Cutler (1985):
Famine is an abnormal event, characterised by a breakdown in social 
relations giving rise to epidemic starvation and excess mortality. It is 
caused initially by a severe disruption in normal economic activity ... 
which leads to expectations of future scarcities o f food among producers, 
traders and consumers. This in turn leads to modes of social behaviour 
such as asset sales, hoarding, speculation and the erosion of traditional 
social bonds which themselves contribute to the development o f famine 
conditions.
However, Cutler’s definition does not explain why excess mortality is necessary 
for defining famine. Excess mortality is not considered to be necessary for 
famines to occur. A definition that describes famine as a process rather than an 
event and does not include mortality as a defining component is given by 
Walker (1989: 6).
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Famine is a socio-economic process which causes the accelerated 
, destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups 
in a community, to a point where they can no longer, as a group, 
maintain a sustainable livelihood.
The famine process usually starts with an exogenous shock to an economy such 
as drought or war. This causes disruption to the food and non-food production 
system which feeds into the rest of the economic system through the market. 
Whether that develops into a full scale famine depends on government policy 
(e.g the existence of contingency plans and famine preparedness), people’s 
coping strategies and how markets perform. Markets are particularly central to 
the process of famine by determining the relationship between food and non­
food production and the distribution of food between people and over time 
(Ravallion: 1987).
The description of famine as a series of processes is useful in recognizing the 
existence of a period of food insecurity and impoverishment which precedes the 
failure of entitlements, and has important implications for its prevention and 
relief. The type of indicators used in famine early warning would, for example, 
depend upon, among other things, the stage of famine. In the early stages of 
famine, indicators of vulnerability such as asset holdings, employment 
opportunities, food prices and wages might provide useful information as to 
who is vulnerable and food insecure, while the nutritional status o f the
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individual may be used in identifying those at increased risk of dying at later 
stages o f famine. Similarly, the choice of intervention method would depend 
on the stage of the process and market performance. For example, the 
entitlement protection intervention aimed at helping the vulnerable to preserve 
their vital assets may only be feasible during the early stages of famine before 
destitution and distress migration, whereas direct feeding is suitable in the later 
stage when people gather in relief camps.
2.3 Famine Early W arning
The famine early warning system is not new. The idea goes back to nineteenth 
century British India and the formulation of Indian Famine Code or Scarcity 
Manuals which contained a set of detailed indicators aimed at predicting 
impending famines and contingency plans for providing relief measures. In 
Africa, the first EW systems started in the early 1970s, though they proliferated 
after the 1974/5 drought and famine in Sahel and the Horn of Africa. What 
actually constitutes early warning varies from one system to the other, but all 
early warning systems collect data on rainfall, agricultural outputs, nutrition and 
more recently on socio-economic aspects (Davies 1991). However, most early 
warning systems concentrate on food availability indicators. Aggregate food 
outputs are predicted employing a "high tech" approach which involves the use 
o f satellite technology and remote sensing.
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The shift of emphasis, in explaining famine, away from food supply 
explanations to better understanding of entitlements at the conceptual level has 
not been reflected in famine early warning (Cutler 1985). Because of the 
donors’ emphasis on "objective indicators", supply oriented indicators are still 
widely used. A common method of using agricultural data for early warning 
purposes developed by the FAO is to construct a food balance sheet. This 
estimates a 12-month food balance sheet of domestic food production, opening 
stocks and imports; and domestic consumption, exports and closing stocks 
(FAO 1990). Apart from the conceptual limitations of being based on the 
concept of food availability per capita, food balance sheet analysis produces 
estimates which may be grossly misleading (Cutler 1985). Walker (1989: 84) 
argues that:
Their [food balance sheets] errors are often larger than the figures they 
are trying to predict, even when they are calculated according to the 
rules laid out.
In addition, the remote sensing technique which the food balance sheet relies 
on for crop area estimates is known to confuse different types of vegetation. 
Walker (1989) notes that the technique does not distinguish between the images 
of native vegetation and crops in smallholder areas where farms are surrounded 
by vegetation.
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The limits of food supply-oriented information are summed up by Mclntire 
(1987:' 291):
In thinking food crisis in Africa ... it seems that observers have fallen 
into a fairly simple fallacy ... [that] famines are produced by crop failure 
in one season; crop failure in one season is (necessarily) sudden; 
therefore, if such failures could be predicted then it would be possible 
to prevent famines, by timely expedition of emergency relief.
Because of the fact that famines largely affect households who grow few or no 
crops, such as pastoralists then information on production can be seriously 
misleading (Mclntire 1987).
The recognition of the limitations of supply-oriented indicators have led many 
to recommend the use of market indicators for EW (Cutler 1985, FAO 1990, 
Ravallion 1989). It is argued that market prices are more sensitive than most 
other indicators in measuring the magnitude of famine (Hutchinson 1991). They 
are also all-encompassing (Walker 1989) in the sense that all factors relating 
to the availability of food can be reflected in market prices (Eldridge et al. 
1986). Walker (1989: 94) argues that "price rises reflect many stresses besides 
poor harvest - speculative hoarding, increased demand from migrants, and 
increased transport costs because of civil war". However, these indicators have 
not yet been systematically incorporated into most systems (Hutchinson 1991)
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because of difficulties in interpreting market data (de Waal 1988, Walker 1989, 
FAO 1990).
A further reason, apart from the difficulties associated with interpreting it, why 
market data has not been used systematically is related to the involvement of 
affected populations in market exchange. It has been argued that in some areas 
farmers are "crop or livestock dependent" and when their crops fail or their 
livestock die during droughts, market prices still remain relatively normal due 
to the lack of effective demand (Cutler 1985). However, a counter argument 
against the classification of rural producers into "market dependent" and "non- 
market dependent" is that it is in the first place artificial because of increasing 
market involvement by all communities (Seaman and Holt 1980). It is hard to 
accept the existence of subsistence farmers who are totally "crop dependent" 
in contemporary African economies. In times o f crop failure subsistence 
farmers become even more dependent on markets by selling their assets such 
as livestock or by migrating in search of work in order to survive. Even in 
severe famines, starving peasants desperately engage in petty trading in an 
attempt to survive (Kumar 1990). In his study o f famine in Wollo, Rahmato 
(1991: 171) observed that "in distress conditions, the peasant gives greater 
attention to the market as well as making greater use of it".
The link between prediction and response has attracted little attention in famine
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literature. For effective famine prevention, EWS should provoke a pre-planned 
response system. "Without being carefully linked to a defined and mandated 
response system, the early warning information systems become ends in 
themselves" rather than effective means of famine prevention (Cutler 1985: 15). 
The same author (1987) has further argued that improving early warning 
without commitments of response might be considered as a "red herring" as 
there is no agreement as to what indicators or level of chosen indicator should 
be taken as a basis for concrete action.
Famine response often depends on the country’s preparedness for famine. A 
pre-planned set of actions indicating what to do and when, can make the 
response a great deal more reliable (Dreze and Sen 1989). This means that 
response would be more systematic. It is when the response is ad hoc that 
authorities find a justification for their inaction. If  a particular warning level is 
identified by an EW indicator, a number of pre-planned measures could be 
automatically implemented (Davies et al 1991) "without the need for major new 
decisions, so that natural bureaucratic inertia operates in favour of pre-planned 
actions" (Swift and Gray 1989: 52). One of the most important lessons to be 
learnt from India’s successful experience of famine prevention is the vital 
importance of contingency planning (Dreze 1988). In this, a predetermined plan 
of action is drawn up and used as a guide for famine and food crisis 
preparedness.
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There are two major shortcomings in our conceptualization of the links between 
prediction and response. First the concept o f famine we have today is based on 
a mass starvation view and most EWS can be referred to as "mass starvation 
warning systems". But this is not how the victims perceive it. "Mass starvation 
is not the threat perceived by the victims. They are concerned about irreversible 
destitution" (Walker 1989: 143). The concept of famine held by the affected 
people focuses on destitution. On the whole, victims see famine not as a threat 
to their lives but to their way o f  life and their primary concern is to preserve 
their assets so that they can return to their normal way of life after famine (de 
Waal 1989).
The second shortcoming is that there is no agreement on what constitutes an 
unacceptable level of an indicator to trigger response. This does not mean 
setting specific standard levels to say, for instance, that famine is present when 
food prices reach a certain level, but rather predicting the thresholds at which 
people fall into food insecurity, destitution and finally starvation. Understanding 
how individuals and communities feed themselves and survive during crisis can 
help us identify these thresholds. "There is a threshold of individual and 
community impoverishment ... at which the ability of households or 
communities to survive collapses" (Swift 1989: 10). The asset status of 
individuals and communities determine how fast they reach the threshold. The 
poorest and low-status groups who have fewest assets and claims may reach the
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threshold faster than others (Swift 1989). Walker (1989: 148) notes that "the 
warning system needs explicit information on when the "point of no return" is 
reached". This is a "distinct threshold - which may be reached through scarcity, 
speculation or other reasons - beyond which the ability of one part o f the 
population to feed itself is abruptly removed" (Seaman and Holt 1980: 294).
Placing the focus of famine on destitution and the existence of thresholds, 
which people reach from one stage of the famine process to the other, also has 
implications for the type of indicators we choose and the response system. For 
example, an early warning system aimed at preventing destitution would 
concentrate on collecting information on market prices of assets and asset 
status, whereas a warning system aimed at predicting mass starvation would 
gather information on health and nutrition (de Waal 1989). Similarly a response 
aimed at preventing destitution would be qualitatively different from a relief 
aimed at preventing starvation.
In pastoral and agro-pastoral societies monitoring the terms of trade between 
livestock and grain prices could provide the basis for predicting destitution. An 
increase in food grain prices is often accompanied by a fall in the price of 
livestock, and herders are forced to sell more of their animals to buy the 
increasingly expensive food grain (Ulrich 1991). Animal prices fall sharply 
during famines for two main reasons. First, increased animal sales flood the
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markets. Herders and agro-pastoralists exchange animals for other means of 
subsistence, mainly grain because it provides a cheaper source o f calories. 
Animal calories cost more than several times the grain calories and pastoralists 
meet most of their calorie requirements through grain purchase. Given the 
lower cost of acquiring grain calories, hard times force pastoralists and agro- 
pastoralists to be more dependent on grains acquired through animal sales 
(Kumar 1990).
Second, meat is a superior good and its demand falls sharply during famines. 
This is exacerbated by the loss of weight in animals in drought situations which 
further reduces the price they can realise in the market (Sen 1981). If  the 
livestock-to-grain terms of trade continue to fall, they reach a level where 
herders may be forced to liquidate all their livestock to meet subsistence 
requirements and as a result slide into destitution. Herd depletion can have a 
devastating consequence on future herd reconstitution. After large scale herd 
liquidation and deaths, herd reconstitution becomes extremely problematic if 
not altogether impossible (Watts 1991).
Thus, although it is important to monitor the terms of trade between livestock 
and food grain and other market indicators as part of an early warning system 
aimed at predicting destitution, there is still the problem of interpreting market 
data. It has been argued that market indicators are complex (de Waal 1988) and
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difficult to interpret to be used effectively in famine prevention (Walker 1989). 
This has led some to recommend a greater emphasis on other indicators. But 
closer examination of the criticism reveals that problems in the interpretation 
o f market data result from lack of understanding, in the first place, of how 
markets function. Market performance has to be assessed in order to be able 
to interpret the market price data (Ravallion: 1987). The potential role of 
market indicators seems to have been underestimated. Both contingency 
planning and famine relief require a proper understanding of markets and the 
local economy. If interventions are to be effective, the likely response of 
markets should be assessed, otherwise the donors and governments would be 
shooting in the dark.
Greater use of market data together with other socio-economic indicators is 
useful in predicting famine, but the real challenge is to put them together and 
decide the level of abnormality at which interventions are triggered. One of the 
missing links between prediction and response is to do with the interpretation 
of what is abnormal or unacceptable. What may be an unacceptable level of 
indicators in one part of a country may be quite normal in another. Therefore 
further examination of what constitutes abnormality should be the first step in 
improving the link between prediction and response.
Because of the failure of famine EWS in Africa, Campbell (1990a) has
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recommended the use of household responses as an alternative to other types 
of information currently collected by EWS . This is based on the concept o f the 
sequential uptake of responses by affected households. The idea here is that by 
monitoring the sequence of responses, early warning systems can identify the 
level o f stress faced by households. This means that responses can be used as 
indicators for impending food shortages and declining food entitlements.
2.4 Household Responses to Famine
An important weakness of Sen’s entitlement approach is that it does not explain 
the responses of households to changes in their entitlements during food crisis. 
Nor does it recognize the importance of household responses in mitigating the 
effects of famines on preserving their livelihoods. However, a growing 
literature on household coping strategies in Africa places special importance on 
understanding what rural households do when they are faced with declining 
entitlements (Campbell 1990b).
Most o f these studies on household coping strategies in Africa enumerate 
responses and identify general patterns. Watts (1983: 434), for instance, studied 
food crises and famine in northern Nigeria in 1973/74 and suggested that:
households do not respond arbitrarily to a food crisis for which they are
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in some sense conceptually prepared; rather they do so serially, with 
respect to the intensity of what one might call famine signals.
He listed ten responses and argued that two critical factors determined the 
sequence of these responses: the "commitment o f domestic resources" involved 
and the degree of "reversibility" of each response. In his view, households start 
with responses that involve the smallest commitment of domestic resources and 
the highest degree of reversibility. This means households prioritise responses 
in such a way that reversible steps are taken first.
Others (Cutler 1986; de Waal 1987; Patrick and von Braun 1994; Rahmato 
1991; Teklu 1992) have also identified sequences of responses based on the 
concept of sequential uptake of responses. The type of responses observed 
include: changes in cropping and planting practices; migration in search of 
employment; dispersed grazing; collection of wild foods; the use o f credit; 
rationing of food consumption; the sale of small stock; the sale of possessions; 
the sale of productive assets; and distress migration. Although the term "coping 
strategies" is often used to describe the responses of households, a number o f 
other expressions such as "coping mechanisms", "survival strategies", "response 
mechanisms" and "behavioral responses" are also used. However, the term 
"coping" implies that households do cope, although in fact they do not always 
(Davies et al 1991). Thus, the term "household responses" which implies the
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individual actions taken by households is considered neutral.
Some of the literature on traditional coping strategies follows the approach that 
has become known as "the moral economy approach" advanced by Scott 
(1976). In this approach, the pre-capitalist communities are viewed as societies 
in which minimum subsistence is assured to all members and the risk of 
starvation is insured against collectively. In this system, individuals or 
households lose their membership and their claims to minimum subsistence if 
they break customary rules. According to Scott, this may collapse under 
exceptionally adverse situations such as wars and droughts. These arrangements 
are designed to cope with food scarcities and other kinds of contingencies. 
According to this approach, market exchange is only marginal to inter-tribal 
relations and has no special significance to social survival (Platteau 1988). This 
is based on the idea that market involvement reduces the moral economy. On 
the other hand, Popkin (1979) strongly opposed this view and argued that 
traditional village institutions and norms have neither been motivated nor 
effective in providing the insurance of subsistence requirements for community 
members (Platteau 1988). Popkin’s argument is based on the view that 
individual risk minimization or security maximisation do not necessarily have 
the same effects at village level.
However, Platteau (1988) has dismissed the arguments of the moral economy
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versus political economy approach and has put forward a balanced approach 
that rejects Popkin’s suggestion of the absence of traditional insurance systems. 
According to Platteau the systems may be imperfect, but they are far from 
absent. As for the moral economy approach the suggestion that market 
penetration in village communities weakens the collective coping strategies 
need not be universal or systematic (ibid). On the contrary, there have been 
many instances where the traditional coping systems have been strengthened or 
intensified by market penetration.
An important feature of pre-capitalist societies is the absence of exclusive and 
clear-cut property rights in productive assets. This means that no single 
individual can claim exclusive right in the use of those assets (ibid). For 
instance, in many African societies large stocks are clan property rather than 
private property (Swift 1989). This absence of property rights is not only 
confined to clan-based communities. In Muslim societies, for example, God is 
the ultimate owner of all property (Platteau 1988). According to Swift (1989), 
this throws doubt to the notion of private ownership in Sen’s entitlement 
theory.
Although the literature on household coping strategies has made some 
contributions to our understanding of what households do when they are faced 
with food crisis, several criticisms can be levelled against the studies on
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household coping strategies. First, the concept o f sequential uptake of responses 
by rural households is based on simplistic generalisations. Households cannot 
be expected to follow a particular sequence of actions as some of the factors 
that determine their responses are exogenous to household decision-making. 
Which responses they adopt first or last would depend on a multitude of 
factors, including local market conditions and household resource endowments. 
The factors determine options open to the household and their viability. 
Moreover, in this concept of sequencing household responses some assets are 
always assumed to be less important than others. For instance, sheep and goats 
are assumed to be less important and, therefore, more likely to be disposed of 
earlier than other animals. Reflecting this view, Cutler (1985: 43) argues that:
there was a tendency for goats to be sold off first, as relatively 
unimportant assets, while cattle would be kept for as long as there was 
water and pasture to support them. Oxen would be sold off only as a last 
resort, as these animals are needed for ploughing and are therefore vital 
to crop production.
However, a lack of empirical evidence for this view is underlined by this same 
author (1985: 51) who, on reflection, shows that his data does not support the 
concept he wishes to propose.
It is interesting to note that a previous hypothesis ... arguing that
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relatively less important animals such as sheep and goats will be sold-off 
first does not seem to be borne out by the data ... It is in fact more 
common for oxen to sold off before other animals ... It seems, therefore, 
that it is impossible to generalise about the exact pattern of livestock 
sales prior to famine migration (italics added).
He (1985: 51) further adds that households may sell their cattle earlier and keep 
"hardy goats which would be more likely to survive the drought and provide 
a nucleus for the rebuilding of household assets afterwards".
Secondly, the notion of "reversibility" as determining the sequence of responses 
is not a useful concept in understanding household responses. This concept is 
based on an arbitrary classification of individual responses into reversible and 
irreversible actions. In the case of assets, the classification is simply based on 
their lumpiness, thus the disposal of, for instance, small animals is considered 
to be easily reversible compared to, say, the disposal of cattle, which is 
considered to be irreversible or least likely to be reversed.
Third, the literature on household coping strategies does not cover household 
responses in conflict situations. Despite the fact that most of the contemporary 
food crisis situations in Africa are related to conflict, most of the studies 
concentrate on food crisis situations caused by other factors such as droughts.
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Finally, most o f the studies of household coping strategies are based on one 
year crises, rather than the processes that lead to crises or comparisons of crisis 
and normal years. Moreover, they have tended to define general patterns of 
household responses, rather than trying to understand the factors underlying 
them.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides a review of literature on famine theories, famine early 
warning and household coping strategies. Although the entitlement approach’s 
contribution to analyzing and understanding famines is recognized, several 
important limitations are identified. Firstly, it is argued that it concentrates 
exclusively on production and exchange failures and does not explain the role 
o f assets and claims in famine vulnerability. Secondly, the entitlement approach 
is criticised for failing to recognize the role o f conflicts in famine analysis. 
Thirdly, by describing famine as a "distinct phenomenon", entitlement theory 
is criticised for failing to understand the processes that lead to famine. A 
further limitation of the entitlement theory is that it considers famine mortality 
as resulting from starvation rather than excess deaths caused by disease and 
poor sanitary conditions.
The review of early warning literature highlights shortcomings in the
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conceptualization of links between prediction and response and the agreement 
on the levels of indicators required to trigger interventions. It is argued that a 
further examination of what constitutes abnormality is required in order to 
improve the link between prediction and response.
Finally, most o f the household response studies reviewed here are based on 
poorly conceptualized models and generalisations, suggesting particular patterns 
of response sequences. These are criticised for failing to understand the 
underlying factors of household responses. Other limitations of the literature on 
household coping strategies include the lack of understanding of household 
responses in conflict situations and a concentration on crisis periods rather than 
the whole process that leads to crises, thus making comparisons between crisis 
and normal years.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the research methodology involved in data collection and 
analytical models. It describes the field work conducted in Somaliland, 
explaining the methods of sample selection, sampling procedure, sample size 
and the study area. It also describes interviews with key informants, including 
elders and tribal leaders in the villages that were surveyed. The collection of 
market information and secondary data is also discussed. Finally, the choice of 
analytical techniques used in the thesis is also explained.
3.2 Data Collection
The collection of data was based on field work conducted in rural Somaliland 
in 1992, involving a formal sample survey as well as case studies and 
interviews with elders and key informants. Information on food and livestock 
markets and trade was also gathered during the field work. In addition, 
background information on food security and famine early warning in the 
region was obtained from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 




The Gabiley district in the north-west region of Somaliland was chosen as the 
site for the field work (see map on Appendix 3.1). This is one of four districts 
in the north-west region of Somaliland and one of the main agricultural districts 
in the country. The three villages selected for the survey - Galooley, Agamso 
and Shabeelle - lie between the district town Gabiley and Arabsiyo. Some of 
the settlements in Galooley and Shabeelle are adjacent to the outskirts of 
Gabiley town. The area is about 45 kilometres west of Hargeisa, the capital of 
Somaliland.
Rural households in the area practise a system of mixed farming in which 
livestock plays an important economic role. Traditionally, they were nomadic 
pastoralists whose livelihoods depended on rearing livestock. But they have 
practised farming since the early 1900s when pastoralists settled in Galoolay 
village to start cultivation. Sorghum and maize are the main food crops grown 
in the area, while Qat (Catha edulis), a mild stimulant plant widely chewed in 
the Somali territories, was grown as an important cash crop in the area until 
1984 when its cultivation and use was banned by the government. Because it 
was highly successful and well adapted to the environment, its banning had a 
serious consequence in the region. It had played such an important role in the 
rural economy that many of the farmers owned Qat fields and were dependent
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on it for their income.
A major problem in livestock and crop production in the area is frequent 
droughts. In every two years out of ten, agro-pastoralists expect crop failure or 
very low yields. However, over the years they have adopted strategies that 
minimise the risks o f crop failure. These include cultivation of a drought 
resistant variety of sorghum. Locally known as Elmi Jama, this variety has low 
yields, but it produces sufficient fodder for the animals even in drought years. 
This is important because in drought years agro-pastoralists rely more on their 
livestock to meet their subsistence requirement.
Following the outbreak of the war between the rebel Somali National 
Movement and government troops in 1988, the agro-pastoralists in the area 
migrated with the rest of the population into the Haud region in eastern 
Ethiopia. In this migration, rural households joined the refugee camps 
established in the area in late 1988 and remained there until January 1991. 
These households suffered losses of large numbers of animals and other assets 
which were either looted or destroyed by government troops.
The area was selected because: (a) it was extensively studied during the 
preparation and implementation of a World Bank funded agricultural 
development project based in the region prior to the war; (b) there was a
40
detailed study of the sample households conducted by the researcher and the 
project consultants in 1987; and (c) it was affected by the war which resulted 
in 1988-92 food crisis.
3.2.2 Sampling Procedure
The survey was based on the same sample of households which were 
interviewed in a yield estimation and household survey carried out in the north­
west region in 1987. The same households selected in the 1987 survey were re­
sampled again in 1992. The survey was based on 100 households selected 
randomly from a sampling frame of agro-pastoralists in the area. There are 
several reasons for re-sampling the same households. Firstly, the 1987 survey 
provides baseline data that can be used to make comparisons and assess the 
effects o f the war and drought on the rural livelihoods. Secondly, the researcher 
and the enumerators had local knowledge and experience in the area which 
made it possible to get the full cooperation of the respondents which would not 
have been possible if a new sample were selected.
Like many other societies in Africa, rural people in Somaliland are often very 
suspicious and sometimes unwilling to cooperate with anyone they consider an 
outsider. If  the interviewers are foreigners they would normally assume that 
they are collecting information for relief purposes and would answer questions
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accordingly, underestimating their assets and incomes on the assumption that 
they would be included in the relief distribution list. Similarly, if  the 
interviewers are Somalis who are not from the same area or sub-clan, they 
would suspect that they are gathering intelligence information for their clans. 
Depending on how sensitive the questions are, they would either bluntly refuse 
to answer them or give misleading information. It was, therefore, crucial to gain 
the full confidence of the respondents. This was very important as the survey 
contained sensitive questions such as ownership of rifles, which are important 
assets in the area, and payments o f blood money, which are generally 
confidential but crucial for understanding inter-household transfers and their 
incomes and expenditures.
A further reason for reselecting the same sample of households was the lack of 
a complete sampling frame for the area which was required if random sampling 
were to be used. Constructing a new sampling frame or updating the existing 
one was not feasible during the study period because the cost involved was 
prohibitive. Thus, the decision to interview the same households allowed more 
time and resources to be spent on minimising non-sampling errors, which 
experience shows are particularly more important in this type of survey. The 
sample of households chosen is considered to be representative of the three 
villages, Galooley, Shabeelle and Agamso that were based on the original 
sampling frame and were, therefore, drawn from the sample. In this survey
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greater emphasis was given on in-depth understanding rather than coverage of 
a large area. However, to the extent that households in other districts have 
similar characteristics, results of the survey could also be true for other areas.
The size o f the sample was considered sufficient given the low variability o f 
the characteristics of households. Although a larger sample might have been 
preferable, there is a trade-off between sampling and non-sampling errors in 
choosing the size of the sample. As the sample size increases, sampling errors 
are reduced but any reduction in sampling errors may be offset by increase in 
non-sampling errors (Poate and Daplyn 1988).
Although it was not possible to interview directly 27 of the 100 households in 
the 1987 survey since they were either in the relief camps in Ethiopia or had 
migrated from the region permanently, the remaining 73 households interviewed 
were considered a sufficient and representative sample.
I believe that a high degree of accuracy was achieved in gathering detailed 
information on rural households in this survey for two reasons. Firstly, the 
researcher’s extensive experience in the study area provided an in-depth local 
knowledge and understanding of the rural situation. The researcher worked in 
the area for more than seven years and conducted several other studies in the 
district, including the 1987 survey. Secondly, the local knowledge o f the
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enumerators who took part in the 1987 survey and had lived in the area since 
then helped check the accuracy of the individual household responses. 
Furthermore, various measures, including built-in-checks in the questionnaire 
were taken to minimize non-sampling errors in the survey and thus obtain 
accurate results.
Thus, a post-enumeration survey carried out after its completion showed that 
the responses were accurate and non-sampling errors minimal. This was carried 
out by the researcher after the completion of the survey to assess the accuracy 
of the survey data. A sub-sample of twelve households were chosen randomly 
from the sample and re-interviewed. No discrepancies were found in this post 
sample enumeration.
3.2.3 Questionnaire Design
A semi-structured questionnaire1 specifically designed to cover the topics of 
the study was used. It covered such topics as household composition, assets and 
livestock ownership from 1988 to 1992, market exchange, and food production 
and consumption patterns, which all required empirical information. The 
questionnaire was easy to use and the enumerators were given interview guides
1 See Appendix 3.2 for the complete questionnaire used in the survey.
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that explained the questions. The forms were written in English, but some 
questions that were thought ambiguous in English were translated into Somali. 
Previous survey experience in the area shows that interviewing is best carried 
out in Qat sessions. Therefore, where possible, interviews were conducted in 
Qat sessions. The households were very clear about the aim of the study. They 
gave their responses on the understanding that the results would only be used 
for research purposes.
3.2.4 Interviews with key informants
Another important part of the data collection exercise was the collection of oral 
literature on droughts and famines in the country. Using a simple checklist of 
topics, key informants were interviewed on past droughts and famines in the 
country.
Village leaders and elders in the survey area were also interviewed on a range 
of topics, including the impact o f the war on their communities, functioning of 
the moral economy at the community level, and household responses and 
changes in market exchange.
45
3.2.5 Secondary Data
The secondary data on market conditions and trade was obtained from various 
sources, including NGOs such as CARE International and SCF, and local 
newspapers which produce daily price reports o f major commodities and 
animals in the main markets. The data collected includes: livestock and food 
prices for 1991-92, export of livestock and volumes of trade in Hargeisa 
market.
Background information on the food security situation in the region and past 
famines was provided by IGADD and the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission of Ethiopia. In addition RRC provided price and market 
information in the eastern region of Hararghe.
3.3 Analytical Methods
A criterion for selecting analytical techniques is whether it can provide a test 
o f the hypothesis and whether accurate data is available for the technique to 
produce reliable results. This is important because analytical techniques are 
sometimes applied mechanically without assessing their suitability. Selecting 
problems and hypotheses that fit to a particular technique, which can be called 
technique-oriented research, can be misleading. Gibson (1966: 79) argued that:
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Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of "technique-oriented" research is 
.the uncritical and mechanical use of available techniques as a substitute 
for, rather than an aid in, in thinking.
In this research, analytical methods were used on the basis of the available data 
and the suitability of the techniques in producing results that can be used to test 
the research hypothesis. Several analytical methods are used, including linear 
programming and ranking criterion. A linear programming model is used as the 
main analytical method in the study. It is used to analyze how rural households 
manage their resources and how changes in market conditions affect the 
interrelationships between resources. It is also used in exploring the likely 
responses of households to changes in their entitlements. The aim of this model 
is to understand the economic rationale and the underlying factors of household 
responses and resource allocation in food insecurity and famine situations.
The use of linear programming in economic analysis o f rural households has 
particular advantages. It is more realistic and systematic in dealing with 
complex interrelationships which arise from households rearranging their mix 
of resources and activities (Barnard and Nix 1979). Moreover, it is based on the 
current household resource structures rather than past resource endowments and 
assumptions about the structure of production, consumption and other variables 
can be altered to study their impact on the incomes and assets of households.
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A further advantage of the linear programming method is that it provides a 
wealth of information that is necessary for assessing policy impact. This by­
product data could provide useful information for interventions. For example, 
the marginal value product o f labour could be used as a guide for setting the 
wage rate of cash/food for work programmes. Finally, the problem of resource 
allocation of households can be studied in greater depth.
However, a drawback of the use of linear programming method is the 
assumption of profit maximisation in the objective function which may not be 
consistent with household objectives. The farmer or the herder may have other 
objectives and priorities such as meeting minimum subsistence requirement and 
risk minimisation. But this can be dealt with by incorporating the other 
objectives in the model as constraints without the need to use goal 
programming. Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong with the method to make 
an allowance for household’s many objectives.
A linear programming problem involves maximising (or minimising) a linear 
objective function subject to linear constraints. It solves formulations allocating 
scarce resources so as to maximise a predetermined objective (McCarl and 
Nuthall 1982). It is essentially a procedure for determining the combination of 
enterprises/activities that is feasible in such a way that a specified objective 
function is maximised without violating set constraints.
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The linear programming model can be expressed mathematically as:
Max  Z = £  CjXj 
j = i
Subject to B i>Aij.Xj
j = 1 .... n 
i = 1 .... m
Where
Z = the total net revenue 
Xj = the level of the jth activity 
Cj = the gross margin o f the jth activity 
Bj = the level of the ith constraint
Ay = the amount of the ith constraint used by the jth  activity
In addition to linear programming, a ranking model is used to examine the 
order in which the divestment decisions are made by the households. This is a
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ranking ratio similar to the net benefit-investment (N/K) ratio2 used in project 
appraisal to rank alternative investment options. The model is chosen because 
divestment decisions made by rural households are comparable to investment 
decisions. In both cases the decision criteria involve weighing up both current 
and future costs and benefits associated with individual decisions. Further 
details of this model are explained in chapter 7.
3.4 Conclusion
Because of the good quality of the data collected in the survey, the information 
obtained provides an in-depth understanding of the rural households in the area. 
This was made possible by the experience and knowledge of the researcher and 
enumerators in the area, the full cooperation of the households, and the baseline 
data gathered in the 1987 survey which provided useful information for 
understanding the processes leading to the food crisis. Interviews with village 
leaders and community elders and secondary data obtained from various 
sources inside and outside the country also provided important information on 
both the current and past food crises in the area.
Furthermore, the quality of the data gathered allows the use of a linear
2 for details of net benefit-investment ratio see Gittinger (1982)
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programming model to examine how households re-allocate their resources in 
crisis situations and how changes in market conditions affect the 
interrelationships between their resources.
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CHAPTER 4. DROUGHTS AND FAMINES, 1888-1987
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a review of the past droughts and famines in Somaliland 
from the late nineteenth century to 1987, using information from various 
sources including oral accounts, colonial publications, and unpublished material. 
Droughts and famines in the twentieth century are divided into two periods: the 
colonial and post-colonial food crises. This is to contrast their impact, how 
rural households responded and public interventions. The chapter focuses on the 
causes, impact and responses o f the households to the droughts and famines. 
Since much of the social history of Somaliland remains unwritten, a substantial 
part of this chapter is derived from oral sources and the unpublished work of 
local historians.
4.2 The Great Famine, 1888-92
The great famine was the most severe famine in the region for centuries, 
affecting most of the countries in the Horn of Africa. It had a devastating 
impact on the region. An estimated one-third of the entire population is 
reported to have perished during this famine (Pankhurst 1985). In Somaliland, 
it is widely remembered as one o f the most severe famines.
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4.2.1 Causes
The famine was caused by a combination of natural calamities: a major cattle 
epidemic; crop failure; and an outbreak of locusts and worms. However, the 
principal trigger was the outbreak of a rinderpest epidemic which first started 
in Ethiopia but quickly spread to the neighbouring countries. According to 
Pankhurst (1985: 59), the rinderpest which was new to the region "appeared 
with unusual virulence and spread like wildfire". The outbreak of the epidemic 
was caused by the importation of infected cattle by Italian troops during the 
war with Ethiopia (ibid). It is believed that infected cattle were included among 
shipments by the Italians at the port of Massawa (Fitzgerald 1994). Pankhurst 
notes that many people believe the disease was deliberately spread by the 
Italians by inoculating some animals with the disease.
The deaths of a large number of cattle led to the deterioration of sanitary 
conditions. The outbreak of cholera and other diseases was also reported during 
the famine and in many areas it was disease, resulting from the breakdown of 
sanitary conditions rather than starvation per se that caused the large number 
o f human deaths.
The cattle epidemic was accompanied by extremely hot and dry weather in 
1888-9 which resulted in widespread crop failures. This crop failure hit the
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Hararghe region in particular. This was a traditionally agricultural area which 
most of the Somali pastoralists were dependent upon for their food grain 
purchases. A locust invasion which destroyed crops was also reported during 
the famine. As a result of the crop failures and the cattle epidemic food prices 
were reported to have gone up sharply. A price increase of one to two hundred 
times was reported between 1889 and 1890 (ibid). Speculations and widespread 
hoarding were partly responsible for the price increases. Large scale deaths of 
draught animals and the expectation of future shortages fuelled the speculations.
The last year of the famine was particularly difficult for the Somalis in the 
Haud region. The troops of the Ethiopian emperor Menelik raided the region 
and seized large numbers of animals that had survived the famine. Samatar 
(quoted in Samatar 1989) puts the estimates of those animals confiscated at
100,000 cattle, 200,000 camels and 600,000 sheep and goats. Pankhurst also 
reports 10,000 cattle seized in the first part of 1892 by the governor o f Harar, 
Ras Makonnen, from the Somalis in the Ogaden region. These raids continued 
until 1897 when the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik, who was pursuing an 
expansionist policy, signed the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty with the British colonial 
government which transferred the sovereignty of western Somaliland to 
Ethiopia.
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4.2.2 Im pact and Household Responses
This was a killer famine. Although the level of deaths varied from one region 
to another, it is estimated that up to a third of the total population in Ethiopia, 
Somaliland and parts of Somalia died as a result o f the famine. These deaths 
resulted mainly from starvation and diseases caused by the poor sanitary 
conditions that existed during the cattle epidemic. Considerable depopulation 
was reported to have occurred in the areas severely hit by the famine. Accounts 
of early travellers show that entire villages were wiped out by epidemics such 
as cholera.
The famine had far-reaching economic and social consequences. It also resulted 
in a very high loss of livestock. Ninety per cent of the total cattle population 
is reported to have been killed by the epidemic. Large numbers of other 
animals also died during the famine because of the outbreak of diseases. In 
Somaliland, it is still widely remembered as one of the most severe famines 
ever in the history of the country. In the Haud region, the great famine is 
known as Filqa which means "break-up" or "disperse", referring to the fact that 
people were forced to disperse during the famine.
In southern Somalia, the accounts of early travellers indicate that the famine 
had a catastrophic impact. Italian travellers who visited Lugh and Juba areas
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during the famine reported tens of thousands of cattle owners who had lost all 
their livestock. The deaths of oxen, in particular, had a serious effect on the 
agricultural areas. As a consequence many farmers in southern Somalia started 
hand cultivation. Some local farmers started to experiment with the use of other 
animals such as donkeys to plough the land in lieu of oxen.
Somali poems recall the devastation of the famines. In one of his poems the 
great Somali poet, Ismail Mire (1860-1951), describes the great famine in one 
of the most popular Somali poems - A Hoopoe Rebuked3. The poet composed 
this poem when he saw a hoopoe crying for rains. Reminding the hoopoe that 
it was not alone in the suffering, he said:
O Hoopoe, when you shed those tears,
Crying for the rains o f spring
And spuming the lightest wink of sleep
Just because your craw is empty,
Do you imagine that you, and you alone 
Are scorched by this dry season o f Jiilaall
No, a great disaster has befallen 
All God’s servants, every one o f them - 
A [famine] has come that leaves nothing in its wake, 
Just like the one that men called the Stalker,
Can it be right, then, to air your grievance 
As if the suffering were yours alone?
Listen, O Hoopoe, to my tidings,
There are camels, once the strongest o f the herd,
3 This poem was translated by Adrzejewski (1993)
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That now look spare and gaunt -
There are men, once rich with milch-beasts,
Who are now too weak to rise at the assembly-ground.
Young men drift to the village, loitering, looking about - 
In the shops there are dates, and guard must be kept 
For they would take those dates and run 
But for their fear o f the tin-roofed jail.
Never does the lion o f the rocks now roar on Toomo plain
And the leopards that once were killers o f goats
Have perished themselves at the hands o f hunters -
... Gone are the burden camels, gone are all the short-homed cattle
Sheep and goats, fattened for slaughter, are scarcely to be seen.
The skin flask from which the ghee was served
Is shrivelled and musty from disuse,
For want o f oil the hair o f goodly wives 
Is now so brittle that it splits and falls.
Look, O Hoopoe, at those shining shapes
You see round you on the ground -
They are the bones o f hyenas, bones o f vulture, even.
... Thirst-stricken folk are dying in Garoowe and Bookh,
Exhausted, their bodies pricked by Gocondho thorns.
They have no grain, but what would it avail them?
The water to boil it in is nowhere to be found.
So Hoopoe, stop your wailing and your moaning
Or you may soon be hunted in your turn -
Stay quiet, speak softly, and you may yet escape arrest!
The economic and social consequence of a famine of this scale was one o f 
devastation, insecurity and vulnerability to future droughts and famines. Many 
rural people consider the great famine as "the mother of the 20th century 
famines". The impact o f the famine was such that the people affected never 
fully recovered from it. Although the intensity varied from one area to another,
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the collapse o f coping strategies and the social consequence of the famine were 
devastating. In some parts of Ethiopia even cannibalism which was unheard 
before was reported during the famine. Pankhurst tells the story of a man who 
killed and ate his wife. Based on this story, a popular song in Shawa says "his 
wife gave him indigestion". Other horrific stories that occurred during the 
famine are also reported.
Although there is no detailed information on how households responded to the 
development of the famine, limited records suggest that there were three types 
of responses. First, rural households started, for the first time, to engage 
significantly in market exchange by selling animals (mainly sheep and goats), 
hides and skins, in order to exchange for food grain. The sale of skins and 
hides peaked in the first two years o f the famine, causing the total export value 
to go up by 28% between 1887/88 to 1888/89 (Table 4.1). The sale o f skins 
and hides increased because pastoralists remove them from the animals just 
before they die and keep them for either local use or sale. Until this famine, 
sale o f skins and hides was confined to the nomads who were in close 
proximity to the three main ports at the Red Sea - Berber, Bulhar and Zaila. 
Increase in total export value in 1888/89 suggests that there were increased sale 
of skins and hides (see table 4.1). This was accompanied by an increase in total 
imports value which rose by 22% for the same period. In fact, large quantities 
of grain had been imported for the first time to Zaila in the recorded history of
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the port (Foreign Office 1892). The total value of trade through the main ports 
o f Zaila, Berbera, and Bulhar shows that imports fell by 30% in the following 
year 1889/90 as pastoralists became impoverished by the famine.






Index Total Value 
(£ Sterling)
Index
1887-8 272,943 100 259,910 100
1888-9 349,179 128 317,836 122
1889-90 304,415 112 238,017 92
1890-91 351,987 129 296,025 114
1891-92 271,274 99 262,710 101
1892-93 314,284 115 312,825 120
1893-94 346,231 127 325,278 125
Source: Pankhurst, R (1965)
The second area of response was mass migration. Large numbers of famine
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victims migrated to coastal towns and villages in the hope of obtaining 
imported grain. Others migrated to other urban towns in search of relief and 
assistance from relatives and mosques. Pastoralists who lost most o f their 
animals migrated to the nearby villages and started to supplement their income 
by engaging in petty trading.
A further strategy adopted by the rural households was an adaptive response 
which led many nomads to break with the tradition of pastoralism by becoming 
settled farmers for the first time. Traditionally nomads were always 
contemptuous of cultivation, but circumstances forced them to start farming. It 
was after this famine that the first farmers in the Gabiley and Borama districts 
o f Somaliland started cultivation. Since they had relatively larger herds of cattle 
than other pastoralists in the country, the losses they suffered were higher. The 
animal herds that survived the famine were below the minimum stock necessary 
for them to remain in pastoralism. Thus, they settled in the agricultural land 
nearest to the main towns and villages where they could farm and sell animal 
products.
4.3 Droughts and Famines, 1900-1959
The rural people have never fully recovered from the great famine and since 
1900 famines have occurred frequently. From 1900-1959, there were eleven
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droughts and famines with varying degrees of severity. Although the details of 
these droughts and famines are limited, rural people in Somaliland still 
remember them vividly. Depending on the causes, severity and how people 
coped with them, these droughts and famines are referred to, and described, 
using different local names. Table 4.2 shows the list of local names, areas 
affected and the main causes of these droughts and famines.
Five of the droughts and famines which affected most parts of Somaliland and 
Haud are reported to have been particularly severe. They are distinguished from 
other famines by referring to them as "abaar dad” or famines that resulted in 
starvation and deaths. Whereas, those that cause loss of livestock are referred 
to as "abaar duunyo". The word "abaar” is used to describe both drought and 
famine in the Somali language, therefore, there is no specific word for famine. 
However, the terms abaar dad and abaar duunyo which literally mean "human 
drought" and "animal drought" are used to differentiate between famines and 
droughts. Abaar dad which refers to famines that cause widespread deaths and 
human suffering is similar to what de Waal (1989) calls "famine that kills", 
whereas abaar duunyo refers mainly to excess losses of animals as a result of 
drought.
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Table 4.2 Chronology of Famines and Droughts in Somaliland and Haud, 1888-1987
Year Local Names Areas Affected Causes and Severity
1888-92 Filqa (Break-up) Somaliland, Haud Rinderpest epidemic, crop 
failures, locusts; A third of the 
population and 90% cattle were 
lost.
1903 Haarriya Somaliland, Haud Failure of rains and epidemic




Civil war and failure of rains 
{Col iyo Abaar)
1918-19 Harga-Cuna (eating 
skins)
Somaliland & Haud Civil war and failure of rains 
{Col iyo Abaar), animal disease
1925 Somaliland & Haud Failure of rains
1927-9 Qorkii (registering relief 
camps)
Somaliland, Haud Failure of rains; 80% of sheep 
and goats died
1933-34 Gabato; Baaha Somaliland Failure of rains
1938 Somaliland Failure of rains
1943-46 Adhi Gaba (loss of 
small stock)
Somaliland Failure of rains
1950-51 Siiga-Case (bowl-dust, 
blower of red dust)
Southern and eastern 
regions of Somaliland, 
Haud
Failure of rains
1955-56 Arbacada; Nawriis (the 
Wednesday year)
Somaliland, Haud Failure of rains; crop failure; 
civil war; epidemic disease
1959 Haud Failure of rains
1965 Somaliland, Haud Cattle epidemic
1968-69 Somaliland, Haud Failure of rains
1974 Dabadheer (prolonged 
drought); Gaadhi- 
Ghaadhi-Saar
Eastern regions of 
Somaliland
Failure of rains; failure of 
government policy





Although there is no single universal cause for all the droughts and famines 
between 1900-1959, most of them were triggered by failure of rains. This often 
resulted from failure or delay of the main Gu ’ (spring) season or sometime the 
failure of the Deyr (autumn) season. However, droughts and famines were 
rarely caused by failure of rains in only one season but a failure or shortage of 
rains over a successive period of seasons. The two famines in 1911 and 1918 
were reported to have been caused by failure of Gu ’ rains in two successive 
years. In the 1918 famine, which was a major famine, the failure of the rains 
had been accompanied by an outbreak of animal disease that killed most of the 
livestock population.
In addition to the failure of rains, plagues such as locusts, epidemic diseases 
and civil wars were proximate causes of the famines. Indeed the most severe 
droughts and famines were often caused by occurrence of these calamities in 
addition to the failure of rains.
After the great famine, the first famine in the twentieth century in 1911-13 was 
caused by several years of successive poor rains and outbreak of civil war. 
Although rainfall records do not exist for that period, oral accounts report 
exceptionally low rainfall from 1909. Failures of rains were exacerbated by
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serious disruptions of trade caused by the uprising of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah 
Hassan (The Mad Mullah) and his army (Dervishes) who were engaged in a 
war against the British administration and the Isaaq clans. Proliferation o f 
weapons during the war, 1889-1920, between the Dervishes and the British 
administration led to tribal conflicts in the country. After many raids by 
followers of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan against the clans who were 
opposed to his leadership, the British administration supplied arms to the 
friendly tribes so that they could defend themselves against the Mad Mullah 
and his Dervishes. But the clans used the new weapons to settle old scores and 
as soon as the British forces withdrew to the coastal towns in Berbera, Bulhar 
and Zailah in what has become known as the "coastal concentration" in 1910, 
serious fighting broke out between the friendly clans. During this conflict large 
scale raiding and looting took place which led to the severe famine in 1911-13 
in which an estimated one-third of the male population died (Colonial Office 
1957).
In 1918 there was another major famine in the country also caused by a 
combination of factors, including successive failure of rains, trade disruptions 
caused by continued war between the colonial government and the Mad Mullah 
and an epidemic disease which killed animals. Like the previous famine, 
conflict played an important part in the development of the famine.
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The drought and famine in 1927-29 were caused by three years o f low rainfall. 
The rainfall records for the major towns in Somaliland show that the 
distribution was very poor and total amounts were generally lower than the 
long term average. For example, in Hargeisa, despite exceptionally good rains 
in 1926, the amount o f rainfall recorded in 1927 and 1928 was 370 and 316 
millimetres - well below the long term average of 431 mm. The rainfall 
recorded in 1928 was one of the lowest for more than four decades. In Sheikh, 
which receives an average of 520 mm, the second lowest rainfall for more than 
three decades of 297 mm was recorded in 1927. The distribution o f the rainfall 
was particularly poor. This was the case in Burao where annual rainfall for the 
two years, 1927 and 1928, was higher than average, but poorly distributed. In 
1927, more than 60% of the rain fell in just two months. Similarly, in 1928 
more than 90% of annual rain fell in the months o f May and November. The 
situation was exacerbated by large swarms of locusts which stripped trees and 
destroyed pasture and crops during the months of July and August in 1928 
(Boothman 1975). This is the first time that locusts contributed significantly to 
a drought. From 1928 until the late 1950s, locusts were a significant factor in 
droughts and famines.
Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show that rainfall was substantially lower than average in 
1933-34, 1938, 1950-51, and 1955-56. It also shows that the rainfall patterns 
of these regions were correlated, causing the droughts to be national rather than
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localised. However, it was not only the correlation between regional rainfall 
which reduced the movement of the nomads across regional boundaries, but 
more importantly it was the conflict between clans which prevented the 
pastoralists from crossing regional boundaries or moving freely in search of 
pasture and water. A serious outbreak of rinderpest in the Borama area in 1934 
(Colonial Office 1935) also contributed to the drought in 1933-34.
Although both droughts in 1950-51 and 1955-56 were particularly severe and 
affected most of the country, the 1950-51 drought hit hardest in the eastern 
parts of Somaliland where both the main G u3 and Deyr rains failed. After the 
failure of the main G u3 rains, pastoralists in the region migrated to the grazing 
areas in the south, but subsequent Deyr rains also failed, causing the 
widespread mortality of animals (Colonial Office 1952). In 1950, Burao 
received only 48 mm of rain - the lowest figure since records began. Other 
towns in the region such as Ainabo, Ber, El-Afwein received 33 mm, 72 mm, 
31 mm respectively - also their lowest records. Because of exceptionally high, 
dusty winds throughout the country, the drought is remembered as Siiga-Case 
or "the blower of red dust" (Swift 1977).
The last drought in this period occurred in 1959 and was also caused by failure 
of rains. Severe water shortages were reported in this drought to have resulted 
in the loss of many animals. But relatively successful intervention by the
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colonial government in transporting water to pastoralists contained the 
development o f the drought.










Source: Colonial Office, Annual Reports.
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4.3.2 Impact
The droughts and famines between 1900-1959 had serious effects in rural 
Somaliland, causing large numbers o f human and animal losses. During this 
period, there were five major droughts and famines which caused widespread 
destitution and starvation in many parts o f the country. O f these droughts and 
famines, the most serious one hit the country in 1911-13. Because o f the 
severity o f the famine, people were reported to have eaten food that was not 
Halaal or clean for Muslims to eat and hence became known as Xaaraama- 
Cune (eating forbidden food). This is one o f the few famines in which most of
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the deaths resulted from starvation rather than epidemic. Although there are no 
statistics on the number of deaths, elders and local historians interviewed 
reported an exceptionally high level of mortality. In some clans, a fifth o f their 
population was estimated to have died during the famine. Colonial government 
reports estimate that up to a third o f the total male population in the country 
perished in this famine (Colonial Office 1957). Moreover, major losses of 
animals also resulted in widespread destitution among the pastoralists.
The 1918 famine which occurred only five years after the 1911-13 famine had 
an equally devastating effect on the country. It is still widely remembered as 
one of the most severe famines in living memory. In this famine, people were 
reported to have eaten skins and, therefore, it became known as Harga-Cuna 
(eating skins). Like the previous famine many pastoralists lost their animals and 
became destitute. In Berbera alone, the colonial government provided daily 
relief to 960 adults and 250 children in the month of February 1918 (Boothman 
1975). This was the first time in the history of the country that a relief camp 
was opened for famine victims.
Another major famine which had a devastating impact on the rural people was 
the one in 1927-29. It killed up to 80% of sheep and goats in Somaliland 
(Colonial Office 1928) and left tens of thousands of pastoralists destitute. A 
British official who travelled through the country during the famine was
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appalled by what he encountered (Colonial Office 1930: 7). He wrote:
it was possible to travel hundred miles, through a depressing odour of 
decaying animal flesh that would make stock yards smell sweet by 
comparison.
Because of the scale of the famine, the colonial government had taken measures 
to provide relief to the destitute families by opening a relief camp at the coastal 
town of Bulhar. At the height of the famine, there were 15,288 destitute people 
in the camp (Boothman 1975). This period became known as Qorkii, referring 
to the registration of famine victims at relief camps. Given the scale of 
destitution, only a small percent of the destitute population registered at the 
relief camps. Perhaps this was because of the social stigma attached to seeking 
relief in government camps in those days. Instead, most of the destitute families 
relied on assistance from their relatives.
The effects of the 1927-29 famine were reflected by drastic changes of trade 
in the country. The loss of animals caused the export of sheep and goats to fall 
to a record low in 1929 as shown in figure 4.5. The data shows that the export 
of sheep and goats did not recover to pre-famine levels until 1932. In contrast, 
the export of skins rose sharply to reach its highest level since the records 
began as shown in figure 4.6. The number of skins exported jumped from 1.75
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million in 1927 to 3.77 million in 1928 (ie 115% increase). This sudden 
increase in the number of skins exported was due to the increased slaughter of 
animals during the famine. When animals are very weak and have little chance 
of survival in droughts and famines, pastoralists slaughter them and remove the 
skins so that they can at least sell them. Thus, the export of 3.77 million skins 
was the result o f the widespread slaughter of sheep and goats in 1928. The 
export of gums and resins also rose sharply during the famine (Figure 4.7). On 
the other hand, food import rose sharply. For instance, the import o f rice rose 
by 79% from 1926 to 1927 and then doubled again to reach its peak of 10,590 
metric tons in 1928 (figures 4.8). Similarly, the import of dates increased by 
162% from 1927 to 1928 to reach its highest level for four decades (figure 4.9). 
Dates were particularly valuable to the pastoralists during periods of food crisis 
because they could be readily eaten without requiring water for cooking. Thus, 
most of the imported dates found their way into the rural areas whereas rice 
was mainly consumed in the urban towns.
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Figure 4.8 Import of Rice, 1919-1937
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The fourth major famine in 1933-34 also resulted in a high level o f destitution 
throughout the country, though conditions were most severe in the Erigavo 
district. Relief camps were established near Erigavo and Berbera during the 
famine with a population o f 3,000 and 6,000 respectively. Like the other 
famines, the export o f sheep and goats fell in the second year o f the famine, 
while the export of skins increased during the two years o f famine (figures 4.5 
and 4.6). As shown in Figure 4.8, the import o f rice also rose sharply.
Although the famine in 1950-51 was most severe in the Burao district and 
Haud, it had a serious impact throughout the country, causing thousands of
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deaths and widespread destitution. At the peak of the famine more than 10,000 
women and children were receiving relief in camps in Erigavo, Buran, El- 
Afwein, Berbera, and Burao provided by the colonial government (Colonial 
Office 1952). Large numbers of deaths caused mainly by disease rather than 
starvation were reported during the famine. Most o f the deaths in the second 
year, for instance, were caused by the outbreak of a malaria epidemic following 
exceptionally good rains in mid 1951. Similarly, more than 1,000 people died 
in the relief camps because of poor sanitary conditions and malnutrition. For 
the first time the colonial government had instituted food-for-work programmes 
for the famine victims. Destitute men were given employment on road 
construction programmes, while women, children, and the aged or infirm men 
were admitted to the relief camps.
The famine also caused an estimated 80% loss of livestock between July 1950 
to March 1951 in the eastern part of the country4 (Colonial Office 1954). The 
export of livestock fell in 1950 as a consequence, though the fall was less 
drastic than previous famines. Like other famines, the death of animals was 
accompanied by the increased export of skins. Export of gums and resins which 
were collected mainly from the eastern parts of the country increased by 114%
4 Pastoralists attributed this exceptionally high loss of animals partly to the gammexane 
chemical used to control locusts. They claimed that the chemical poisoned wells and pasture and 
caused significant number of animal deaths.
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in 1950, suggesting that increased number o f people were engaged in gathering 
and selling of gums and resins. In the eastern districts of the country, where the 
famine was more severe, it created a conflict between the two majority clans 
in the area - Dolbahante and Habar Jealo - which resulted from a dispute in the 
grazing and water rights in the south of the territory. More than 80 people were 
killed in a fighting which took place in the Las Anod district between 1952 and 
1953 (Colonial Office 1957).
The last major famine during the colonial administration in 1955-56 also had 
a significant impact on the country. It is locally known as Arbacada or "The 
Wednesday Year", referring to the fact that the year started on Wednesday 
which local people associate with severe droughts5. Because herds had not 
recovered from the previous drought, pastoralists were less able to cope with 
this famine. As a result, there were heavy losses of livestock in the second year 
of the famine and famine conditions were reported throughout the country. 
Although' there was a relatively small fall of sheep and goat exports in the 
second year o f the famine, export of skins increased as expected, suggesting 
that a large number of animals had been slaughtered. A relief camp was opened 
in Abdul-Kadir in the west o f the country for the famine victims. Similarly,
5 If the new year in the local calendar coincides with Wednesday, people expect calamities 
such as severe droughts, civil wars and epidemics. The period is then referred to as Arabacada 
(Wednesday).
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food-for-work programmes were resumed by the colonial government for 
destitute men (Boothman 1975).
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show that there was a sudden increase of food imports 
during the famine. The amount of rice imported more than tripled from 1954 
to 1956, reaching the second highest record for two decades. Probably because 
of a lack of purchasing power and good rains which reduced the requirement 
for imported food after the earlier famine, the amount of rice imported was less 
than 1,000 metric tons, the lowest ever record, in 1953. Yet this famine 
changed the trend and the import of rice peaked to 9,204 metric tons. At the 
same time, the import o f dates increased sharply, while the figures for millet 
which was imported from Ethiopia also showed the same trend. However, the 
data for millet are not very reliable because unlike other items which passed 
through the sea ports, an accurate measurement of millet trade was not possible 
given the free movement of pastoralists through the nominal border between 
Somaliland and Ethiopia.
The last major drought during the colonial administration in 1955-56 was 
relatively less severe than earlier droughts and famines. Yet, exceptionally high 
food imports in 1959, as shown in figures 4.10 and 4.11, suggest a shortage of 
food in the country. Because of the failure of G u’ rains, widespread crop 
failures were reported in the western parts of the country which contributed to
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the shortage of food grains. Acute water shortage was also reported in the 
Hargeis'a district during the drought, forcing the colonial government to take 
emergency measures and mobilise transport to supply water to both the 
pastoralists in the area and inhabitants o f the capital, Hargeisa (Boothman 
1975). Although this intervention covered only one district, it is believed that 
it was largely successful in averting widespread human and animal losses.
Figure 4.10 Import of Dates, 1947-1959
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Figure 4.11 Import of Rice, 1947-1959
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4.3.2 Household Responses
Although there is no detailed information on rural household responses during 
these droughts and famines, oral accounts and some o f the available 
documentary sources indicate several response patterns. First, during the 
famines, households increased their involvement in market exchange by 
stepping up the disposal o f animals and animal products. Increased animal sales 
are shown by increases in animal exports in the first year of most famines and 
droughts. Although there were exceptionally high losses o f small stock in most 
o f the famines, export figures show no corresponding fall. For instance,
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between 1927 and 1928 more than 80% of the small stock died, but the annual 
export o f sheep and goats fell by only 38%. Similarly, in the equally disastrous 
famine in 1955-56 which also resulted in animal losses o f more than 50%, 
export of small stock between 1955 and 1956 fell by only 3.4%. This suggests 
that, in spite of high losses of livestock, pastoralists continued to sell large 
numbers of live animals. Furthermore, increased sale o f skins provided them 
with the extra revenue they required to purchase imported food items since they 
were no longer able to meet their subsistence requirement from livestock 
products such as milk and ghee. Pastoralists slaughtered large numbers of 
animals that had little chance of survival in droughts and were not suitable for 
sale.
Free trade with the outside world certainly provided reliable markets and some 
security in crisis periods. The markets for both live animals and animal 
products remained stable throughout droughts and famines. No significant 
changes in the prices of export animals and imported items were reported. 
Although price data is not available, oral accounts suggest relatively stable 
market prices during the famines. Similarly, import prices remained relatively 
stable at these times (figure 4.12). The port of Berbera was the main reference 
market for the rest of the country and with the exception of conflicts most of 
the pastoralists traded their goods for food and manufactured items. The 
exchange of animals and animal products for food and manufactured goods was
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central to the pastoralists even in normal years (Swift 1979).
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Second, during the more severe famines some households responded by 
migrating to villages and towns in search of employment or relief. Most of 
these households migrated to towns such as Hargeisa which previously had a 
very small population of about several hundred people. However, in most cases 
not all household members migrated to towns. Instead, households sent some 
of their members to the towns. Which members were sent away depended on 
the severity of the famine and the opportunities available in the towns. For 
example, sending children and the elderly to stay with relatives in towns was 
common in most droughts, but adult members also migrated to towns in search 
of employment in severe famines. However, the bulk of the permanent 
migration to urban towns took place after the Second World War when most 
major towns, such as Hargeisa, were established.
Third, many households adopted a new strategy for augmenting their incomes 
by working for wealthier families who had large herds and required labour. It 
was often the adult members of the families who had lost most o f their 
livestock, that engaged in this type of activity. In addition, other income 
generating activities such as selling firewood, charcoal, and gums and resins 
were also taken up by an increasing number of households. There are no 
statistics for trade in firewood and charcoal, but data for gums and resins 
(Figure 4.7) show that their trade increased substantially during droughts and 
famines. Figure 4.7 and 4.13 show an increasing overall trend in the trade of
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gums and resins which suggests that an increasing number of people were 
involved in collecting and selling gums and resins.
Fourth, pastoral households also adopted a system of redistribution in which 
destitute households were assisted by relatives. One of the most common 
methods of redistribution known as Xoolo Goyn involved giving some breeding 
animals to the destitute and the very poor who had lost most or all o f their 
animals in the droughts. Other systems of redistribution widely used include 
Zekaat6, alms gifts and remittances from relatives working in the towns. 
Although there had been some changes in the traditional social networks as a 
result of increased market involvement (Swift 1979), they largely remained 
effective in times of crisis.
As a response to increased frequency of severe water shortages in drought 
periods, many households invested in building cemented ponds (Berkado) from 
the 1950s to store water for human and livestock use during the dry season. 
These new private watering points and large dams (Balliyo) constructed by the 
colonial government in the grazing areas helped to reduce water shortages and 
the overcrowding of animals around the few existing permanent wells.
6 It is the duty of every Muslim who lives above subsistence level to pay Zakaat for the 
relief of the poor. This is not a charity but a legal claim by the poor against the rich. The rate 
varies according to the wealth, but it starts with a 2.5% of the person’s total assets.
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Diversification o f the species of animals owned was another strategy adopted 
by the pastoralists to minimize the risks of droughts. They kept herds composed 
o f camel, cattle, sheep and goats. Because these animals are affected by 
different diseases and have different resistance to droughts, pastoralists 
minimized the risks o f losing all of their animals in droughts or epidemics. Of 
particular importance are the small stock which breed more quickly and rebuild 
stocks after droughts or diseases. However, as result o f a shift from a mainly 
subsistence to a more commercial pastoral economy since the early 1950s the 
species composition of herds has changed (Swift 1979) with a substantially 
increased proportion of small stock to camels. This meant the ownership of 
fewer camels.
A further common strategy adopted by the pastoralists was splitting herds 
according to sex, breed or productivity and spreading them over a wide range 
of area. This involved separating large animals from small stocks or separating 
herds into milking and dry herds. In this herd management system, for example, 
the main herds were often taken away to distant pastures and dry season 
grazing areas, while milking animals were kept close to the main watering 
points.
A remarkable feature of the responses adopted by the households has been their 
ability to cope with the effects of the droughts and famines. Indeed most of the
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droughts that affected the country did not translate into famines mainly because 
households adopted strategies that mitigated the effects o f these droughts. It 
was only prolonged droughts together with wars {Col iyo Abaar) and other 
plagues such as locusts and epidemics that turned to major famines. Even in 
these famines, their coping strategies helped them to prevent widespread 
starvation despite the lack of any major relief interventions. Commenting on the 
recovery of pastoral households after the 1927-29 famine which killed 80% of 
small stock in the country, a British Somaliland government official remarked 
that (Colonial Office 1931: 7) they have:
proved surprising resilient, and although the normal has not yet been 
reached, there is reason to hope to that the recovery will be complete 
within the next two years provided there are no further abnormal 
conditions to impede progress.
4.4 Droughts and Famines, 1960-87
From independence until 1987 at least four major droughts with varying 
degrees of severity hit the country. The first drought occurred in 1965, five 
years after independence, and affected parts of Somaliland and Haud. A cattle 
epidemic which killed large numbers of cattle herds was reported in this 
drought. The second drought in 1968-69 which also affected parts of 
Somaliland and Haud was caused by the failure of rains. Both o f these droughts
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were relatively less severe than previous ones before independence. However, 
the 1974-75 drought turned out to be one of the most severe famines since 
1920. Although it affected many parts of Somaliland, it hit hardest in the 
eastern regions.
The 1974-75 famine coincided with the commencement of a rural development 
campaign aimed at teaching Somali nomads the official alphabet of the Somali 
language. The regime was busy in mobilising tens of thousands of students and 
teachers for the rural mass literacy campaign during the earlier stages of the 
famine and the early signs were ignored. It was only reported when several 
hundred destitute nomads gathered in the outskirts of major towns such as 
Burao and Erigavo. Government officials in the regions affected by the famine 
were aware of its development, but reluctant to report it to the central 
government in fear of being seen to be against the government’s rural 
"prosperity" campaign. It was only after the first relief camps were opened near 
Burao and Erigavo that the government acknowledged the existence o f the 
famine and the rural "prosperity" campaign turned into a desperate famine relief 
operation. In the beginning of 1975, there were more than 200,000 destitute 
people (Lewis 1975) in eighteen relief camps. By March 1975, some 5,000 
destitute nomads were arriving at the relief camps per day (Hitchcock and 
Hussein 1987).
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The last drought in this period occurred in 1980 and affected mainly the North 
West region of Somaliland and parts of Haud. One of the worst affected areas 
was Gabiley district where agro-pastoralists lost more than half o f their 
animals. Severe water shortages were reported in this drought, but unlike the 
one in 1959 there was no government intervention. This drought also resulted 
in food shortages in the region following major crop failures. Since the late 
1960s local food production had accounted for a large proportion of the total 
food consumed in the country, thus, crop failures had greater impact on food 
availability throughout the country.
With the exception of the 1974-75 famine, the information available on the 
droughts after independence is very limited and unreliable, thus the remainder 
of this section concentrates on the causes, impact and household responses of 
the 1974-75 famine.
4.4.1. Causes
This famine, which has become known as Dabadheer1 (the prolonged famine), 
was caused by a severe drought which affected most of the northern regions 
(Somaliland) and Haud. The drought was "the culmination of four successive
7 This is also known as Gaadhi-Gaadhi-Saar which refers to water tanks mounted on trucks 
to supply water to remote villages. It literally means putting a car on the top of another one.
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years o f poor rains" (Lewis 1975: 1). It was triggered by the failure of Deyr 
(autumn) rains in 1974 which led to severe water shortages. The water points 
dried up early in the season and as a result nomads were forced to move closer 
to the water points near dry river beds which still had some water early in the 
dry season. But because of overcrowding these wells soon dried up. In addition, 
there were shortages of pasture caused by the overcrowding of livestock in 
areas close to the towns and water.
The calamity began in November 1974 when cattle died in large numbers. By 
January of the following year, thousands of nomads had already lost most or 
all of their sheep, goats and cattle. Camels survived until late in the drought, 
but they then died in large numbers because of a lack of pasture. This was one 
o f a few droughts in which a large number of camels - the most resistant and 
most prized of all the animals in nomadic life - died.
Furthermore, there was a serious shortage of food throughout the country which 
exacerbated the situation. Following the nationalisation of banking, imports and 
wholesale trade and the introduction of price controls, food markets in the 
northern regions were seriously disrupted. The response of private traders to the 
introduction of nationalisation and a centrally controlled system was panic 
hoarding and speculation which seriously affected food availability. Meanwhile, 
the food rationing system which the government introduced to replace the
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existing free market system failed to work and only added to the speculations 
in food markets. The failure o f the rationing system particularly in rural areas 
was even recognized by the regime at the time (Lewis 1975). Hundreds of 
government shops aimed at selling food items at fixed prices were opened in 
major towns and villages and residents were issued with identity cards to buy 
fixed amounts of food every week, but because of a shortage of supplies only 
small numbers of people managed to buy sufficient food in these shops. In the 
rural areas, pastoralists who were not registered relied on food purchased in the 
black market at exorbitant prices.
The widespread crop failure and the subsequent food shortages in neighbouring 
Ethiopia also contributed to the food crisis during the famine. Since the 
introduction of the food rationing system, most of the Somali pastoralists in the 
northern regions depended on cereal grains from the Hararghe region for their 
consumption. But this region was also affected by the drought. Indeed, 
Hararghe was one of most severely affected regions throughout Ethiopia and 
grain prices were reported to have tripled during the famine.
4.4.2 Im pact and Household Responses
The 1974-75 famine had a significant impact on the pastoral households in the 
affected regions. It resulted in a very high loss o f life and widespread
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destitution. More than 20,000 people were reported to have died of starvation 
and malnutrition (Hitchcock and Hussein 1987) during the famine. Although 
no statistics are available, further deaths of the destitute nomads occurred after 
they were resettled in the southern agricultural areas of the country because of 
poor sanitation and malarial diseases. Moreover, it is estimated that more than 
100,000 households became destitute as a result of the famine. Up to 300,000 
people, representing 10%- 15% of the entire pastoral population were forced 
to register in relief camps (Haaland and Keddeman 1984).
The famine had far-reaching consequences on the rural economy, killing an 
estimated 5 million animals (Hitchcock and Hussein 1987). The export of 
animals which accounted for up to 90% of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings plummeted. Similarly, the slaughter of animals inside the country fell 
sharply. An analysis of the effects of the famine on the export and slaughter of 
sheep and goats shows that there was a significant downward shift o f the trend 
of small stock exports and slaughtering. Results o f regressions presented in 
table 4.3 show that subsequent exports of small stock were 49% lower than in 
the pre-famine period. Similarly, the famine caused the slaughter of sheep and 
goats to fall 11 percent below the pre-famine level. The share of Saudi 
livestock imports from Somalia which was 75% for small stock and 90% for 
cattle until the 1974-75 famine fell to around 50% (Russe 1982).
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A further consequence of this famine was the dislocation of up to 75,000 
nomads who were resettled in the agricultural land along the two rivers in 
southern Somalia. Pursuing its objective of settling pastoralists, the government 
settled drought affected nomads in three major centres in Kurtenwaarey, 
Sablaale and Dujuuma in southern Somalia. In the initial stages of the 
settlement programme pastoralists resisted the idea of suddenly changing their 
way of life and engaging in farming of which they had no experience. But 
circumstances have forced them to accept settlement of an alien environment. 
The re-settlement programme had a negative impact on the livelihoods of both 
the settlers and the households they left in the nomadic areas. It increased the 
vulnerability of the communities and members of households who were left 
behind in the drought-affected areas. This resulted mainly from the fact that 
relatives who supported each other in difficult periods became separated in this 
programme. At the same time it failed to provide a reliable source of income 
for the settlers, forcing most of them to return to their former way of life in 
pastoralism or to migrate to urban towns (Hitchcock and Hussein 1987).
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Table 4.3 Regression Results
-77.36 + 0.04T - 0.49D
1. Small stock exports (-3.7) (4.0) (-2.8)
R2 = 0.42
-52.65 + 0.03T - 0.1 ID
2. Small stock slaughter (-18.6) (21.5) (-4.35)
R2 =0.98
Where: D = 1 for famine period, D = 0 for non-famine period; T = Time; figures in parentheses 
are t-ratios; the data used for this regression is obtained from the FAO data series.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have traced the droughts and famines that have affected the 
country for one hundred years. Since the great famine in 1888-1892 there have 
been frequent droughts and famines in Somaliland and Haud. Although most 
of the famines were caused by failure of rains in successive number o f seasons, 
the most severe were associated with civil wars. However, other plagues such
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as locusts have also contributed to the causes of famines.
Pastoralists coped with these droughts and famines by developing a series of 
adaptive and coping strategies aimed at mitigating the effects on their 
livelihoods. These included increased market exchange, diversified herd 
composition, split-herding, a range of redistributive system, migratory 
movements, and sending members of their families to urban towns to send back 
remittances. Some of the pastoralists have settled and started cultivation, while 
others have started engaging in petty trade. These strategies have largely been 
successful in mitigating the effects of droughts and famines and preventing 
widespread starvation in most crises. Free trade and integration into the world 
markets permitted pastoralists to adopt more effective responses in terms of 
providing a relatively stable market and employment opportunities not only 
inside the country but also in neighbouring countries such as Djibouti and the 
Arabian Gulf.
An important difference between the famines in the colonial period and those 
in the post-colonial periods was the role of public interventions in responding 
to crises. In the colonial period various interventions, including famine relief, 
food-for-work schemes and the provision of water were undertaken during 
severe droughts and famine. Although these responses were often limited in 
scope because of budgetary reasons, they have largely been successful in
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mitigating the effects o f the droughts and famines. However, in the post­
colonial period public interventions were conspicuously absent during droughts 
and famines8.
8 Some relief was provided to the victims of the 1974-75 famine at a very late stage of the 
famine.
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CHAPTER 5. RURAL ECONOMY BEFORE THE WAR
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the structure of rural economy before the 1988 war. It 
describes crop and livestock production systems, the cultivation of Qat, the 
functioning of redistributive systems and the role o f development programmes 
on agriculture in the district. It also discusses government pricing policy and 
the performance of food and livestock markets in the region. Using data from 
the 1987 survey and other studies conducted prior to the war, these issues are 
discussed to present a picture of the true situation of rural families before the 
war. This is important for understanding how the rural households responded 
to the food crisis from 1988-92 and how they coped (or did not cope) with the 
effects of the war.
5.2 Agriculture in Gabiley
Agro-pastoralists in the area practise a system of mixed farming in which 
livestock play an important role. They have cultivated food crops and raised 
livestock since the early 1900s. Rain-fed sorghum was the main food crop 
accounting for 75% of the cultivated area. Sorghum was the most important 
crop because of its resistance to droughts which occurred in the region every
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five years. But maize and pulses were also grown as food crops. Watermelons, 
vegetables and Qat were grown as cash crops. Small farms irrigated mainly by 
pumping water from hand-dug shallow wells alongside the banks o f dry river 
beds produced vegetables, water melons, guavas, citrus, and mangoes.
There were 6,029 farming households with arable farms in the Gabiley district 
in 1988, according to a village listing and household survey conducted in 1988 
(NWADEP 1988b). Table 5.1 shows that the Gabiley district had the largest 
number of farming households within the two regions of the North West and 
Awdal. Only 9% of the farming households owned irrigated farms. Farming 
households in the district lived in settlements (reers). There were 111 reers in 
the district containing an average of 7.8 households. Generally there are wide 
variations in the number of households in a reer, which in the case of Gabiley 
ranged from 1 to 123 households. Reers containing large numbers of farming 
households were generally those that were closer to the town or around 
villages.
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Table 5.1 Distribution of Farming Households and Reers in the North West and 
Awdal Regions
District




No of Households 
with Irrigated Farms
Gabiley 6,029 111 565
Hargeisa 4,095 1,255 649
Borama 1,691 348 75
Baki 3,245 621 117
Total 15,060 3,001 1,406
Source: Gazetteer: Village Listing Survey, NWADEP, 1988.
A major problem in the area was severe soil erosion. In the rainy seasons, 
hundreds of hectares of land were washed away by rain water every year. 
Recognising the threat of soil erosion to the district’s arable land, the British 
colonial administration started investigations into ways of controlling soil 
erosion in the late 1940s by carrying out a series of trials. This was pioneered 
by two agricultural officers A. Seager and R.N. Green who constructed bunds 
(earth banks) adapted from Yemen where they had been used by the local 
farmers to control gullies and conserve moisture SAR (1976). Because the 
programme was based on simple technology that involved the use of local
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labour and oxen, it was successful and farmers participated fully in the actual 
construction of bunds. Indeed, it was a low-cost conservation programme which 
the farmers were able to replicate and carry out any subsequent maintenance 
on their own.
The success of this small scale programme led to the set up of a USAID project 
in 1961 and a subsequent World Bank project which expanded bunding 
programmes into the rest of the arable land. The USAID project was confined 
to only two small locations in Gabiley district - Arabsiyo and El Bardale. 
Although this was also a small scale project, it was relatively successful in El 
Bardale where a religious community had been practising both dry-land and 
small scale irrigated farming as a cooperative. However, the modest success of 
this project was more to do with the organisation of the community rather than 
bunding per se. The community was led by a highly respected and well 
connected religious leader who invested large sums of money on the 
development of the community farms.
5.2.1 Agricultural Development in the District
Agriculture in the district was significantly affected by the establishment of a 
major development project in the region. In 1979, a US$40 million World Bank
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project9 - the North West Regions Agricultural Development Project 
(NWADEP) - was set up in the northern regions to improve the incomes of 
rural households by increasing crop yields through soil and water conservation. 
Since 1979, some 23,000 hectares o f land involving 7,500 farms have been 
bunded in the three districts of Gabiley, Hargeisa and Borama. More than 70% 
of the farms in the Gabiley district were bunded from 1979-87. However, the 
project has failed to transform the traditional agriculture as intended. There are 
several reasons for this.
First, the bunding programme was carried out without testing its 
appropriateness and effects on crop yields as it was significantly different in 
terms of scale and technology from the previous programmes. Unlike the earlier 
soil conservation programmes, this project introduced heavy machinery to build 
larger bunds. Although this involved removing substantial amounts of the top 
soil, no attempt was made, for example, to assess its effects on soil fertility and 
yields. Citing these problems, such as the removal o f top soil and exposure of 
the subsoil, farmers had originally resisted the new system of bunding. 
However, by offering free human and livestock water points for those who 
accepted bunding, the project overcame the farmers’ initial resistance. Given 
the water shortage in the area, they had been forced to accept bunding primarily
9 The second phase of the project which started in 1984 was co-financed by the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development and the EEC
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as a means of getting access to free water points constructed by the project. In 
addition to water points, other services were offered such as land clearing 
which influenced them to accept bunding. Moreover, in some areas farmers 
bunded their land primarily because it provided permanent demarcation of their 
plots and greater degree of security of tenure (SOGREAH 1980).
Second, the participatory approach used in the earlier programmes was replaced 
by an approach which was essentially top down and imposed on the farmers. 
In the first two bunding schemes implemented in the region, the farmers’ 
participation was necessary and they were required to take part in the 
construction and subsequent repairs and maintenance. However, this was no 
longer the case in this project in which the emphasis was to achieve set targets 
o f bunding. Moreover, the project disregarded the local knowledge of 
conservation and the traditional system of water harvesting widely used to 
conserve moisture for Qat fields.
A third reason why the project failed was because of a lack of a repair and 
maintenance policy. The project management’s preoccupation in achieving set 
targets of bunding meant that the quality control was neglected, resulting in 
frequent breakages o f bunds. Farmers were supposed to carry out the repairs of 
broken bunds, but because of the size of the new type o f bunds, repairing 
required heavy machines which the small farmers could not afford. Indeed,
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most o f the broken bunds were so eroded that they required redesigning and 
rebuilding. This was one of the most serious consequences of bunding, resulting 
in much of the bunded land to be abandoned by the farmers. For example, in 
Gogeysa, a small village five miles north of Gabiley, up to 80% of the bunds 
have been completely abandoned mainly because o f lack of repairs. In the 
survey area, more than 25% of the bunds have also been abandoned. The 
breakage of bunds further accelerated soil erosion because once the structures 
break down they cause more serious damage than if they had not been built at 
all.
Farmers have also abandoned their traditional crop rotation systems as a result 
of bunding. Before bunding, farmers cultivated about one-third of their arable 
land, leaving the remaining area fallow for livestock grazing. After several 
years, the cultivated portion was fallowed and another part was cultivated. This 
system of rotation allowed the land to recover its fertility. After bunding, the 
bunded land should be cultivated continuously because if the bunded land is 
fallowed weeds take over and controlling then becomes very difficult. The area 
between the bunds harbours different species of weeds which cannot be 
controlled unless the land is cultivated continuously.
The abandonment of the traditional crop rotation system and the subsequent 
continuous cultivation of bunded fields had caused the soil fertility to decline.
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The effect of this was shown by a yield study survey conducted in 1987 which 
found that the yield o f bunded fields cultivated continuously without rotation 
was significantly lower than other fields (NWADEP 1988a). A further effect 
of bunding on the farming system was a decline in maize cultivation. Because 
of water-logging caused by uneven distribution of water in between bunds, 
farmers reduced the cultivation of maize, which is less resistant to water­
logging. Instead, they increased cultivation of sorghum which is resistant to 
water-logging and nutrient deficiency in the soil caused by the removal o f top 
soil in the bunded fields. Cultivation of legumes such as cowpeas which are 
less resistant to water-logging was also reduced. The effects of these were 
reduced diversification of crops and intercropping, both of which were 
important risk minimization strategies.
The use o f oxen for land preparation was also replaced by tractors because of 
the fact the sub-soil exposed after the construction of bunds was too hard and 
compacted for ox ploughing. Consequently, less than 14%10 of land 
preparation in 1987 were carried out by oxen compared to 80% in 1979 
(Ahmed 1990). An important effect of this was an increased reliance on tractors 
which, because of a shortage of fuel and spare parts, were not often available 
at the critical time of planting and land preparation. In order to make maximum
10 Oxen are, however, used for weeding (Baab-baaq) and thinning after the land preparation 
had been done by tractors.
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use o f rain water and reduce the losses caused by birds11 farmers sow their 
crops early in the rainy season, creating a peak period for tractor demand. 
Many farmers reported missing the ideal planting times because of the shortage 
of tractors (NWADEP 1988).
5.2.2 Crop Production
Sorghum was the principal crop grown in the area, accounting for 75% of the 
cultivated area. An average of 1.7 hectares of sorghum was grown by the 
farmers (NWADEP 1988a). Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of sorghum 
cultivation in Gabiley in 1987. Other crops grown included maize, pulses and 
water melons. While sorghum was grown as the main cereal crop, maize was 
grown as an early crop because of its shorter duration. Pulses were grown for 
intercropping with sorghum and maize, but water melons and vegetables were 
grown as cash crops. In addition, some farmers cultivated small scale irrigated 
farms along the dry rivers on which they grew mainly fruit and vegetables.
11 Bird damage is highest in the months of October and November, therefore, farmers try 
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Grain yields of sorghum and maize were relatively low compared to average 
yields in similar environments. In normal years their average yields were 450 
kgs and 550 kgs respectively. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, a 
broadcasting method of planting practised in the area produces wide variations 
in plant densities and yields. Using a seeding rate o f 13.5 kgs per hectare, the 
seed is broadcast before ploughing, producing plant populations that vary from 
1,800 to 96,000 per hectare. Because of a lack of extension services in the area, 
line sowing which produces more uniform plant density had not been 
introduced. Secondly, significant losses of yields were caused by stalk borer 
and smut disease. Studies conducted in the area found yield losses of up to
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40% of farms affected by the disease and the stalk borer. A third factor which 
contributed to the low yields was losses caused by birds.
|
| A low yielding, long duration variety of sorghum with a growing cycle o f 140-[
i
| 170 days was grown in the area because of its resistance to droughts, pests and
diseases. This variety also had the advantage of producing higher yields of 
straw used for animal feed than other varieties. Thus, 98% of the farmers in the 
region grew this variety of sorghum.
j Because of a shortage of pasture in the area, sorghum was grown mainly to
I
provide stover for the animals during the dry season, although it was also 
grown for meeting the subsistence requirements of the family. This was 
particularly so in drought years when the only harvest farmers obtained was 
straw yield. Table 5.2 shows that in 1987, which was not a drought year, up to 





























































































































The shortage o f grazing land in the area was exacerbated by the bunding 
programme which forced many farmers to start the production o f grass in 
preference to food crops (NWADEP 1988a). This was the case in Upper Botor 
village near Gabiley where large numbers o f farmers allowed pasture to grow 
in their bunds with yields of up to six tons of hay per hectare. This hay was 
either sold to livestock traders who transported it to Berbera to feed animals 
awaiting exportation or stored to feed animals at the farm during the dry 
season. Given the very low costs involved in producing hay, farmers reported 
that in drought years it was more profitable and less risky to produce pasture 
than sorghum.
Sorghum yields were expected to increase under the NWADEP. Yet after more 
than a decade of project services, average yields obtained by farmers have not 
increased. Although the project claimed that bunding would raise yields by 
more than 50 percent (SAR 1984), detailed independent studies carried out in 
1980 and 1987 reveal that there was no significant difference between the 
yields of bunded and unbunded fields (NWADEP 1988a; SOGREAH 1980). 
Table 5.3 summarises the results of the 1987 yield study.
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Table 5.3 Comparison of Grain and Straw Yields Between Bunded And 
Unbunded Fields, 1987
Grain Yields Straw Yields
Bunded Unbunded Bunded Unbunded
Mean (kg/ha) 235 226 4,152 4,156
Coefficient of 115 130 70 86
Variation %
Standard Error 27 29 293 364
Range 0 - 1,345 0 - 1,450 220-15,040 20-■17,240
t-ratios 0.24 (Not significant @ -0.007 (Not significant @
1% level) 1% level)
Source: Survey data, 1987
5.2.3 Livestock Production
Farmers derived a higher proportion of their incomes from animals than from 
crop production. In a typical year the revenues from animals would be twice 
the value of farm output. For instance, in 1987 cash income from the animals 
was So Sh 43,800, while the total output value of crops was So Sh 21,954 
(Tables 5.2 & 5.4). As shown in Table 5.4, the sale o f milk and ghee accounted
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for 66% of total cash revenues from animals. An average cow in the area 
produced up to 400 litres o f milk per six months of lactation period of which 
240 litres were sold in exchange for food grains and to meet other cash 
requirements o f the household, while the rest was consumed by the family. 
Goats’ milk was mainly consumed by the household, while sheep’s milk was 
processed to make ghee. But cows’ milk was either sold fresh or processed to 
produce ghee which can be stored for long periods and sold as and when the 
household needed cash. Ghee-making was common during the rainy season 
when milk prices were generally low. However, because it coincides with a 
peak period in terms of labour requirement, most farmers in the area sold their 
milk produce fresh unless prices were exceptionally low.
Table 5.4 Mean household Cash Revenues from Animals, 1987
Source Revenue (So Sh) % of Total 
Revenue
Milk and Ghee Sales 28,800 66
Animal Sales 15,000 34
Total 43,800 100
Source: Survey data, 1987
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Table 5.5 reports animal species owned by households in 1987. Compared with 
animal ownership in the nomadic areas, herd sizes were much smaller yet their 
productivity was higher. This was mainly due to the fact that the straw/fodder 
which farmers feed their animals was superior in terms of nutritional value to 
grazing in the nomadic areas. Moreover, the easy access of water in agro­
pastoral areas also meant that animals were less mobile than in nomadic areas.









Source: Survey data, 1987
Households in the area practised a system whereby some o f the animals
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together with members of the family were sent to summer pasture in the Haud 
region or near the border between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Mainly sheep and 
goats were sent away to search for better grazing. As cattle require water every 
two days, their movements are much more restricted than other animals. In a 
typical year up to 20% of household members would be away with the animals 
(see Table 5.6). However, not all households sent members of their families 
away with the animals. Those with smaller herds often entered an agreement 
with their relatives to combine their herds and share the task of looking after 
them.
Table 5.6 Seasonally Migrant Household Members, 1987
Mean % of Total
Male Female Children Total Members
Seasonally Migrant 0.50 0.33 0.77 1.59 20
Total HH Members 2.30 2.00 3.40 7.78 100
Source: Survey data, 1987
One major problem for livestock production in the area was overgrazing which 
resulted from a rapid expansion of cultivation and extensive bush clearance 
carried out by the NWADEP project. Since the early 1980s hundreds of
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hectares o f grazing land were turned into arable land, resulting in overgrazing 
in the remaining areas. This was exacerbated by a massive destruction o f trees 
in the area by half a million Ethiopian refugees based in the region. These 
factors intensified what was already described by SAR (1976) as an alarming 
rate o f rangeland degradation.
5.3 Qat in the R ural Economy
Cultivation of Qat13 (Catha edulis) in the area started in the early 1960s when 
farmers in the village of Galoolay began to experiment it as a cash crop. Since 
then it has become the most important cash crop in the North-west and Awdal 
regions. Many farmers in the area have adopted the cultivation of Qat since the 
1974/75 drought. Because of its resistance to droughts and the semi-arid 
environment, farmers who owned Qat fields managed to cope well with the 
drought conditions. When all other crops failed, owners were able to harvest 
their Qat fields and sell at very high prices. This influenced other farmers to 
start cultivating it. By 1983 more than two-thirds of the farmers in Galoolay 
had Qat fields with one to eighteen year old plants (NWADEP 1983). Although
13 Qat is chewed for its stimulant effect. It is widely consumed in the Horn of Africa and 
Yemen. In Somaliland up to 90% of the male population and some 5% of women chew it 
regularly in the afternoons.
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it takes several years to reach maturity, cuttings can start as early as the second 
year.
The success of Qat cultivation was contributed by strong domestic demand 
which maintained its price throughout the year. This results from the fact that 
Qat is both demand and income inelastic: its demand does not change either 
with incomes or with its price. Because it has become more o f a necessity 
good, the amount of Qat consumed does not fall even if its price goes up. 
Similarly, its demand does not change with income levels, therefore, both the 
rich and the poor consume certain numbers of bundles irrespective of their 
incomes and wealth. Indeed, as more and more people took up the habit of 
chewing, its market continued to expand.
The cultivation of Qat provided stable source of income for farmers in the area. 
In 1983, the annual gross revenue for the average Qat owner in Galoolay was 
about So Sh 110,000 (US$2,200)14 (NWADEP 1983) which was roughly ten 
times the combined revenues from crops and animals. Some of this revenue 
was reinvested in the farm by expanding the cultivation of Qat and food crops. 
Thus, contrary to the government’s claim that Qat was replacing food crops, 
the growing of Qat was in fact increasing the production of food crops. Qat
14 At the black market rate of 50 shillings per $
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owners also invested some of the revenues on building more permanent houses 
(e.g. tin-roofed huts). Improved living conditions and increased wealth in the 
area was indicated by second and third marriages among the Qat owners in the 
early 1980s. Many farmers considered Qat plants as their most prized assets. 
As one farmer put it, the plants were "their camels" since Qat shares similar 
characteristics with camels (i.e. resistance to droughts; and wealth and status 
associated with its ownership). As Samatar (1988) noted many producers also 
described it as a famine or hunger preventer.
In addition, the cultivation of Qat also provided employment to many people 
both inside and outside the rural sector. In the rural areas, this was because of 
its labour-intensive operations such as weeding, bunding, pruning and 
harvesting which require labour input from outside the household (Ahmed
1990). It thus provided employment to labourers whose primary source of 
income was working on Qat farms. It also provided employment to traders and 
agents, including women whose only source of income was selling Qat.
The government’s decision in 1983 to ban the cultivation of Qat seriously 
weakened the ability of the agro-pastoralists to cope with crises. By early 1984, 
all Qat farms in the country were destroyed. The banning of Qat which was 
later rescinded in 1990 was essentially a means of punishing local farmers since 
the ban did not affect the consumption and importation of Qat from Ethiopia.
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It had a devastating consequence on the rural economy. It denied an important 
source of income to the growers and others whose livelihoods depended on 
Qat. This was not the first time Qat was banned in the country. The colonial 
government in Somaliland experimented with outlawing the importation of Qat 
from Ethiopia, but failed to control the long border between Somaliland and 
Ethiopia.
5.4 Food and Livestock Markets
Households in the area used markets in Gabiley and Arabsiyo to sell their 
produce and live animals in exchange for other goods. As both of these markets 
are easily accessible to the main market in Hargeisa, the prices of animals and 
cereals closely followed the prices that prevailed in the reference market at 
Hargeisa. Thus, given the absence of information barriers and transport 
problems the markets were spatially integrated.
5.4.1 Food Markets
Grain markets in the area were relatively free and there was no government 
intervention until the early 1970s when the government created several 
parastatals which were granted an absolute monopoly over the trade o f all 
major food items. This followed the wave of nationalisation of banks, imports
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and wholesale trade in the early 1970s. The Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC) was responsible for the purchase, storage, sale and 
distribution of sorghum and maize, while the Ente Nazionale di Commercio 
(ENC) was responsible for the importation of wheat, wheat flour, and rice. A 
third parastatal was the Pasta Factory which produced spaghetti from 
concessional wheat. Private traders were prohibited by law to import, store, 
purchase or distribute food items.
Of these parastatals, the ADC had the most damaging effect on the markets of 
food crops. It adopted a consumer-oriented policy which penalised producers 
by fixing procurement prices of maize and sorghum at a level that forced many 
farmers to shift from cereal production to other crops such as vegetables and 
Qat. Its purchasing prices were so low that in 1980 the fixed prices of sorghum 
and maize were only about 15% of the parallel market price (SOGREAH 
1980). Moreover, the producer price indices reported in Table 5.7 also show 
that the real producer prices for sorghum and maize continued to fall from 1974 
to 1984. To enforce its monopoly and prevent the establishment of parallel 
markets, the ADC employed enumerators, assisted by local forces, who 
conducted yield assessments before harvesting to decide the quantity of grain 
each producer had to sell to the ADC.
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The effect of this pricing policy was a substantial fall in the region’s total food 
output. From 1971 to 1977, the total sorghum production fell by 33% from
15 Because of a lack of producer index for the rural areas, the prices have been deflated by 
Mogadishu Consumer Price Index
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30,000 tons to about 20,000 tons in the North West and Awdal regions which 
were already deficit in food grains. The local production provided less than half 
of the total sorghum and maize consumed. The other half was made up by 
sorghum imported from Ethiopia by nomads on the black market and transfers 
from southern Somalia. However, because of high transport costs and consumer 
preference for the white sorghum produced in the north and Ethiopia, the 
transfer of grains from the south was generally negligible. It was only in 
drought years that sorghum produced in the south reached markets in the north.
Lack of price incentives was also one of the reasons why many farmers in the 
north started cultivating Qat. Perhaps the large numbers o f Qat fields 
established soon after the introduction of government price control was partly 
in response to this policy. Although increased remittances from family members 
working abroad provided the necessary investment capital required for growing 
Qat and contributed to its cultivation, it appears that the government’s pricing 
policy encouraged farmers to find an alternative crop which they could sell 
freely in the market. However, not all farmers responded to this by growing 
Qat. Many of them started growing other cash crops such as water melon 
which were not covered by government price controls.
As part of the World and IMF structural adjustment, the government finally 
liberalised food markets in 1984 and allowed private sector involvement in
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cereal marketing so that farmers could sell their production surplus in the free 
market. The role o f the ADC was changed to strategic grain storage and price 
liberalisation, while the operations o f ENC was confined to distributing donated 
food items to public institutions such as schools, hospitals and police. However, 
prices of sorghum and maize still remained low because of the availability of 
donated or cheap imported wheat in the local markets. This was because ENC 
still continued to sell donated wheat and maize at a discount to public 
institutions, while food aid intended for refugees also entered local markets, 
depressing food prices.
5.4.2. Livestock Markets
Unlike food markets, there was very little government involvement in livestock 
markets. They operated in an essentially free market setting. Private traders 
were mainly responsible for purchasing animals in local markets and then 
exporting them to the Arabian Gulf. Livestock trade was the only important 
economic activity that remained in the private sector after the nationalisations 
of the early 1970s. Government involvement was confined to collecting its 
taxes. Although it made several attempts to regulate livestock marketing in 
order to have a greater influence on the activities of private traders, the 
livestock trade remained largely independent of direct government control. 
Despite the establishment of a parastatal, the Livestock Development Agency,
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similar to the ADC, the government was less willing to take actions that 
jeopardised the most important source of its foreign exchange earnings.
However, the requirement of livestock traders to remit part o f the foreign 
exchange through the national bank at the official exchange rate may have had 
some effects on the prices of animals. Samatar (1989) suggests that this had a 
significant effect on the final price received by the producers which as a result 
stagnated at about $42 per sheep when the consumer price index (1970=100) 
rose to more than 1000 in 1984, causing a deterioration of pastoral terms of 
trade. However, this is not supported by the evidence. Livestock traders 
remitted a small proportion of their foreign exchange earnings through national 
banks, although in theory they were required to remit up to 70%. The rest of 
the foreign exchange was remitted back to the country through the franco  
valuta system. Under this system the traders were allowed to import any 
consumer goods by using their own foreign exchange. It is true that the sheep 
price remained at about $42, but what matters here is whether local currency 
proceeds kept pace with inflation. Again, the evidence shows that livestock 
prices rose much faster than inflation (Haaland and Keddeman 1984). For 
instance, from 1980 to 1987 the consumer price index rose four fold, while the 
price of sheep rose by more than ten times from So Sh 440 in 1980 
(SOGREAH 1980) to So Sh 5,000 in 1987 (NWADEP 1988a)
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In addition, livestock trade operated in a fairly competitive manner. Despite the 
fact that the number o f traders involved in livestock markets was limited by the 
large capital required, there was no indication of a high degree o f market 
concentration (i.e. a high proportion of total trade being controlled by a few 
traders). Although a high degree of market concentration does not prove the 
existence of collusive pricing, there are theoretical reasons to suggest that the 
presence of a few traders each with a large market share is associated with non­
competitive market pricing. However, in the late 1970s, many small traders 
entered into livestock marketing, reducing significantly the market share o f the 
existing livestock traders. Initially, the new entrants were faced with obstacles 
such as the lack of capital and skills required in livestock export, but finally 
they overcame these obstacles. Thus, although the government always accused 
the private traders o f speculative behaviour, no individual trader was in a 
position to influence livestock prices significantly.
Furthermore, there were no barriers to price information. Despite the lack of 
mass-media market intelligence, market information was communicated through 
personal contacts. Herders obtained livestock prices regularly which helped 
them decide when and where to sell their animals. They collected this 
information whilst visiting village markets. For instance, when a member o f a 
settlement (reer) returns from a visit to a village or a town, the first thing he 
is asked about is the market information. This constant information gathering
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kept them well informed about the market situations.
When producers take their animals into a market a dillaal acts as a middleman 
between the producer and the trader. Although the role of dillaals in marketing 
is somewhat controversial, their services are still used by producers because of 
two reasons. Firstly, producers consider their knowledge of the market and 
bargaining process indispensable. Dillaals facilitate the exchange process and 
perform an essential task in bridging the gap between sellers and buyers. They 
also act as information brokers, telling producers who is credit worthy and who 
is not since some of the traders pay only half of the money at the time of the 
sale. Secondly, herders feel socially obliged to help those who earn a living as 
dillaals. For every sale they make, dillaals are paid a fixed commission which 
is generally not greater than 10% of the price of the animal. Yet dillaals are 
sometimes viewed with suspicion and accused of making a profit at the expense 
of their client by reporting less than the amount offered for the animals and 
pocketing the difference. This is mainly because of the fact that price 
negotiations are conducted secretly in a trading language and herders are only 
informed by the dillaal when prices are agreed. Therefore it is possible for 
unscrupulous dillaals to defraud herders in this manner if the herder is not 
present when the money is paid by the trader. However, since they have to rely 
on their reputation as brokers to attract future clients, they are cautious about 
defrauding producers.
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4.4 Social Networks and the Moral Economy
The Somali social and political structure consists o f clan-families which sub­
divide into clans, sub-clans, primary lineage, and dia-paying groups (Figure 
5.3). The dia-paying group is the most stable political and social unit with a 
membership from around one hundred to several thousand men. The members 
of the dia-paying groups have a contractual agreement to support each other 
and to share payments of blood money. As the term dia (blood money) paying 
implies they have collective responsibility for the payment and receipt of 
compensation of the acts committed by, or against, their individual members 
(Lewis 1961). Compensation is paid for homicide or physical injuries. For 
blood-compensation the rate is fixed at 100 camels (or their equivalent in other 
animals or cash) if a man is killed, or 50 camels if a woman is killed. But 
compensation for injures is assessed by religious leaders, using camel standards.
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I group Dia-paying group
Adapted from: A Pastoral Democracy, I.M. Lewis.
The dia-paying groups also have a common agreement to help each other 
during food crisis. They have a very strong sense of solidarity and a high 
degree of cooperation which closely links the members of the group. Although 
this is less formal than blood money payments, members have an obligation to 
help the destitute and those who are in severe hardship during crisis.
In times of crisis, each clan member is expected to observe the moral system
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or code of conduct because breaking community norms can have serious 
consequences for the individual or group involved. The importance attached to 
observing community norms and moral principles is indicated by many poems 
and stories in the Somali oral literature which warn people against opportunistic 
actions that may damage the social reputation of their group or clan. A 
particular poem often cited to warn those suspected of breaking customary rules 
refers to how the Sub clan16 lost its nobility. This is based on a story that Sub 
members consumed carcasses o f dead animals (i.e. meat that had not been 
ritually slaughtered) in a drought period when there was still some food around. 
The poem warns others that the Sub lost their nobility in this drought by eating 
forbidden food and thus breaking the community norm (Sabta waxa Midgaha 
looga dhigay saban abaareede; way nala sinnaayeen markay samadu 
toosnayde). Other poems, on the other hand, praise those who observe 
customary rules and fulfil their obligations in times of crisis. In one of his 
poems (Cahill 1986: 39), Mohamed Abdulla Hassan (the Mad Mullah), praised 
the support one receives from a relative during a famine:
Who welcomes you like a kinsman in your day of need
and who, at the height o f the drought, does not bar his gate against you,
Is not he who never fails you in your weakness one o f the brethren?
16 These groups practice skills, such as hairdressing, ironwork, and shoe-making, despised 
by the Somalis. Intermarriages with the "noble" Somalis and full participation in Somali social 
relations are prohibited.
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Specific forms of transfers practised in the rural economy include Xoolo Goyn 
(giving animals) and Zakaat and alms gifts. Xoolo Goyn (Xoolayn) involves 
giving breeding animals to destitute families who have lost their animals during 
droughts. This often takes place between dia-paying members and close 
relatives. Zakaat is a form of payment that is payable by every Muslim who 
lives above the subsistence level. They are required to distribute about 2.4% of 
their total capital per year among the poor, the old and the destitute. Zakaat is 
often paid to close relatives who are entitled to claim it. Alms which takes 
different forms is provided as gifts mainly for immediate consumption. 
However, these transfers do not carry any obligation to reciprocate.
In rural Gabiley, there are three additional forms of mutual aid in agricultural 
and related activities. These included: (1) Guus which means helping with farm 
activities such as weeding, thinning, harvesting, and threshing. In these 
activities, there is no remuneration, but the farmer provides them with food and 
Qat. Groups of kinsmen and neighbours would normally perform these tasks.
(2) Sharing oxen with those who own only one ox to join up and form a team.
(3) Lending oxen for land preparation and weeding, and (4) doing community 
work such as constructing and maintaining water points and schools.
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4.5 Conclusions
Rural households in the Gabiley district adopted a system of farming which 
suited the soil and climate in dry-land conditions. This involves raising animals 
as well as growing food crops such as sorghum which is resistant to the 
frequent droughts in the area and at the same time provides fodder for the 
animals during the dry season. The government development programmes 
intended to improve farming in the area only added to the existing soil erosion 
and overgrazing problems by using inappropriate technology and by neglecting 
animal production which played a key role in the rural economy.
On the other hand, the adoption of improved farming practices was discouraged 
by the governments pricing policy which favoured consumers and penalized 
rural producers. For more than a decade the producer prices of the main cereal 
crops were fixed at no more than 15% of the free market price, forcing many 
producers to grow non-food crops such as Qat.
The farmers’ adaptive response to the government’s policy and the recurrence 
of droughts in the area was increased adoption of Qat which was introduced in 
Gabiley in the late 1960s. The cultivation of Qat in the area was highly 
successful. Because of its growing demand and its ability to produce high 
yields even in drought years, it was very attractive to rural producers. Many
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farmers sold their animals and other assets to invest in the cultivation of Qat. 
However, the government’s decision to ban it in 1984 had a devastating impact 
on the rural households, making them even more vulnerable to droughts and 
famine.
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CHAPTER 6. THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND THE SUBSEQUENT 
CRISIS
6.1 Introduction
The war between the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the regime of 
Siyad Barre broke out in May 1988 when the rebels launched a surprise attack 
on the government troops based in the cities of Burao and Hargeisa. The 
government’s response was the indiscriminate bombing of the cities, towns and 
villages of Somaliland, resulting in mass deaths and the displacement of tens 
of thousands of people.
This chapter is about the effects of the war on rural households and the 
subsequent crisis caused by the displacement o f the population. It concentrates 
on the loss of incomes and assets, the disruption of markets and trade, and the 
population displacement. The ensuing social and health crisis and how it 
affected the ability of the households to cope with the situation is also 
discussed.
Making an overall assessment of the effects of war in general is relatively 
difficult due to its unique characteristics compared to other disasters. For 
example, it is difficult to isolate the effect of war from other factors, such as
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drought, which may occur at the same time. Similarly, some of the effects may 
not be noticed long after the hostilities have ended. However, despite these 
difficulties, it is necessary to know the effects of war on such key factors as 
living conditions, incomes, and other economic indicators, and the extent to 
which these effects can be attributed to war.
6.2 Background
In order to understand the nature and the causes of the 1988 war and the 
subsequent tragedy, several events which precipitated it and contributed to the 
development of the crisis need to be highlighted. The first was the hasty union 
of the two Somali states, the republic of Somaliland and the Italian Trust 
Territory, to form the Somali Republic in 1960. In this union, the legislative 
bodies o f the former colonies were merged to create a new Somali parliament 
based in the southern city of Mogadishu, which became the national capital. 
Southern leaders held all the major posts in the new government and the 
majority of seats in Parliament. In the interest of the union, Somaliland 
representatives accepted most of the conditions demanded by southern leaders. 
However, more than 70 years of two different colonial systems of government 
meant that there were fundamental differences between the former colonies that 
proved almost impossible to overcome. These differences were cultural, 
political, administrative, economic and social.
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As early as 1961 there was widespread discontent with the union in Somaliland. 
In a referendum for the constitution on 20 June 1961, Somaliland voted against 
it. Furthermore, in December of the same year an unsuccessful coup aimed at 
rescinding the act of the union was staged by a group of junior officers. 
Although these two events clearly showed that northerners were dissatisfied 
with the union, southern leaders who had the majority of the seats in both the 
government and parliament did little to address these grievances. Instead, they 
adopted measures aimed at enforcing full integration, which only added to the 
problems and further alienated the northerners.
The second important watershed was the military coup in 1969 which brought 
the dictator Siyad Barre to power. As soon as he was in power he devised a 
policy of repression against the people of Somaliland, whom he saw as a threat 
to his regime. He adopted economic policies that penalised trade and other 
economic interests in Somaliland and increased the imbalance of development 
funds and aid distribution between north and south. For instance, in 1986 less 
than 5% of the development aid budget was allocated to the north.
The third antecedent of the crisis was the 1977-78 Ogaden war which caused 
a flood of refugees from the eastern regions of Ethiopia following the defeat 
of the Somali army. By 1979 there were 1.3 million refugees in the country 
(Cahill 1986). More than half of these were settled in Somaliland. In the North­
132
west region alone more than half a million refugees were settled in 12 camps. 
This influx intensified pressure on already limited resources and services, 
leading to resentment among the local people. Tension was increased by the 
government’s policy of recruiting refugees into the army and using them 
against the Isaaqs. Land and property seized from local people were given to 
the refugees and the former fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF). The Isaaqs, who form 75% of the population, protested against this 
oppression and in 1981 formed the Somali National Movement (SNM). 
Nevertheless, the formation of the SNM only intensified the regime’s repression 
and plunder of the Isaaqs. From 1981 onwards, SNM fighters engaged in a 
guerilla war along the border and sometimes infiltrated into the mainland to 
carry out attacks against military and security forces.
In 1988 the SNM launched a surprise attack against government forces 
stationed in the two cities of Hargeisa and Burao. The attack followed an 
unprecedented peace accord between the two embattled dictators of Somalia 
and Ethiopia. The response by the government to the SNM invasion was a 
wholesale, indiscriminate aerial and ground bombardment o f towns and villages 
in what was described as an act of genocide (The Guardian 1989). This forced 
almost the entire Isaaq population to flee from the country and seek sanctuary 
in Ethiopia. Three years later, the dictator was toppled when his troops were 
defeated. The SNM captured Berbera on 29 January 1991 and a few days later
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liberated the rest of the country. This was followed by the declaration of the 
independence of Somaliland at a congress held in Burao on 18 May 1991.
6.3 The Effects of the War
The war had a devastating impact with far reaching social and economic 
consequences for the rural communities. It caused population displacement and 
loss of life which resulted from summary executions, aerial bombardments, 
ground attacks and the destruction of villages by government troops. It also 
caused the loss of more than half of the country’s livestock, making thousands 
o f pastoralists destitute.
Other effects were the destruction of markets and disruption of food production 
which had virtually ceased during the war and the destruction of tree crops and 
irrigation equipment on horticultural farms.
6.3.1 Loss of Life and Displacement of Population
Thousands of herders and farmers were killed in the war. Although it is 
difficult to get a correct estimate of these deaths in a country where statistical 
information of any kind is lacking, it is thought that up to 20,000 died in the 
rural areas. This represents about 20% of the total number of deaths reported
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to be about 100,000 throughout Somaliland (The Guardian 1993). These deaths 
were the result of the summary executions, aerial bombardments, ground 
attacks and destruction of villages carried out by government troops. Mass 
graves and corpses found in many towns and villages after the war are 
testimony to the scale and brutality of the government troops against their own 
people. In his report Why Somalis flee , Robert Gersony (1989) argued that the 
troops carried out what appears to be systematic attacks, targeted at farmers and 
nomads, their livestock, watering points and the grazing areas near their 
villages, killing many of the residents and forcing the survivors to flee.
Fully mechanized special troops known as the "Isaaq Exterminating Wing" 
(Dabar-goynta Isaaqa) were largely responsible for these brutal acts in rural 
villages. Recruited mainly from the refugees and the former fighters o f the 
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), they had the task of implementing 
the government’s policy of punishing nomads and farmers and destroying rural 
lives and livelihoods. They destroyed or poisoned wells (vital for the pastoral 
economy), seized livestock and burned entire villages to deprive the rural 
population of its basic means of livelihood (Amnesty International 1988). 
Herders and farmers in particular were targeted as they were perceived to 
provide support base for the SNM. This widespread destruction was carried out
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in the spirit o f General Morgan’s 17 infamous "death letter" which advocated 
the implementation of draconian measures, including the destruction of villages 
and towns in the territory situated between the bases of government troops and 
the Ethiopian border.
Mass displacement o f the rural population also took place during the war. 
Within a few months of its outbreak, almost the entire Isaaq population was 
displaced and forced to seek refuge in eastern Ethiopia where relief camps were 
established. By August 1989, about 361,000 refugees were registered in five 
camps in eastern Ethiopia (Table 6.1).
17 General Morgan was the commander of the armed forces in the north and the son-in-law 
>f Siyad Barre
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Source: Toole and Bhatia (1992)
6.3.2 Loss of Assets and Income
One of the most devastating effects of the war was the loss o f livestock. 
Although the exact number of animals lost, due to the conflict, is not yet 
known, it is estimated that more than half of the country’s total livestock 
population was lost as a result of the war and other related causes (SEPHA
1991). Moreover, a comparison of livestock holdings before and after the war 
also shows a drastic fall of livestock holdings. A survey conducted by Save the 
Children Fund (SCF) in 1991 reports average livestock holdings of 65 small 
stock, 10.8 camel and 1.3 cattle (SCF 1992) as compared to pre-war average
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holdings of 100 small stock, 25 camels and 5 cattle18. This represents a 35%, 
57% and 74% fall from pre-war average holdings for different livestock species 
respectively. In addition, most of these households have holding sizes that are 
well below the minimum viable stocks needed for meeting subsistence 
requirements and maintaining herd size. A large number of rural households 
also lost all of their livestock and became destitute. These households depended 
on food aid distributed in refugee camps in Ethiopia (Ryle 1992).
Several factors account for these high losses in livestock. First, the government 
troops and armed militias targeted watering points and villages in their attacks, 
seizing large numbers o f animals and killing many others. The confiscation of 
animals took place even before the outbreak of war as many farmers were 
accused of being SNM sympathizers. The troops also destroyed water sources 
by blowing up or draining water reservoirs. In some areas open wells were 
poisoned, while others were contaminated with corpses (Africa Watch 1989).
Secondly, extensive planting of mines in most o f the rural areas also accounts 
for high animal losses. An estimated 2-10 million mines (Warsidaha Somaliland 
1993) were planted in Somaliland in what has been described as terror mining.
18 The pre-war average holdings are based on studies conducted by the NWADEP and 
>OGREAH Consultants in the early and mid 1980s, thus it may possible that average holdings 
vere lower than these figures.
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The intention of this strategy was to force the population to flee and render the 
land extremely dangerous and uninhabitable (African Rights and Mines 
Advisory Group 1993). This had a devastating impact on the pastoralists who 
had to use heavily mined wells. As most of the grazing land and routes to 
markets and villages were mined, nomads were forced to use their animals as 
an "early-warning" for land mines, resulting in loss of hundreds of animals 
(ibid). Originally, the land mines were used as a counter-insurgency strategy 
against the SNM, but during the war they were planted indiscriminately in and 
around grazing areas, water points and main routes.
A third factor which contributed to this high loss of livestock was the lack of 
veterinary services. Veterinary drugs were either looted or destroyed. 
Consequently, animal health deteriorated and there were widespread outbreaks 
o f tick-borne diseases which killed many animals. Inadequate veterinary 
services was a major problem even before the war because of curfews and 
restrictions imposed on the movement of people and transport.
Finally, another contributing factor was the distress sale of livestock by 
pastoralists. A sudden fall of livestock prices during the war led pastoralists to 
increase their sale of animals to meet their subsistence requirements. Livestock 
markets in eastern Ethiopia were flooded with animals and the terms of trade 
between livestock and food grain fell sharply. The pressure to sell or slaughter
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more and more animals, including breeding stock, had increased because the 
number of people to be supported from a given herd size had increased and the 
average family’s subsistence requirements were no longer met from the normal 
peace time sales of livestock and livestock products such as milk, ghee and 
hides.
Agro-pastoralists, in particular, suffered higher losses than nomads. The 1992 
survey shows that up to 23% of farming households lost all of their animals 
during the war, while the remaining households suffered losses reaching up to 
80%. The agro-pastoralists were hit hardest because of their close proximity to 
the main towns and bases of government troops. They also lost larger numbers 
of animals after they migrated to the Haud region near the refugee camps 
because their animals were not adapted to the harsher environment of that area.
Another effect of the war on agro-pastoralists was disruption to crop 
production, since farmers were forced to abandon their farms. Agricultural land 
remained uncultivated from 1988 to 1991 when farmers returned to their land 
and started cultivating. Even then most farmers were unable to resume 
cultivation because of land mines and the lack of seeds and oxen to plant their 
farms. In some of the best agricultural areas in Gabiley and Arabsiyo the land 
was so densely mined that farmers were not even able to graze their animals 
(African Rights and Mines Advisory Group 1993). Moreover, in the
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horticultural areas, irrigation equipment such as pumps and pipes were looted, 
and wells and tree crops destroyed. For instance, in Arabsiyo, a town 20 miles 
west o f the capital Hargeisa and one of the most important horticultural centres, 
90% o f its horticultural farms were destroyed after the 20,000 residents who 
lived in the town were forced to flee. By 1991 only a small number of farmers 
resumed vegetable production on their farms. The rest of the horticultural 
farmland remains uncultivated because of the lack of seeds and the acute 
shortage of irrigation equipment (Coulton et al 1991).
6.3.3 Disruption of M arkets and Trade
Another effect of the war was the destruction of market centres and the mining 
of transport routes which virtually brought trade to a standstill. This coincided 
with the closure of Berbera port for animal exports from the second half of 
1988 to 1990 (Table 6.2). Because market exchange was central to the survival 
of rural households, the collapse of markets had a devastating effect on them, 
forcing many to dispose of large numbers of their animals. Soon after the 
outbreak of war the terms of trade between livestock and cereal grain fell 
sharply. For example, in the second half of 1988 an average goat could barely 
buy 20 kgs of cereal grain as compared to 100 kgs in 1987. This represented 
a drastic fall of the terms of trade between small stock and cereal grain. To 
acquire the same amount of grain, 5 times more goats had to be sold in 1988
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than in 1987. There was a similar fall in the terms of trade between cattle and 
cereals, though it was less drastic than that of small stock and cereals. Although 
all animal prices fell during the war, the relative fall o f small stock prices was 
substantially greater than that of other animals.
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Table 6.2 Livestock Exports, 1981-92
Year Sheep Goats Cattle Camel
1981 685 680 116 15
1982 730 719 157 15
1983 559 557 54 8
1984 339 337 8 4
1985 718 719 43 7
1986 567 567 56 9
1987 579 579 52 20
1988 201 203 27 11
1989-90 0 0 0 0
1991 140 60 20 0
199219 150 5
Source: Elmi, A. (1991); Survey data, 1992
Despite the collapse o f livestock exports due to the closure of Berbera port and 
the disruption of markets, several other important factors contributed to the fall
19 These figures go up to the end of August.
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of livestock prices. Firstly, the demand for meat almost effectively collapsed 
as hundreds of thousands of local consumers were made refugees by the war. 
Secondly, there were increased sales of animals by pastoralists. This resulted 
mainly from the fact that they had to support relatives who had fled from the 
urban areas. The distribution of food rations in the refugee camps was not fully 
established until 1989, so for about a year the pastoralists had to support their 
relatives. This forced them to sell more animals to feed larger families. Even 
after the refugee camps were established some of the refugee families still 
depended on the support of their relatives in the rural areas. Furthermore, the 
local markets were also flooded with livestock sold by Ogadeni nomads who 
were also affected by the closure of Berbera port.
A third reason why animal prices fell drastically was because of the poor health 
of the animals caused by the absence of veterinary services. There was an 
epidemic of tick borne diseases which affected most herds in the region. 
Overcrowding and shortage of pasture also added to the problem. During the 
war, the pastoralists abandoned their traditional grazing lands in Somaliland and 
restricted their movements to the Haud region. More than 10 million animals 
were estimated to have gathered in the region during the conflict, causing a 
serious shortage of both water and pasture. Thus, the animals offered for sale 
were often weak and in poor condition, which further reduced their market 
price.
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The collapse of the banking system during the war constituted another major 
difficulty. The lack of a central bank and control of the money supply caused 
the Somali shilling to lose its value against foreign currencies. The situation 
was further exacerbated by the fact that Somali shillings continued to be printed 
by some of the Somali faction leaders. As a result, the exchange rate fell from 
200 So Sh to the US dollar in late 1988 to 8,000 So Sh in mid 1992. The 
exchange rate was also characterised by high fluctuations, contributing to 
uncertainty and instability in the food and livestock markets.
Animal prices improved when the export of animals resumed in 1991. In the 
second half of the year, private traders exported about 200,000 small stock and
20,000 cattle to Saudi Arabia via Yemen. But the prospect of a quick 
resumption of livestock trade was damaged by the presence o f brucellosis 
disease in some of the animals exported to Yemen, causing large numbers of 
animals to be turned back. Nevertheless, traders still managed to export large 
numbers of animals until early 1992 when the port was closed again because 
of a conflict between clan militias in Berbera.
The Berbera conflict, which lasted from March 1992 to September of the same 
year, took place at a critical time when markets were still recovering from the 
disruptions caused by the war. The effect of this conflict on the markets was 
a sudden depreciation of the Somali shilling from 6,800 to the US dollar in
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February 1992 to So Sh 10,000 in April 1992 (Figure 6.1). Food prices also 
rose proportionately higher than the exchange rate depreciation. The price of 
wheat20, for instance, rose by 165% from the first week of February to the 
fourth week of March 1992 (Figure 6.2). Similarly, wheat flour and sugar 
prices rose more than 88% for the same period (Figures 6.3 & 6.4).
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Source: Survey data, 1992; Care International
20 Wheat, which is still distributed in the refugee camps, has become the main staple food 
rural areas since 1988.
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Although traders were importing food from Djibouti during this conflict, they 
were discouraged by the food monetisation programme of Care International 
from importing sufficient quantities required to stabilize prices . This 
programme, which was started just before the Berbera conflict, caused 
uncertainty in local food markets. Many traders suffered significant losses when 
Care International imported large quantities of food and sold at prices lower 
than those prevailing in the local markets21. Large quantities of food looted
21 This was due to the fact that prices were set by the World Food Programme several 
lonths before the first shipments arrived and Care International representatives were not able to 
aange prices without permission from WFP headquarters.
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from their stores were also released on to the markets, depressing prices further. 
The main drawback of this programme was the lack of proper planning and 
coordination. For example, private traders were not informed of the type and 
size o f food aid supplies, their selling prices or the timing of their release. Nor 
was the new administration in Hargeisa informed in detail about the food aid 
programme. This state of uncertainty was partly due to the fact that Care 
International and the WFP maintained large food stores in Djibouti, which were 
intended for the food monetisation programme in Somaliland. Constant 
speculation on the likely effects of this programme on local food markets 
prevented traders making long term plans with respect to food imports.
6.4 Destitution and Crisis
As stated above, significant numbers of rural households became destitute, 
especially those households which had very low asset status at the beginning 
of the war. While households which preserved some of their animals have a 
good chance of recovering from the crisis, those who lost all their productive 
assets have little or no chance of getting back to their way of life. Health and 
social crises have contributed to the high level of destitution. For instance, a 
sudden increase in social obligations during the war forced many households 
to sell their animals. In fact, meeting such commitments accounted for as much 
as half the annual expenditure o f many households.
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6.4.1 Destitution
Not all rural households were affected by the crisis in the same way. While 
some of the them coped and emerged with some of their assets intact, others 
lost all their assets and became destitute. Those who were more vulnerable 
disposed of their animals earlier and, as the crisis deepened, moved to the relief 
camps and lived there, while others lived outside the camps.
Up to 23% of households sampled were classified as destitute. However, this 
classification is not based on conventional criteria which concentrate on 
ownership of physical assets. It is based on criteria developed and used by the 
local people themselves, which takes into account not only the ownership of 
physical assets but more importantly other sources of income and claims on 
relatives and other households. It also takes into account household 
characteristics such as the dependency ratio and size of the household. This 
means a household that does not own any assets but receives remittances from 
relatives working abroad would not be classified as destitute, whereas a 
household that owns a few physical assets but has a high dependency ratio 
would be classified as destitute. This system of classification is used by the 
local people to decide those who should pay blood-money compensation.
Why did some households slide into destitution earlier than others?
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Understanding the differential vulnerability o f households to the crisis requires 
the examination of pre-crisis household asset and income structures. Table 6.3 
compares the animal ownership, crop production and household characteristics 
of destitute households (Caydh) with dia-paying households (JBaha Gal) before 
the war. It shows that those who became destitute during the war owned less 
than half the average livestock units of the dia-paying households, although 
there was little difference between the output values from farming. This means, 
other things being equal, that destitute households derived a greater proportion 
of their income from crop production than other households. In other words 
they relied more on farming than animal production. Thus the loss of farming 
income during the war had a greater effect on them.
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Table 6.3 A Comparison of Destitute and Dia-Paying Households’ Farm 







Farm Output and Animal 
Ownership
Livestock Units22 6.24 13.7
Total Farm O Value (So Sh) 20,472 22,266
Household Characteristics
HH Size 8.9 7.8
Dependency Ratio 0.54 0.56
Adult Men 2.47 2.34
Adult Women 2.3 2.02
Children 4.1 3.39
Mean Age (HH Head) 52 47
Source: Survey data, 1987 & 1992
22 1 camel = 1.3 LU; 1 cattle = 0.7 LU; 1 donkey = 0.4 LU; 1 sheep = 0.08 LU; 1 goat 
> 0.08 LU.
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There were also other differences in household characteristics, which may have 
contributed to the differential vulnerability. Although there was no difference 
in the dependency ratio (i.e the ratio of active adult members to total household 
members), destitute households were larger in sizes than dia-paying households. 
The problem facing larger families during a crisis when there are no 
employment opportunities is not just feeding too many people but also meeting 
all o f their social obligations. For instance, in the case of blood money 
payments, all male members in the family, including children, are counted. 
Unless a household reaches a stage where members classified as destitute, they 
have a social obligation to meet fully all the payments and contributions their 
dia-paying group deems necessary as and when they arise. Moreover, the 
average age of household heads among the destitutes was higher than in other 
households.
A Comparison of remittances received in 1992 also shows that destitute 
households, which had relatives working abroad, received much lower 
remittances than other households (Table 6.4). Consequently, destitute 
households which resumed growing Qat have planted less than half the number 
of plants grown by dia-paying households.
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Table 6.4 Remittances and Investments in Qat Cultivation, 1992
Remittance Qat
% Amount % No of
Receiving (So Sh) Cultivating Plants
Destitute Households 29 1,310,000 41 1,071
Dia-paying Households 30 2,084,706 52 2,105
Source: Survey data, 1992
6.4.2 Social Crisis
Ironically the community insurance and transfer systems which played 
important roles in the collective coping strategies of households have also 
contributed to the crisis and destitution among some of the rural households. 
The blood money payment, for instance, which played an important role in 
preventing and containing localised conflicts, also forced many households to 
liquidate some of their productive assets. So did contributions to the war which 
again was a community rather than individual decision.
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6.4.2.1 Blood-money payments
The payment of blood money (Mag) and other compensation by rural 
households increased sharply during the war. All dia-paying households (Baha 
Gal) interviewed in the 1992 survey reported paying significant amounts of 
blood money for the last twelve months. They paid an average of So Sh 
140,109 which in 1991/92 terms was equivalent to at least a goat or sheep. At 
the same time another 39% of households still owed almost twice the amount 
they had paid (Table 6.5). The amounts they paid varied widely depending on 
the size of their dia-paying group, the number of compensations and the 
number of male members in the households. For instance, households belonging 
to smaller dia-paying groups and with larger numbers of male members paid 
much more than others. This appears to have been the case for most o f the 
destitute households which continued to pay blood money until they were no 
longer able to pay it.
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St. Dev. 183,771 437,137
Min 350 21,000
Max 900,000 2,100,000
No of HH 56 22
Source: Survey data, 1992
Increased incidents during the war were responsible for high blood money 
payments. The absence of effective central authority in the refugee camps and 
increased violence and lawlessness in the area led to many killings and injuries. 
This was exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons in the area. Although 
most of the killings and injuries were committed by freelance bandits, the 
absence of a central authority to deal with such cases meant that their dia- 
paying groups were collectively responsible for the damage they caused.
Changes in the terms of blood money payments introduced during the war also 
put additional pressure on rural households. Because of the fear that internal
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conflict would deflect attention away from the common struggle against the 
regime, elders constituted emergency laws demanding that outstanding blood 
money to be settled within a short period of time. Thus many households were 
under pressure to meet these requirements as soon as they arose. Normally, 
families would be given sufficient time to settle any outstanding blood money. 
Although the system survived during the war, arrears in blood money payments 
forced many households to default on payments for the first time, jeopardizing 
the whole system.
6.4.2.2 Contributions to the War Effort
A further social obligation households had to meet during the war was the 
contribution to the war effort and the struggle between the SNM and 
government troops. Two types of contributions were required from individual 
households. Firstly, a typical family was required to send a male member of 
fighting age to join the SNM forces23. If, however, for various reasons, a 
family was not able to meet this requirement, they had a second option of 
providing at least one ox or camel, in addition to other contributions. Secondly, 
one sheep or goat, or their equivalent in cash, was also required from each
23 The SNM relied heavily on the recruitment of fighters from nomads and agro-pastoralists. 
ocally known as Gaos Dhegoole (the Deaf Brigade), which refers to the fact that they had no 
>rmal military training, they formed the best fighters in the movement.
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household at least once a year.
These contributions were decided by a committee of elders in every dia-paying 
group in consultation with a council of elders which had the overall 
responsibility of coordinating the recruitment o f SNM fighters and the 
collection of contributions. While dia-paying households were able to meet both 
demands, destitute families were only able to contribute men to take part in the 
fighting. In fact all destitute households reported that members o f their families 
took an active part in the fighting. Even early in the war when these households 
still had animals they still preferred to send male members of their families to 
the war rather than donate animals.
Moreover, a further requirement was the ownership of rifles by rural 
households. This was made necessary by the security situation. Having 
sustained heavy losses as a result of attacks by government troops who 
sometimes crossed the border between Ethiopia and Somaliland, most of the 
households were forced to purchase their own guns to defend themselves in the 
event of war. Deteriorating security in the area and increased raids on animals 
also made it necessary for households to own rifles. For example, by the end 
of 1992 as many as half of the households in the survey area still owned rifles, 
while another one-third reported selling their weapons just after the end of the 
war.
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6.4.2.3 Women in the Crisis
The crisis had a differential impact on men and women among the rural 
households. There was a significant increase in the number and type o f tasks 
performed by women during the crisis. As men became increasingly involved 
in community level activities associated with the war, women were forced to 
do tasks for which men were traditionally responsible or which had been shared 
by both men and women. As a result of the crisis, women took responsibility 
for a whole range of new activities such as queuing to collect food rations, 
fetching water from distant sources and engaging in petty trading to supplement 
their incomes. However, two types of activities were particularly demanding 
and time consuming. The first was obtaining food rations from the refugee 
camps where they queued for long hours on distribution days. Because of poor 
organisation of the system this often took a very long time.
The other new demanding activity, for which women were responsible, was 
collecting water which also took up a significant part o f their time. Because of 
the severe water shortage in the refugee camps where households received as 
little as one litre per day per person for very long periods (Shoham, et al 1989) 
women hauled water from distant dams and ponds. In some households, women 
were spending as much as half of their time hauling water from these sources 
to their homes. As a consequence they had less time for other important
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activities such as child care and animal husbandry. This problem was 
accentuated by increased illness among household members, particularly those 
who lived in the camps, which further reduced the amount o f labour available 
for household activities.
6.4.3 Malnutrition and Health Crisis
Excess mortality and deterioration of the nutritional status of the refugees were 
reported in the first twelve months of the crisis. Within the first few months of 
the war, there was already a high level of malnutrition and increased incidence 
of disease. In one of the first reports about the situation of the refugee camps, 
commissioned by the Save the Children Fund, Shoham et al (1989) wrote that 
"in the space of few months ... a healthy and resourceful population has been 
devastated by malnutrition and disease". From August 1988 to July 1989 the 
crude mortality rate was estimated to have been 46 per 1,000 persons, while the 
under five mortality rate was 152 per 1,000 children (Toole and Bhatia 1992). 
The crude mortality rate peaked in February 1989 at around 28 deaths per
1,000 people per month. The excess deaths were caused by the increased 
prevalence of infectious diseases and the breakdown of sanitation in the refugee 
camps. Figure 6.5 shows that the most common cause of under five deaths was 
diarrhoeal diseases. Poor sanitation in the camps and inadequate water supplies 
were attributed to the high incidence of diarrhoeal diseases and hepatitis in the
160
camps.
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Source: Save the Children; UNHCR; Ethiopian Ministry of Health and 
Administration for Refugee Affairs (cited in Toole and Bhatia 1992).
A very high prevalence of malnutrition among children under than five years 
o f age was also reported. Nutritional surveys conducted by the Save the 
Children Fund show that the acute malnutrition of children under five years of 
age increased from 13.5% in July 1988 to 26.4% in March 1989 (Table 6.6). 
The malnutrition rate of 26.4% o f children with Weight-for-Height (WFH) 
below 80% was found to be comparable to that reported in Korem at the height
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of the Ethiopian famine in 1984 (Shoham, et al 1989).
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a high level of malnutrition, most deaths 
in the refugee camps were caused by the increased incidence of communicable 
diseases and not by starvation. For instance, there was an epidemic o f hepatitis 
which affected up to 5,000 refugees in only one of the camps between January 
and May 1989 (Toole and Bhatia 1992). Although there are no detailed figures 
for the number of deaths caused by this disease, it is believed that it caused 
hundreds of deaths. Diarrhoea and pneumonia, which were the leading causes 
of death among children, also caused large numbers of deaths amongst the adult 
population. As Toole and Bhatia (1992) argue, the high incidence of diarrhoea 
and hepatitis, which affect the nutritional status of children, also contributed to 
the high rate o f acute malnutrition.
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Table 6.6 Nutritional Status of Under Five Children at Hartisheik, Ethiopia, 
September 1988 - March 1989.
No Date Sample Proportion Proportion
< 80% < 70 WFH
WFH
1 Sept 1988 1,080 13.5 % 1.8 %
2 Nov 1988 1,350 21.7 % 2.2 %
3 Jan 1989 1,350 16.9 % 2.3 %
4 Mar 1989 1,350 26.4 % 4.3 %
Source: Shoham, J., Rivers, J. and Payne, P. (1989) "Hartisheik," Centre for 
Human Nutrition, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine: London, 
Memeo
The survey households who lost members of their families in the refugee camps 
also reported that the deaths were caused mainly by disease rather than 
starvation. While only a few households who lived outside the refugee camps 
reported deaths of members of their households, almost all those living in the 
camps reported the death of at least one family member. This again shows that 




Three years of war have had a devastating impact on rural Somaliland with far 
reaching economic and social consequences. The human cost o f the war has 
been particularly appalling with the death of more than 20,000 people in the 
rural areas alone. It is also responsible for the loss of more than half o f the 
country’s livestock population, forcing thousands of pastoralists to become 
destitutes dependent on food aid distributed in the refugee camps. This loss in 
livestock resulted from the destruction of water sources, land mines planted 
extensively in the rural areas, the appropriation of livestock by government 
troops, the lack of veterinary services, and the distress sale of livestock by 
pastoralists.
Other effects of the war in agricultural areas included the disruption of food 
production which virtually ceased, the mining of some of the best agricultural 
land in the country and the destruction of tree crops and irrigation equipment 
in the horticultural farms. One of the most serious effects of the war was the 
closure of Berbera port which caused the collapse of livestock markets. This 
was exacerbated by the breakdown of banking and the subsequent depreciation 
of the Somali shilling against foreign currencies.
Although the collective coping mechanisms and community insurance systems
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have played an important role in mitigating the effects of the war and 
subsequent crisis on the livelihoods of rural households, they have also partly 
contributed to the crisis. For instance, high arrears in blood money payments 
have, for the first time, forced many households to default on payments, 
thereby jeopardizing the functioning of the whole system. Meeting social 
obligations during the crisis has also forced many households to liquidate some 
of their productive assets.
One immediate consequence of the war has been the increased vulnerability o f 
rural households to future conflicts, droughts and famines. The coping strategies 
of rural households have been weakened to such a degree that the moderate 
droughts with which they used to cope well in the past are now likely to cause 
starvation and death.
165
CHAPTER 7. HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the response pattern of rural households during the crisis. 
It focuses on how these households managed their assets and the key factors 
that determined the sequence of responses they took up in order to mitigate the 
effect of the crisis on their livelihoods. Since the most important assets they 
owned were animals, the chapter concentrates on the sequence in which the 
animals were disposed of. The availability of accurate data on the animals sold 
by the households for the period from 1988-92 makes it possible to get a full 
picture of the sequence and pattern of responses. Unlike most of the household 
response studies which are based on one year crisis, the five year data allows 
comparisons to be made between strategies adopted in different situations 
during the crisis and normal times.
Moreover, the underlying factors affecting the responses taken up by the 
households are also examined in order to understand more clearly the problem 
of household resource management in crisis situations. In this respect, a simple 
linear programming model is used to assess the effects of individual decisions 
on the overall structure and interrelationships of household resources.
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7.2 The Concept of Response Sequencing
The literature on household coping strategies report a sequence of responses 
adopted by rural households in mitigating the effects of food crisis on their 
livelihoods. It is argued that, despite some variations, there is a general pattern 
in which the responses are adopted (Shipton 1990). Watts (1988), for instance, 
argued that households follow a sequence of responses depending on the 
intensity of the crisis. Based on a case study in northern Nigeria, Watts 
developed a model of household responses to food crisis by listing sequentially 


































































Others have also identified a similar sequence of responses followed by rural 
households faced with food crisis. In north eastern Ethiopia, for example, 
Rahmato (1991) reported a sequence of responses in the following order:
Stage One - collection of wild foods
- reduction of number of meals
- inter-household transfers
- sale of small stock
Stage two - temporary migration in search of employment
Stage three - sale of young cattle
- sale of cows
- sale of draft oxen
- sale of personal possessions (e.g. jewellery)
- sale of housing
Stage four - migration in search of relief
According to Rahmato, there is a sequential series of responses taken up by 
households as survival strategies. In the first stage, households take austerity 
measures and reduce their food consumption. At the same time they also
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dispose of their small stock. In the second stage, households migrate 
temporarily in search of employment. The third and the fourth stages involve 
the liquidation of cattle, draft oxen and other assets, and out-migration in search 
of relief.
Cutler (1986), who also surveyed migrant households in the Red Sea province 
in Sudan, reported a sequence of responses in a three-stage pre-famine model 
as follows:
Stage One sale of small stock (e.g. goats)
labour migration 
Stage two sale of tools
sale of breeding animals 
sale of household belongings 
sale of land 
Stage three mass migration
These and other studies conducted in India (Walker 1989) suggest that 
households adopt a predictable sequence of responses. They advocate a 
sequence of actions ranging from the disposal of "less important assets" such
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as goats and sheep to the sale of their most productive assets such as oxen. 
Corbett (1988), who reviewed several studies on household responses in Africa, 
concluded that there is a distinct sequence in the responses of households faced 
with declining entitlements to food. Reflecting this view, Campbell (1990a: 
231) also argued that the adoption of responses "follows a sequence from more 
to less palatable alternatives as a shortage intensifies, ultimately resulting in the 
liquidation of productive assets."
Two factors are considered as the determinants of the sequence in which 
responses are taken up. The first is the "reversibility" of the responses 
(Campbell 1990; Corbett 1998; Shipton 1990; Watts 1988). This suggests the 
responses are sequenced in such a way that the earliest or most reversible 
responses are adopted first and the least reversible ones last. On the basis of 
this criterion, the responses are classified as "earliest reversible responses", 
"immediate or semi-reversible responses", and "least reversible responses" 
(Shipton 1990). For example, in animal disposal strategies adopted by 
households, the sale of small stock is always assumed to be the "earliest 
reversible response" in the sense that the households can reconstitute them soon 
after the crisis has ended. On the other hand, the sale of cows is considered to 
be one of the "least reversible responses".
The second criterion which also determines how responses are sequenced is the
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"commitment of domestic resources" (Watts 1988). This suggests that the 
responses involving the lowest "domestic resource commitments" are adopted 
earlier than those involving greater "domestic resource commitments"^ The two 
criteria are inversely related and the responses that are highly reversible will 
involve lowest "commitment o f domestic resources" (Figure 7.1).
However, there are three areas of confusion in these concepts. Firstly, the 
concept of "reversibility" is not adequately defined and it is not clear why 
certain responses should be more reversible than others. Nor is it clear how 
they should be determined. For instance, will a decision involving disposal of 
a camel be more or less reversible than one involving disposal of an ox? Does 
the "reversibility" of responses change over time or does it mean that some 
responses are always more reversible than others? Furthermore, provided that 
there are markets for all household assets, then the sale of any asset is 
reversible in the sense that the household can purchase it back after the crisis.
Secondly, the concept attaches values to household assets arbitrarily in order 
to classify them on the basis of "reversibility". Consequently, some assets are 
always assumed to be less important than others and are therefore "easily 
reversible". A good example is the case of small stock which are always 
assumed to be less important than other animals and assets. Thus, in food crisis 
situations it is expected that they will be disposed of earlier than other animals
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and assets. Reflecting this view, Cutler (1985: 49) argued that goats are sold 
off first as "relatively unimportant assets". Corbett (1988) also argued that 
sheep and goats are acquired during non-crisis years as a form o f saving and 
easily liquidated at times of crisis. She suggested that they do not play a key 
role in income generation because "unlike oxen [they] are not essential to crop 
production (1988: 1106)." But this is simplistic and misleading because sheep 
and goats are important assets and play a key role in generating incomes for 
rural households. They are not just kept as liquid assets to be disposed of easily 
as and when needed. More importantly they are kept for income generation. 
Moreover, they have particular significance in famine situations since they 
breed more quickly and rebuild stocks soon after the crisis.
Finally, these concepts fail to take into account important factors such as 
market conditions which are exogenous to household decision-making. These 
factors explain why the order of responses changes from time to time. Which 
responses are taken up by rural households and in what order depend on what 
is possible in the prevailing market conditions. For instance, households may 
not dispose of some assets at a particular time because either the prices are too 
low or there is no market for them - conditions which too often occurs in crisis 
periods. In these circumstances, neither the "reversibility" nor the "commitment 
of domestic resources" will determine the kind and sequence of responses 
adopted.
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Because o f the dynamic environment in which households live, responses are 
re-examined and changed in the light of new circumstances. The implication of 
this for the concept of the sequential uptake of responses is that there cannot 
be a predetermined sequence of actions followed by rural households since both 
the timing and sequence of responses will vary from time to time.
7.3 R ural Household Responses in Gabiley, 1988-92
During the crisis rural households in Gabiley adopted a range of responses. 
Considering the overall pattern of responses, the order in which they were taken 
up contrasts sharply with those described in response sequence models. When 
the five year response patterns are put together the picture that emerges 
indicates that the sequence of responses was reversed: those responses 
considered as the last in the sequence were adopted earliest, while those 
considered as the earliest responses were taken up late in the crisis. Starting 
with out-migration and disposal of oxen, households adopted a strategy that was 
not determined by the "reversibility" of actions but by a range of factors some 
of which were outside the control of household decision-making.
Since the most important assets owned by rural households were animals, I 
shall concentrate on the responses concerning the disposal of animals. Although 
some households took up other responses such as the sale of possessions, these
174
were negligible because very few households had managed to migrate with 
their possessions. For example, most households reported that they left behind 
the main parts of their collapsible huts (Aqal Somali) which were looted during 
the war. Unlike the mobile pastoralists who keep a sufficient number of burden 
camel to move from one location to another, most of these households relied 
on donkeys to transport their belongings.
Although households reported cutting back their food consumption during the 
crisis, there was no particular order in which the response was adopted. Even 
in the non-crisis periods, rural households adopted austerity measures by 
reducing both the amount and number of meals taken per day. Reducing 
consumption was a common strategy adopted by rural people in Somaliland 
during the dry season. This often involved taking fewer meals, eating coarse 
food, reducing milk consumption and so on. In the pastoral areas, for instance, 
camel boys lived on milk alone without food grains for very long periods. 
Nevertheless, the survey households reported that food expenditure accounted 
for a small proportion of their income, while meeting community obligations 
such as blood money payments and expenditure on other requirements such as 
water for their animals accounted for a much larger proportion of their income. 
One reason why food expenditure was low was because all households received 
ration foods from the refugee camps. Although the amount of food they
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received varied from time to time, it mostly covered up to 30 percent of their 
requirements.
7.3.1 Migration
One of the first responses to the development of the crisis in 1988 was mass 
migration by the households across the border to Ethiopia. Soon after the 
outbreak of the war in and around Gabiley in June 1988, most households 
migrated with their animals after suffering heavy losses in attacks by 
government troops. Anticipating that the war would be over in a matter of 
weeks, they temporarily settled in the border villages. It was not until early July 
1988 when government troops recaptured Hargeisa from the SNM that they 
realized the war was going to last much longer than they originally thought. 
They registered in the refugee camps late in the year when relief distribution 
had started. All households interviewed reported migrating to eastern Ethiopia 
during the crisis.
Although security was the main reason why people migrated from their 
villages, disruption of markets and trade and the destruction of the
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infrastructure meant that the situation was very critical24. In eastern Ethiopia 
they were at least able to sell some of their animals to exchange for food, 
though prices were low and falling as the crisis deepened. Thus migration was 
an important survival strategy for these households.
7.3.2 Sale of Oxen
When the disposal of different types of animals during the crisis is compared, 
the sale of oxen turns out to be one of the earliest responses in the sequence 
in which animals were disposed of. The animal disposal strategy adopted by 50 
households from 1988-92 are compared in order to establish the pattern o f sales 
and present an overall picture of the response strategies adopted by the 
households. Those households selected from the overall sample were chosen 
because they owned all types of animals, including oxen, cows, sheep and 
goats. This is important because if a household owns only one specie o f animal 
the timing of their sales cannot be compared with a household owning different 
species of animals and having a wider choice of response options.
Table 7.1 summarises the sales of different animals from 1988-92. From 
August to December 1988, some 50% of the households sold an average o f 1.5
24 For example, non-Isaaq households who lived around Gabiley also migrated from the area 
ring the crisis, not because of fear of government attacks but because of food crisis.
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oxen. Yet for the remaining four years from 1989-90 only three households 
sold an average of one ox. No oxen were sold from 1991-92. The first 
households sold their oxen just one month after the outbreak of the war, but the 
sale continued until December 1988. Households reported selling their oxen at 
small markets in eastern Ethiopia, including Hartisheik, which later became the 
main refugee centre. Traders and farmers from the main towns in eastern 
Ethiopia were reported to have bought the oxen.














Oxen 50 1.50 6 1.00 0 0
Cows 46 2.60 34 2.25 14 1.35
Camel 8 1.50 2 1.00 0 0
Sheep 36 5.90 32 11.44 32 10.10
Goats 4 2.20 4 3.00 6 3.00
Source: Survey data, 1992
The pattern in which oxen were sold clearly indicates household preference in
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sequencing their responses. Although they knew that the crisis was deepening, 
they did not hold on to their most valued asset up to the last possible time. 
From their point of view, this response was the outcome of carefully weighed 
decisions rather than panic selling. Households interviewed during the survey 
reported that they considered a wide range of critical factors affecting both their 
current and future livelihoods, including current and future market conditions 
for different animals, the revenues they would forgo by selling some animals 
rather than others, and the costs and risks associated with keeping particular 
animals.
7.3.3 Sale of Cows
The sale of cows was also one of the earliest responses that many households 
took up during the crisis. Forty six percent of households sold an average of 2.6 
cows in 1988 as compared to 33% who sold an average of 2.3 cows in the next 
two years (Table 7.1). But in the following two years (i.e. 1991-92) only 14% 
of the households sold an average of 1.4 cows. Although the number of 
households who sold cows in 1988 was almost as high as those who sold oxen, 
households reported that most of the sales of cows took place late in the year 
from October to December, while most of the oxen were sold between August 
and October. The other significant difference between the sale of oxen and 
cows is that the sale of cows continued in the next four years, whereas, the sale
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of oxen was confined to the first two years of the crisis.
The overall sale of cattle was highest in the first year o f the crisis. Some 84% 
of the households reported selling either oxen or cows in that year compared 
to only 36% of the households who sold either sheep or goats, despite the fact 
that the average small stock holdings were three times higher than those of 
cattle.
7.3.4 Sale of Camels
Because of the fact that only 30 out of the 50 households owned camels, the 
sale of camels was generally lower than that of other animals. Nonetheless, it 
was highest in 1988 when 8% of the households sold an average of 1.5 camels. 
But in the next two years only one household sold a camel. Households 
disposed of their camels in 1988 despite the fact that they relied on them as 
their primary means of transport. Increased mobility particularly in the first 
year of the crises meant that the need to preserve camels for transport was 
higher than at any other time.
7.3.5 Sale of Small Stock
Although the sale of oxen, cows and camels was highest during the first year
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of the crisis, the sale of sheep and goats, on the other hand, remained almost 
unchanged and did not differ significantly from the pre-crisis period. Only 36% 
of households sold an average of 5.9 sheep in 1988, while 4% of them sold an 
average of 4.0 goats in addition to sheep. The sale of sheep remained almost 
the same in the subsequent years. From 1989-92 around 30% of the households 
sold an average of 5.5 sheep per year.
It is interesting to note that the sale of goats was generally very low. Although 
the loss of goats was significantly higher than that of other animals in the 
initial stages of the crisis, average holdings still remained higher than that of 
other animals except sheep. Two possible reasons were suggested by the 
affected households: (1) households which lived inside the camps or those who 
had members of their family living there mostly kept goats rather than sheep; 
(2) those households who sold their cows kept their goats for milking.
7.4 Understanding Animal Sales Strategy
Why did households dispose of their animals in this pattern? One possible 
explanation could be that 1988 was the peak of the crisis and disposal of 
productive assets such oxen was a terminal stage in households responses. 
Although this might seem plausible because of the fact that households suffered 
their highest losses in 1988, there is little evidence to support this hypothesis.
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It is true that animal losses were highest in 1988, but in fact the real crisis 
occurred in 1989 when there were famine conditions that resulted from a 
combined social and health crisis and the collapse of markets and trade. It was 
in 1989 that the crisis had greatest impact on households.
The real explanation lies in the way in which markets functioned during the 
crisis. Thus, the first step to understanding the animal sales strategy adopted by 
the households is to look at the prevailing market prices from 1987-92. Table
7.2 presents the average prices of different animals during this period25. It 
shows that the price of sheep and goats fell in the first year of the crisis, while 
the price of other animals increased (at least nominally)26. For instance, the 
price of sheep fell by 10% from 1987 to 1988, while the price of oxen rose by 
60%. In 1987, the price of an ox was equivalent to about 9 sheep, but in 1988 
it was equivalent to more than 15 sheep. But this changed drastically in 1989 
when the price of sheep and goats increased more than five fold, while the 
price of oxen and camels actually fell. The price of cows rose in 1989, though 
the increase was modest compared to the 500% increase in the price o f small
25 The prices from 1988-92 are the actual prices households reported receiving after selling 
sir animals. However, these are not different from the prices that prevailed in the main markets 
ed by rural households to sell their animals.
26 The inflationary price increases were due to declining exchange rates between the Somali 
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When households were asked why they sold their animals in this pattern, they 
explained that the prevailing market price was one of their main considerations. 
Muhumed Meygag is one of the household heads who adopted this sequence 
o f responses. At the beginning of the crisis he owned 30 sheep, 5 goats, 13 
cows, 1 ox and 1 camel. He sold his animals in the following order: one ox in 
August 1988; his only camel in January 1989; two cows in 1990; another two 
cows in 1989; three goats in 1991; and five sheep in 1992. Asked why he sold 
his animals in this sequence, he explained:
During the war I was supporting two families and I was required 
to make financial contributions to the SNM. The money I raised 
by selling the ox was at least sufficient to meet our principal 
needs. I could only have raised that amount by selling all the 
sheep, if there was a buyer willing to purchase them all. When 
you have to sell an animal you study the market, you assess your 
priorities and then you decide which animal to sell.
Another household head is Ibrahim Hersi who lost his father during the war. 
His family is classified as destitute (Caydh) and was exempted from the dia- 
payments. At the beginning of the crisis his family owned 70 sheep, 10 cows, 
7 camels and 2 oxen. During the crisis he sold 2 oxen in 1988, 7 sheep in 1989 
and 5 cows in 1990. He explained the sale of his animals as follows:
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1988 was a particularly difficult year for our family. We lost 50 
'sheep in that year. I could have sold the rest of the sheep, but 
there was no market for them. One sheep sold for as little as So 
Sh 2,000 in Allaybaday27. But oxen were selling relatively 
better. In addition to our subsistence requirement, I needed to buy 
a rifle so I sold two oxen. In the following year I sold some 
sheep because by then the price had improved. By 1990 we had 
only 6 cows, but I sold 5 of them and took the remaining cow to 
a relative to keep it for us. You see, it was very difficult to keep 
cattle in that year. There was a severe shortage of both water and 
pasture. In the previous years we fed them with lentils (misir) we 
received from the refugee camps, but like the other rations it was 
reduced in 1990.
The accounts of these two households and others interviewed in the survey 
illustrate that the decisions concerning the timing and sequence of animal sales 
do not just follow a predetermined order but change according to a range of 
exogenous factors (e.g. prevailing market price) and endogenous factors (e.g. 
the costs associated with selling or keeping particular animal and the type and 
size of their priority needs). In other words their decisions were based on 
careful calculations of prevailing market conditions, future revenues households 
would forgo by selling animals and the future viability of their herds. Using a 
ranking and a linear programming model, these issues are examined in detail.
27 This is one of the villages on the border between Ethiopia and Somaliland to which some 
aseholds migrated during the war.
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7.5.1 Ranking Model
Corbett (1988) identified the importance households attach to both current and 
future income streams in sequencing their responses. This point was further 
elaborated by Devereux (1993a) who argued that current as well as future 
values of assets determine the timing of their disposal. These factors are 
important in understanding the sequence of household responses because they 
take into account: (1) the current values of assets at the time of disposal and 
not just the historic or pre-crisis values; and (2) the future revenues households 
would forgo by selling assets. Thus the decision to sell one type of asset earlier 
than another would depend on, among other things, the current market price of 
the asset and the expected future revenue which the household would forgo by 
selling the asset. But other important asset characteristics such as liquidity, 
lumpiness and the risks associated with keeping the asset also influence the 
decision. Riskiness is a particularly important consideration in crisis situations 
because of the increased probability of losing the asset altogether.
The sequence of responses by rural households is examined using a ranking 
model. Although this mainly compares the current values of assets with their 
future revenues, it also takes into account risks associated with future revenues 
by estimating expected values. The model is based on a ranking ratio similar 
to the net benefit-investment (N/K) ratio used in investment appraisal for
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ranking projects. The idea is that the basis of divestment decisions made by the 
households is similar to that made in investment decisions. In both cases the 
decision criteria involve comparing costs and benefits associated with the 
decisions over time. What makes this ratio particularly relevant to the 
household responses is the fact that it is used for assessing decisions that are 
not mutually exclusive i.e. the selection of one option does not mean that the 
other cannot be chosen. This means the decision criteria of this ratio are 
concerned with the sequence in which options are selected and not whether a 
particular option is chosen or not.
Households divestment decisions involve weighing up the costs and benefits 
associated with disposing of an asset. However, because of changes in market 
prices these decisions have to be reviewed from time to time. This is 
particularly important during crisis situations because market instability causes 
significant changes in the relative prices of assets which then affect the 
sequence in which assets are disposed of. This is illustrated by animal prices 
from 1989-92 (Table 7.2). The prices show two types of movements. The first 
is a general inflationary price increase resulting from the collapse o f the 
banking system during the war. The second movement involves a drastic shift 
in the relative prices of animals (Table 7.3). For example, between 1987 and 
1988 the relative price index of sheep and oxen rose by 77%. But in 1989 the 
index fell by more than 70% compared to the pre-crisis level.
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Table 7.3 Relative Price Indices for Different Animals, 1987-92




1987 100 100 100 100 100
1988 174 177 121 123 144
1989 30 29 37 36 80
1990 26 51 28 54 94
1991 41 40 33 33 124
1992 71 69 44 43 163
Source: Survey data, 1992
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These changes in the relative prices can be captured by the ranking criterion 
which is given by the ratio:
Pa = the current price of the animal
Rt = the expected revenue generated by the animal in year t 
t = the productive live of the asset
Given the alternative options open to the household, the decision criterion is to 
rank the responses on the basis of this ratio. The alternative options are not 
mutually exclusive i.e. the selection of one option does not mean that the other 
cannot be chosen. Hence, the decision is mainly concerned with the order in 
which responses are taken up and not whether the household takes up the
R=
L  R
r=0 (1 + i)
Where
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response or not. By selling assets with the highest ratio households maximise 
the cash raised per unit of the total expected revenue.
Although it is easy to obtain the current market values of a particular asset, 
estimating its expected future revenue is rather difficult. Firstly, there are risks 
associated with future revenues of the asset which often increase during periods 
o f crisis. Secondly, revenues received in the future are worth less than those 
received at present. In other words, the future revenues of assets have to be 
discounted at some rate in order to compare with their present values. However, 
it was still possible to estimate the expected revenue for the different animals. 
The average annual revenues of different animals are estimated for their 
remaining productive lives28. Using households’ subjective probabilities, the 
future revenues are then adjusted for the risk of droughts. Households expect 
a moderate drought every five years and a severe drought every ten years. 
Moderate droughts normally do not have much effect on the production of 
camels, sheep and goats, therefore their revenues are not expected to change 
much. But net revenues from cattle are expected to fall. However, in severe 
droughts which occur every 10 years revenues for all animals are expected to
28 The remaining productive life of small stocks is assumed to be four years, given their 
irage age. For cows, oxen and camels it is assumed to be six, seven and eight years, 
ipectively.
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fall significantly. Expected future revenues are discounted using annual rates 
of return o f 10.5% for sheep and goats, 12% for cattle and 10% for camels29. 
Although these figures may change depending on assumptions made about the 
probabilities o f risk and discount rates, the method of estimation used is 
consistent for different animals.
Tables 7.4-7.8 present the ranking ratios calculated for different animals from 
1988-92. Table 7.4 shows that in 1988 the ratio for oxen was highest, while 
that for goats was lowest. Thus on the basis of these criteria, an ox was most 
likely to be sold first in 1988, while a goat was least likely to be sold. But 
because of a sudden change in the relative prices of animals in 1989, these 
ratios changed drastically. Camel and oxen have the lowest ratios, while sheep 
and goats have the highest ratios as shown in Table 7.5 which suggests that in 
1989 sheep and goats were most likely to be sold off first. The ratios continue 
to change until 1991, but stabilize thereafter30.
29 The annual rates of return for sheep and goats are assumed to be the same as those 
imated for pastoral households in Central Somalia (Abdulahi 1990).
30 An alternative explanation of the ratios is that households would have been better o ff if 
:y sold animals with a ratio of greater than one. However, this does not take into account the 
tus and other non-quantifiable benefits which householders attach to keeping animals. Even 
in, a lack o f alternative investment prevents them from contemplating such a decision.
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Table 7.4 Ranking Animal Sales by Price-Expected Revenue Ratio, 1988
Pa PVR Ratio Rank
Goat 4,600 4,279 1.07 5
Sheep 4,700 4,279 1.10 4
Cow 39,000 20,905 1.87 3
Ox 72,000 29,211 2.46 1
Camel 72,500 32,943 2.20 2
Source: Survey data, 1992
Table 7.5 Ranking Animal Sales by Price-Expected Revenue Ratio, 1989
Pa PVR Ratio Rank
Goat 25,000 12,838 1.95 2
Sheep 27,000 12,838 2.10 1
Cow 65,000 62,716 1.04 3
Ox 66,800 87,632 0.76 4
Camel 50,000 98,830 0.51 5
Source: Survey data, 1992
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Table 7.6 Ranking Animal Sales by Price-Expected Revenue Ratio, 1990
Pa PVR Ratio Rank
Goat 85,000 29,955 2.84 1
Sheep 45,000 29,955 1.50 2
Cow 165,000 146,337 1.13 3
Ox 200,000 204,474 0.98 4
Camel 150,000 230,602 0.65 5
Table 7.7 Ranking Animal Sales by Price-Expected Revenue Ratio.
Pa PVR Ratio Rank
Goat 95,000 42,793 2.22 2
Sheep 100,000 42,793 2.34 1
Cow 220,000 209,053 1.05 4
Ox 350,000 292,105 1.20 3
Camel 320,000 329,432 0.97 5
Source: Survey data, 1992
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Table 7.8 Ranking Animal Sales by Price-Expected Revenue Ratio, 1992
Pa PVR Ratio Rank
Goat 140,000 81,307 1.72 2
Sheep 150,000 81,307 1.84 1
Cow 430,000 397,200 1.08 4
Ox 900,000 555,000 1.62 3
Camel 320,000 625,920 0.51 5
Source: Survey data, 1992
Although this model has the advantage of incorporating the main factors which 
determine the disposal of assets by rural households, its analysis is still partial. 
It does not take into account the interrelationships between different animals or 
how the sale of a particular species of animal affects remaining household 
resources. For example, the sale of a draught ox may not only affect the 
cultivation of the land, but may also affect the number of cattle for which the 
farm can provide sufficient fodder. This means that decisions involving the 
disposal of household assets will have repercussions for both the farm and the 
herd.
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7.5.2 Linear Programming Model
A linear programming model is used to examine the effects o f animal sales on 
household resource structure. The basic model is set up using the 1987 survey 
data to look retrospectively at the effects of individual responses on overall 
resource allocation. The use of the technique for this kind of analysis was 
highlighted in Chapter 3. This section focuses on the construction of the matrix 
and the interpretation of the results.
A representative model was set up for the 56 dia-paying households which are 
considered to be relatively homogeneous. Although there are some variations 
in terms of asset holdings, these are not expected to make much difference as 
to how households allocate their resources, given the fact that they all face the 
same constraints and have similar resource structures. The matrix constructed 
includes various types of activities and enterprises that are open to a household 
and the constraints that limit its production possibilities. The main constraints 
included are land, labour, pasture, subsistence requirements and livestock 
numbers. A household’s other objectives, such as meeting minimum subsistence 
requirements, are also incorporated into the matrix as constraints which have 
to be met before maximising the total net revenue.
Given the constraints, the household is assumed to be maximising its total net
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revenue. This means that if the household has several objectives, total net 
revenue maximisation is specified as the objective function, but other objectives 
are defined as constraints. In this way, the household’s other important 
objectives are taken into account without the need to use a goal programming 
model which formally incorporates a household’s multiple objectives.
Three types of activities are included in the model. These are producing, selling 
and transfer activities. The producing activities are the main ones such as the 
crops and animals produced by the household, while the selling activities 
represent the sale of products which are separate from the producing activities. 
A transfer activity is used for passing resources from one row to another in 
order to add flexibility to the model. The net revenues for the producing 
activities are the average annual gross margins of the activities based on the 
1987 survey. For the selling activities, the net revenues are their selling prices. 
Since the transfer activities do not affect the total net revenue, their net 
revenues are included in the matrix as zeros.
The input-output coefficients used in the model are derived from the 1987 and 
1992 survey data. They represent the demand and supply of the resource and 
the relationships between different types of activities. Negative coefficients 
indicate the supply of resources or "giving of permission" to undertake other 
activities. Positive coefficients, on the other hand, indicate the demand for
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resources or "permission" to carry out activities.
The results of the model are presented in Table 7.9. The base model produces 
an optimum plan with a net revenue of So Sh 184,009 which satisfies minimum 
household requirements (Appendix 7.1). The table shows the effects of animal 
disposal scenarios on the household’s total net revenues. For instance, the sale 
of an ox which raises 72,000 shillings reduces the total net revenue by 7.7%, 
while the sale of 15 sheep or goats which raises the same amount of cash 
reduces the total net revenue by 15.5%. The sale of a cow reduces the total net 
revenue by only 2.7%. Changes in the total net revenues are revenues forgone 
as a result of the sale of animals. In the case of the ox, these would be the 
costs of withdrawing it from production. In the case of the sheep or goats, these 
would be the lost output revenues.
These results show that in 1987/88 the sale of an ox was preferable to the sale 
of 15 sheep or goats which would have raised the same amount o f cash. They 
also show that the sale of a cow was preferable to the sale of an equivalent 
number of sheep or goats. These results are again consistent with the 
households’ animal sales strategy for 1988. Although this model is static in the 
sense that it studies the situation in a single period, the solutions would not be 
expected to differ much from the present one if a dynamic element were 
incorporated. The current model adequately represents households problems.
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The linear programming models are criticized for being normative in the sense 
that they indicate what households ought to do under a given set of 
circumstances and not what they will do. However, the results of this model are 
validated by the actual household resource allocation which closely resembles 
those in the model. The important point to note is that while the model does 
not predict the sequence in which assets have to be taken up, it nevertheless 
shows what individual responses would cost the household and how they would 
affect overall household resources.
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Table 7.9 Effects of Animal Sales Scenarios on Total Net Revenue.
Effect on Total Net Revenue
Total Net % of Change
Revenue
Base Model 184,009
Disposal of an ox 169,790 -7.73
Disposal of 15 sheep/goats 155,584 -15.45
Disposal of a cow 179,057 -2.69
Source: Survey data, 1988 & 1992
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter the hypothesis that rural households adopt a predictable 
sequence of responses is rejected. The analysis presented supports the 
alternative proposition that there is no particular sequence of responses taken 
up by households faced with food insecurity and famine conditions. It is argued 
that the "reversibility" and "domestic resource commitments" criteria claimed 
to determine sequence of responses are insufficient in explaining household 
responses. These criteria fail to take into account important factors such as 
market conditions, which determine the order in which responses are taken up.
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The strategy involving the sale of animals adopted by 50 households is 
examined in detail in order to understand the order in which animals were 
disposed of and the factors that influenced the choice made by the households. 
Considering the overall pattern of responses taken up by households, the picture 
that emerges indicates that the order in which they were taken up contrasts 
sharply with those described in response sequence models. The responses 
considered as the last in the sequence were in fact adopted earliest, while those 
considered as the earliest were taken up late in the crisis. Perhaps the most 
important factor in determining the order in which the animals were disposed 
of was the relative price of animals. Significant shifts in prices during the five 
year period under consideration were mainly responsible for the order in which 
animals were disposed of. A ranking model which takes into account changes 
in relative prices and the expected revenue a household would forgo by 
disposing of assets is used to examine the order in which responses were taken 
up.
The effects of individual responses on overall household resources are also 
shown to be important in determining the sequence of responses. Given the 
interrelationships between different household resources, the disposal o f any 
particular asset affects both the structure and organisation of household 
resources.
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CHAPTER 8. HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES AND FAMINE PREVENTION
8.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the implications of household responses for famine early 
warning and relief. The use of household responses in monitoring food crises 
has been widely suggested because it is argued that it can provide earlier and 
more accurate information than existing indicators. The Sahel and Horn of 
Africa in particular have been identified as potential areas where EWS could 
monitor the responses of households (Davies 1993). In the light of the analysis 
presented in the previous chapter, the ways in which monitoring household 
responses could provide information on impending food crises are examined in 
this chapter. The implications of better understanding household responses for 
famine relief are also assessed.
8.2 Implications for Famine Early Warning
Accepting the hypothesis that household responses do not follow a predictable 
pattern has implications for their use in famine early warning. This means that 
response sequences cannot generally be used as indicators of the level of stress 
faced by households unless the underlying factors are fully understood. If  they 
are used in this way, they can even produce misleading information about the
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real nature of the situation affecting households. For instance, in the sequential 
response model, the disposal of some assets is always interpreted as a late 
indicator suggesting the final stage of the household coping response. Yet, as 
argued in Chapter 7 it may be the first stage of the response.
Nevertheless, rejecting particular sequences of responses does not necessarily 
mean responses have no use in EWS. On the contrary, I shall argue that 
gathering information about them is important in EWS provided that the 
underlying factors are fully understood. By understanding the relationships 
between resources and how changes in market conditions affect asset structure 
of households, responses can be interpreted with greater accuracy.
8.2.1 M onitoring Response Sequences
The idea of using household responses in famine early warning has arisen 
because of the failure of the existing EWS to provide timely and accurate 
information on declining entitlements to food and impending famine conditions. 
The EWS has concentrated on food availability indicators. The shift of 
emphasis in explaining famine away from food supply explanations to a better 
understanding of entitlements at the conceptual level has not been reflected in 
famine early warning (Cutler 1985). Because of the donors’ emphasis on 
"objective indicators", supply oriented indicators are still widely used in EWS.
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The food balance sheet is an example of a method still based on the concept 
of per capita food availability. Moreover, market indicators widely 
recommended for EWS have not yet been systematically incorporated into these 
systems because of difficulties associated with the interpretation of market data. 
Nutritional surveillance, which is also one of the main tools used in EWS, is 
a late indicator since the rapid decline of nutritional status occurs only in the 
final stages of famine. In addition, gathering information by conventional EWS 
has also proved unsustainable because of the very high costs involved.
Consequently, monitoring household responses as part of famine early warning 
has been widely recommended (Campbell 1990; Corbett 1988; Maxwell and 
Frankenberger 1992). This is based on the concept of the households’ 
sequential uptake of responses. The idea here is that by monitoring the 
sequence of responses, early warning systems can identify the level of stress 
faced by households. This means that responses can be used as indicators for 
impending food shortages and declining food entitlements. Campbell (1990a: 
239), among others, has argued that monitoring the sequence of household 
responses could provide relevant, accurate and timely information on emerging 
food shortages, adding that the outcome of this type of information could 
provide a simple binary message - "there is or there is not a problem." Because 
of their usefulness and simplicity, according to Campbell, these responses could 
even be used as an alternative set of information to the existing EWS.
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It is also argued that monitoring household responses in famine EWS could 
provide information that is geographically specific and timely for identifying 
declining entitlements to food. For example, Cutler (1986: 181) has argued that 
"studies on the sequence of household responses ... are likely to give more time 
specific and location specific early warning". Furthermore, monitoring 
responses is claimed to have a number of advantages over the conventional 
EWS (Campbell 1990a) by: (1) reflecting the situation where food shortage first 
occurs; (2) providing a simple binary message which can be easily interpreted;
(3) being inexpensive since it is based on local knowledge and relies on local 
people as compared to externally funded systems; and (4) by being less 
bureaucratic.
In monitoring household responses, Maxwell and Frankenberger (1992) 
suggested three types of indicators: (1) leading or early indicators which are the 
changes in responses before the onset of food crisis such as crop failures, 
livestock conditions and changes in market conditions; (2) concurrent or stress 
indicators which occur with decreased access to food; and (3) trailing indicators 
which occur after entitlements to food have declined. Within this framework, 
the sale of productive assets and out-migration, for example, are interpreted as 
a sign that households have failed to cope with the food crisis.
This concept of monitoring household responses for famine EWS is based on
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two important assumptions. First, it is assumed that households adopt responses 
sequentially and that this sequence follows a predictable pattern (Watt 1988; 
Corbett 1988; Campbell 1990). Although community differences in adopting 
responses are reported, it is still argued that the response strategies are selected 
in an identifiable sequence and that there are similarities across communities 
which can be generalised. This assumes that household responses follow 
repeatable and predictable patterns which can indicate the stage of declining 
entitlements to food. Secondly, it is also assumed that responses are not 
adopted simultaneously (Campbell 1990a) and that each response is exhausted 
before the next one is taken up.
However, these assumptions are untenable for a number of reasons. First, as 
argued in Chapter 7, the proposition that there is a predictable pattern of 
responses is not supported by the empirical evidence presented in the preceding 
chapters. The analysis showed that there is no "typical" pattern that can be used 
as a basis for monitoring declining food entitlements faced by households. It 
was argued that the sequence of responses adopted by households is 
conditioned by a range of factors some of which are outside the control of 
household decision-making. Second, although some of the responses are 
exhaustible in the sense that they are adopted and used before households take 
up subsequent responses, many others are continuous processes, such as food 
rationing (Devereux 1993), while other responses are taken up simultaneously.
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For example, the sale of small stock, distress migration and the sale o f oxen 
may all take place at the same time rather than being adopted as a series of 
discrete events. Thus, the assumption, that responses are not adopted 
simultaneously, does not hold true in many cases.
Third, responses take place in a changing dynamic environment which makes 
it difficult to establish a set of responses that can be used as a basis for 
monitoring changes. Because of changes in key factors that determine the 
adoption of responses both their type and sequence change continuously. For 
instance, every significant change in absolute and relative prices of main assets 
forces households to re-examine their responses and adjust accordingly. This 
is particularly important in war related food crises which are often characterised 
by great instability and market failures.
Finally, there is the problem associated with differentiating between short term 
responses to declining entitlements to food, i.e. coping responses, and more 
permanent responses, namely adapting responses. Davies (1993) points out a 
conceptual problem in drawing the line between "coping" and "adapting" 
responses. "Coping" is the short-term response to threats to food entitlements, 
whereas an "adapting" response is related to permanent changes motivated by 
the need to alter the way in which food entitlements are acquired. Because of 
changes in the environment in which rural households live some of the
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responses are permanent in nature, involving the restructuring of resources. 
Adaptive responses may be brought about by new threats and opportunities or 
increased dependence on market exchange. An example of an adaptive response 
is the sedentarisation of pastoral households. Using household responses as 
indicators in famine EWS requires an understanding of and differentiating 
between short term coping responses and adaptive responses (Davies 1993).
These problems show that using household responses in EWS, which initially 
appears simple, is rather complex. Consequently, any EWS based on 
information derived from household response sequences could produce 
misleading information on the actual situations of households. For example, the 
sale of small stock, according to Campbell (1990a), would produce the simple 
message that "there is no problem". Yet this could mean different things 
depending on a range of factors. It could mean that households have exhausted 
all other responses and are selling their only remaining assets. Or it could mean 
that it is the beginning of their response strategy. Although in practice other 
indicators can be used in conjunction with this information, nonetheless the 
message derived from this response would be incorrect if  it were used in this 
way.
The responses of rural households in Somaliland in 1988 illustrate the 
confusion that can be caused by such interpretations of household response
208
sequences. Faced with the threat of entitlement failure after the outbreak of 
war, households engaged in a series of responses starting with out-migration 
and the disposal of one of their most important productive assets - oxen. This 
was followed by the disposal of camel and cows. Comparing these responses 
with the standard response sequence would have suggested that households 
were in a late stage of the famine process in 1988. However, this was not the 
case, as argued in the preceding chapter. The nutrition survey conducted in the 
refugee camp, where these households were registered, confirms this point. It 
shows that in 1988 the situation of households was far better than in the 
following years. In 1988, 10% of children were found to be malnourished, 
whereas in 1989, up to 26% were reported to have been severely malnourished. 
Both 1989 and 1990 were, in fact, the most critical period when famine 
conditions existed in and around the refugee camps.
8.2.2 Understanding Household Responses
Although monitoring household response sequences alone cannot provide useful 
information for famine EWS, a greater understanding of why households 
respond in the way they do can help in interpreting their responses. This means 
understanding household resource structures and the effects o f changes in 
market exchange and outputs on interrelationships between assets. What types 
of resources are owned by households and what their relative importance is in
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terms of production and income generation are important in understanding 
responses. So are the interrelationships between resources and the impact of 
changes in market prices and outputs. When market prices change and outputs 
fall in food crisis situations the interrelationships between assets owned by 
households also change. This results from the fact that individual assets are not 
kept separately but maintained as a mix of enterprises/resources in which 
changes in one affect the rest. Furthermore, some assets are used as inputs in 
the production of others required for income generation. Many others still share 
the same scarce resources. Thus, changes in the prices and outputs an asset 
affects the remaining resources owned by the household. This in turn affects the 
likely responses of the household to these changes.
Thus, the first step in understanding household responses is examining how 
changes in market exchange and production affect their resource organisation. 
The reasons why households sell some of their assets earlier than others cannot 
be entirely explained by changes in market conditions. Part of the explanation 
has to be sought by examining the effect of changes in market exchange on the 
overall household resource structure. This means examining not only the effect 
of one asset in isolation, but the total impact on all assets owned by the 
household. To illustrate these points, the linear programming model developed 
in the preceding chapter is used to project the effects of changes in prices and 
outputs on the organisation of resources. Key variables are changed one at a
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time and their effects on the total revenue assessed.
Table 8.1 shows the effects of different price and output scenarios on the 
overall total revenue of the representative household. The table summarises the 
effects of animal and food price changes on the total net revenue. It shows, for 
instance, that a 25%31 fall in the price of small stock and of cows results in 
11.6% and 11.4% falls in respective the total net revenues. But a 25% increase 
in the price of food purchased results in only a 1.2% fall in the total revenue. 
What this shows is that household revenues are less sensitive to food price 
changes than to changes in the prices of marketable animals. One reason for 
this is that unlike the change in prices of, for instance, water and animal feed, 
food prices do not affect the organisation and interrelationships of household 
resources. The implication for household response monitoring is that important 
food consumption adjustments may not take place in the event o f increased 
food prices. The proposition that households reduce the number o f meals and 
the amount of food they consume, which is often described as inevitable, is 
based on the assumption that households make significant savings by cutting 
down on their consumption. Yet this analysis shows that changes in food prices 
do not have much impact on total net revenue, therefore households may not 
save much by cutting down on their food consumption.
31 A level of 25% change is used as a basis because at that level changes in individual 
resources affect the organisation of other resources.
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Table 8.1 The Effects of Different Price and Output Scenarios on Household 
Total Net Revenue
Scenario %  o f Change
1 25% fall of sheep/goat price -11.6
2 25% fall of calf price -11.4
3 25% increase in food grain price -1.2
4 25% fall of crop output -2.1
5 Total Crop failure -8.3
6 Loss of 25% of small stock -12.9
7 Total loss of all small stock -51.5
8 25% loss of cows -13.5
9 Total loss of all cows -53.9
10 25% Loss of animals -26.3
Source: Survey data, 1992
Similarly, a 25% fall in crop yields reduces the total revenue by only 2.1%, but 
the same level of fall in the number of small stock and cattle reduces the total
212
net revenue by 12.9% and 13.5%, respectively. Indeed, even a total crop 
failure32 reduces the total net revenue by only 8.3%. This suggests that 
changes which do not affect animal production, either directly or indirectly, 
have little impact on total net revenue. However, any change which affects one 
or more of the productive assets causes a significant impact on revenue and 
overall resource structure.
8.3 Implications for Famine Relief
A greater understanding of household responses also has implications for 
famine responses. Understanding responses and the underlying factors helps in 
identifying the type of interventions required in mitigating the effects o f famine 
on households’ livelihood.
In the same way, better understanding of household responses could also help 
in the timing of relief intervention. Significant delays in responding to 
impending famines occur mainly because of a lack of sufficient understanding 
at the conceptual level of the threshold levels beyond which households are 
forced to take up drastic steps that jeopardize their future livelihood. Moreover, 
there is also a misunderstanding of what constitutes "abnormal" levels in
32 When a total crop failure occurs farmers still obtain straw yield which is used to feed 
animals. Thus, it is assumed the farmer would get straw but no grain yield
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interpreting indicators used in famine EWS.
8.3.1 Type of Interventions
Understanding how households re-allocate their resources and how they respond 
to threats to their livelihood can also shed light on the type of intervention that 
are most likely to succeed in preserving their way of life. This has the 
advantage of understanding the most critical constraints facing households and 
then suggesting the possible effects of intervention. If households are disposing 
of their animals it may be due to a number of factors such as increasing food 
prices, falling animal prices, a shortage of water or pasture, increased 
subsistence requirements or a combination of these. Which factors are the most 
critical can only be determined by fully understanding the structure of 
household resources and how they are re-allocated in crisis situations.
This is illustrated by the model described in the preceding section which can 
suggests the likely effects on household revenues of different interventions or 
combination of interventions. For instance, it shows that the loss or disposal of 
animals will have substantial effect on household revenues. If this is caused by 
a shortage of water or pasture, which can be shown by the by-product data of 
the model, interventions other than fodder or water aid will not address the 
underlying cause of the problem. The model also shows that relief food, which
214
has become the standard intervention in famine situations, can only be suitable 
in situations where food prices rise exceptionally. But even then its overall 
effect is unlikely to have any significant impact on households’ income, since 
such households do not spend a large proportion of their income on food.
Instead, relief food may have negative effects on household resources. This 
results from the fact that households have to commit a significant proportion 
of their labour to activities relating to the relief programme. At least one 
member of the family, often the household head, is required to be physically 
present in the relief camps for most of the time to register and queue for food 
distribution. Since this occurs during times of peak labour requirement in the 
crisis situation, households are forced to make decisions on the allocation of 
labour at a critical period. This is important because time spent on seeking 
relief has to be withdrawn from household activities. However, in order to 
make an informed choice on the re-allocation of labour and assess the likely 
benefits and costs associated with the decision, households require detailed 
information about the relief programme. They need to know, among other 
things, the duration of the programme, the amount of food they will receive and 
the time it will take them to register and queue for daily or weekly rations. 
Since this information is unavailable, not only to the expected recipients o f the 
relief but also to the relief agencies themselves which do not have definitive 
plans, households make decisions based on imperfect knowledge with
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incomplete or sometimes inaccurate information. Interventions o f this nature, 
therefore, only add to the uncertainties faced by households in such situations.
Rather than preventing the depletion of assets such intervention may encourage 
the disposal of assets. In the absence of accurate information on the relief 
operation, households tend to perceive it as a long-term programme, influencing 
them to favour joining it at the expense of preserving their assets. If  the 
household sends one or two members of the family to a relief camp, their 
labour has to be withdrawn either from the farm or from tending the animals. 
As a result, the household may even be forced to sell some of their animals. 
Thus, instead of helping households to preserve their assets, food intervention 
may have the negative impact of forcing them to dispose of their animals, 
thereby causing destitution rather than preventing it.
This partly explains why many households become dependent on relief aid. 
This dependence does not occur because of the fact that the food distributed is 
free, but more importantly because households make significant adjustments to 
their existing way of life to accommodate the requirements o f the new way of 
life as recipients of relief. In this adjustment process farmers and herders 
become "famine victims". In fact many households who could have coped with 
the crisis without any intervention are made destitute and dependent on food 
hand-outs, as a result of the failure of this type of intervention.
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In rural Somaliland, the establishment of relief camps in Haud in 1988 created 
dependence of some households on relief food. Unlike urban families, these 
rural households had migrated with their animals and some of their other assets. 
It appears that most o f the families would have coped with the crisis without 
joining the relief camps. However, the distribution of free food influenced them 
to join, although this involved significant adjustments and re-organisation of 
resources. As a result some households were forced either to sell their animals 
or to ask relatives to look after them. Up to 10% of the destitute households 
interviewed said that they had disposed of the few animals they had because 
they were not able to look after them while at the same time staying in refugee 
camps.
8.3.2 The Timing of Relief Intervention
The timing of relief interventions could also be improved by a greater 
understanding of the effects on household resources of changes to key 
variables. Examining the responses to possible changes in market exchange and 
outputs helps to identify the threshold levels beyond which households are 
forced to take actions that seriously jeopardize their future livelihoods. Such 
threshold levels can be identified by projecting the effects of different scenarios 
on household resources as shown in Table 8.1. For instance, although some 
changes such as increases in food prices or a significant fall in crop output
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reduce the total net revenue by less than 5%, the same level o f fall in animal 
prices reduces the total revenue by as much as one-fourth. It follows then that 
if more than a 10% fall in total net revenue is considered to be critical, then a 
25% fall in animal prices could be used as a threshold level to trigger action. 
A similar example is the price of water which if it reaches a certain level 
makes it unviable for households to keep animals. In this case an increase in 
the price of water by more than 5 times (which can occur in some drought 
situations) forces the household to dispose of all its animals.
If these critical threshold levels of key variables are identified in advance then 
intervention could be made more timely in such a way that they can be 
triggered when a variable reaches that particular level. This also helps in 
understanding and predicting the stage at which households are no longer able 
to cope without outside intervention. It is through these means that the failure 
of household coping strategies in crisis situations can be better anticipated and 
responded to more effectively.
These threshold levels can also provide more specific information than the 
arbitrary levels of indicators currently used in explaining the presence of 
famine. Ambiguity often arises because of the use of terms such as "abnormal" 
and "exceptionally high" used in describing levels of indicators. Without a 
bench mark to compare these estimates, their description as "normal" or
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"abnormal" is highly subjective and dependent on the value judgement o f the 
researcher. For example, while in some famine EW assessments an increase in 
food prices of about 100% is considered as "abnormal", in others it is 
considered as "normal". Thus, what constitutes an unacceptable level o f an 
indicator varies from one assessment to another.
Identifying threshold levels is also in line with the recent emphasis on 
contingency planning and preparedness in famine prone areas. Failure of timely 
response to impending famines in many African countries has been attributed 
to a lack of pre-planned response systems. However, drawing up a pre-planned 
measure of responses that can be automatically implemented in times of crises 
requires a prior identification of levels of EW indicators that can be used to 
activate the response system. It is only when these threshold levels o f key 
variables are identified in advance that a pre-arranged intervention can be 
triggered automatically. The advantage of this is that there is no need for major 
new decisions to be made by the authorities concerned in triggering a response, 
thus proving that the "natural bureaucratic inertia operates in favour of pre­
planned actions (Swift and Gray 1989: 52)".
8.4 Conclusions
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This chapter has explored how greater understanding of household responses 
can also help in EWS and famine intervention. While the concept o f using 
household response sequences in EWS is rejected for misdiagnosing crisis 
situations, it is argued that understanding interrelationships between household 
resources and the likely effects of changes in market conditions on its resource 
allocation can provide vital information which can help in interpreting 
responses with greater accuracy. When relative market prices change and 
outputs fall in crisis situations the interrelationships between household assets 
change. This results from the fact that they are not kept separately but as a mix 
of resource in which changes in one affect the rest. The projections based on 
the linear programming model show how different changes affect the allocation 
of resource and overall household total net revenue.
A greater understanding of the underlying factors affecting household responses 
could also help in identifying the type of interventions that are most likely to 
succeed in mitigating the effects of famine on household livelihoods. Moreover, 
it can help in the timing of relief interventions. Significant delays in responding 
to impending food crises occur mainly because of a lack of sufficient 
understanding of what constitutes an "abnormal" levels of indicators. Prior 
identification of threshold levels beyond which households are forced to take 
drastic actions that seriously jeopardize the future viability of their resources 
can be used as a basis for setting up a pre-planned interventions that can be
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automatically triggered if and when these levels are reached.
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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined the responses adopted by households in rural 
Somaliland to changes in their resource endowments and market exchange 
during the 1988-92 food crisis. This chapter summarises the main findings of 
the thesis and the implications for policy and future research.
9.2 Summary of the Main Findings
Despite the recurrence of famine in Africa there is still a lack of proper 
understanding as to how rural households respond to food insecurity and famine 
situations. A growing literature on household coping strategies has not helped 
either in understanding how rural households respond to food crisis, what 
determines their responses and how they manage their resources in crisis 
situations. Many of these studies are based on simplistic generalisations and 
poorly conceptualized models which attempt to define a particular sequence of 
responses.
The research questions put forward in this thesis are (1) Is there a predictable 
pattern of responses followed by rural households when faced with declining
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entitlements to food? (2) What determines the sequence of household 
responses? (3) How do rural households manage their resources during crises?
(4) What are the implications for famine early warning system and famine 
relief?
This thesis is based on the premise that a greater understanding of household 
responses requires closer examinations of market conditions and household 
resource endowments. In this context the following hypotheses are advanced: 
(1) there is a predictable sequence of responses adopted by rural households 
faced with food insecurity and famine conditions; (2) a better understanding of 
market conditions and household resource management is required to 
understand the underlying factors of household responses. These hypotheses are 
tested using empirical data obtained from the Gabiley district in rural 
Somaliland in two surveys conducted before and after the crisis. This area was 
selected because of the availability of survey data collected just before the 
outbreak of the 1988 war and because of the researcher’s extensive experience 
in the area which made it possible to obtain good quality data. The information 
obtained provided an in-depth understanding of the rural households.
The analysis presented in the thesis rejected the hypothesis that there is a 
predictable sequence of responses adopted by rural households in food crisis 
situations. It is argued that the "reversibility" and the "domestic resource
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commitments" criteria claimed to determine the sequence of responses fail to 
take into account important factors such as market conditions which influence 
the order in which responses are taken up and are, therefore, insufficient in 
explaining household responses. Perhaps the most important factor in 
determining the order in which the animals were disposed of in rural 
Somaliland was the relative prices of animals. Significant shifts in the relative 
prices of animals during the five year period was mainly responsible for the 
order in which the animals were disposed of. Other important factors such as 
household resource organisation and management which determine the sequence 
of responses in crisis situations are also examined.
The long-term adaptive and coping strategies developed by the rural households 
have also been examined by reviewing the droughts and famines in Somaliland 
from the late 19th century to 1987. The strategies adopted include diversified 
herd composition, split-herding, migratory movements, increased market 
exchange, a range of redistributive systems, and sending family members to 
urban towns to send back remittances. Some of the adaptive strategies adopted 
by the pastoralists included sedentarisation. These strategies have largely been 
successful in mitigating the effects of droughts and famines and preventing 
widespread starvation in most crises. Free trade and integration into the world 
markets permitted pastoralists to adopt more effective responses in terms of 
providing a relatively stable market and employment opportunities not only
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inside the country but also in neighbouring countries.
The thesis also argues that government policies and interventions, most notably 
the banning of Qat cultivation and the adoption of pricing policy which 
penalized rural producers, have contributed to the vulnerability o f the rural 
households. The failure of the development programme aimed at offsetting 
these effects also further undermined the ability of households to cope with 
food crises. Thus, the 1988 war and the subsequent crisis occurred at a critical 
time when rural households were more vulnerable than ever before. 
Consequently, the war had a devastating impact with far reaching economic and 
social consequences on the households.
While the concept of using response sequences as indicators in EWS is 
rejected, it is argued that a greater understanding of market prices and 
household resource management can provide useful information for famine 
early warning and famine response. It is argued that if the underlying factors 
of responses are fully understood they can help in identifying the type of 
interventions most likely to succeed in mitigating the effects o f famine on 
households’ livelihoods. In the same way, they could also help in the timing of 
relief interventions. Significant delays occur because of a lack of sufficient 
understanding of threshold levels beyond which households are forced to take 
drastic actions that seriously jeopardize the future of their livelihoods. It is
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suggested that the delays can be prevented by prior identification o f these 
threshold levels.
9.3 Implications for Policy
Several policy implication can be drawn from this thesis. First, the results of 
the thesis caution against the use of household response sequences in EWS. The 
concept is not as simple as it appears initially. A greater understanding of a 
range of factors including market conditions, household resource structure and 
allocation, and the underlying factors of the responses is required in order to 
incorporate household responses into EWS. These factors which determine the 
order in which the responses are adopted show that it is impossible to 
generalise from responses observed in one area at a particular time.
Second, the increased recurrence of droughts and famines calls for better 
preparedness for future crises. What is needed is a pre-planned measure of 
responses that can be triggered automatically in times of crises. This entails a 
public commitment to respond to impending crisis and undertake appropriate 
interventions. Perhaps lessons could be learnt from the famine preparedness and 
intervention programmes of the colonial administration. Moreover, a greater 
attention needs to be paid to the appropriateness and timing of interventions 
aimed at containing entitlement failures.
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Third, this study also suggests improving the exchange of information between 
donors and the potential or the actual recipients of relief aid. When households 
are faced with declining entitlements, they have to plan and make decisions on 
how to respond to the crisis and protect their livelihoods. In this decision­
making they need, among other things, information on the type, timing and 
duration of the relief programme so as to make informed decisions concerning 
the responses to the crisis. Lack of this vital information means that households 
make decisions based on imperfect knowledge with incomplete or sometimes 
inaccurate information. Thus, interventions of this nature, only add to the 
uncertainties faced by households in such situations.
Finally, there is a need for a closer link between relief and development aid. 
This means re-designing both emergency relief and development aid. Relief aid 
should not only be confined to containing the crisis, but should also be 
concerned with making sure that victims are better able to handle future crisis. 
In this way not only the immediate survival of the communities will be 
addressed, but also the medium and long-term development needs beyond the 
crisis. In the same way, development programmes should also be designed to 
make them more flexible in addressing both the long-term development 
requirements and the short-term needs of the communities concerned. In view 
of this, relief and development should not be seen as alternative approaches, but 
closely related interventions aimed at both the short and medium to long-term
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needs. I believe that the alleged dilemma between relief and development is an 
exaggerated one based on the misconception that there is a dividing line 
between the two. What is needed in the light of the recurrent and increasing 
number of emergencies is the development of positive links between relief and 
development aid.
9.4 Implications for Future Research
Further research into the performance of markets in conflict and crisis situations 
and how they affect the responses and coping strategies of households is 
required. Although markets become more central to the survival o f rural 
households during food crisis, very little in known about how their performance 
influences household decision-making in crisis situations or how they respond 
to relief interventions given the lack of central authority to regulate their 
functioning.
This thesis has highlighted the importance of social networks and collective 
insurance systems and their role in mitigating the effects of famines. However, 
these systems have been weakened by prolonged conflicts and increased 
recurrence of droughts and famines. Further investigations are needed into the 
long-term viability of these systems and how they can be supported.
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Respondent’s N am e.................
Respondent’s Main Occupation
2. HOUSEHOLD DETAILS
Age of the respondent [______] years
Are you the head of the family?_____________________________ [_____ ] yes/no
If no, what is your relationship within the household?_________________ [_____ ]
Do you have more than one family?__________________________[_____ ] yes/no
If yes, how many families in total__________________________________[_____ ]
What is the size of the family?____________________________________ [_____ ]
No of males over 15 yrs [_____ ]
No of females over 15 yrs [_____ ]
No of children under 15 yrs [_____]
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3. LIVESTOCK AND ASSET OWNERSHIP
3 .1  1992
Type o f  L ivestock No. No. Born No. Died No Sold No Bought P r ic e /  Total Value
Head (sh)
3 .2  1991
Type o f  L ivestock No. No. Born No. Died No Sold No Bought P r ic e /  Total Value
Head (sh)
3 .3  1990










Type o f  L ivestock No. No. Born No. Died No Sold No Bought P ric e / Total Value
Head (sh)
3.5 1988








Do you own any landholding [ ] yes/no
If yes, No of Qoodis [_____]











5. SALE OF ASSETS
Type of Asset No Price Buyer Date/Month Market
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6. FOOD CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURES
Food Item Unit Nunber Expenditure Period
7. OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME
No. of family members employed [________] Total Income [_______]
Type of the Crop Area (Oodis') Expected Output Source of the Seed






Do you sell any produce? [______ J yes/no
If yes, how much/many of the following do you sell per week/month?
Produce Unit Otv Price/unit Total Amount Remarks
Milk ____  _____  __________  ____________  _______________
Ghee ____  _____  __________  ____________  _______________
Hides ____  _____  __________  ____________  _______________
Skins
8. REMITTANCE, AID AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
Is any member of your family living or working abroad? [ ] yes/no
If yes, what is the relationship? [________________________]
Where does s/he live? [________________________]
How much money did s/he send you for the last 12 months? [________]
Do you receive food from the refugee camps [ ] yes/no
If yes, how many members of your family are registered? [_____]
9. BLOOD MONEY, COMPENSATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, ZAKAAT AND 
OTHER PAYMENTS
Type of Payment Amounts Paid Amounts Due Remarks
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10. KAT CULTIVATION
How many Kat fields do you own?




Appendix 5.1 Official and Parallel Market Exchange Rates, 1973-1987 (So Sh per
S) '
Period Official Rate Parallel Market Rate
1973-77 6.3 6.3-7.0
1978 - 30/6/81 6.3 7-16
1/7/81 - 30/6/82 6.3-12.59 16-24
1/7/82 - 22/10/83 15.23 24-50
23/10/83 - 14/9/84 17.35 50-95
15/9/84 - 31/12/84 26.00 95-105
1/1/85 - mid 85 36.00 105-120
July 1985 88.00 120
May 1987 135.00 155
Source: Jamal (1988)

